Book contents
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Part I The Theoretical Foundations
- Part II Balance Sheet Operations in Different Times and CBI
- Part III The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy
- References
- Index
- References
References
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 April 2024
Book contents
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Part I The Theoretical Foundations
- Part II Balance Sheet Operations in Different Times and CBI
- Part III The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy
- References
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence , pp. 220 - 242Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024
References
Abbassi, P., & Linzert, T. (2012). The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy in Steering Money Market Rates during the Financial Crisis. Journal of Macroeconomics, 34 (4), 945–954.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acharya, V. V., Imbierowicz, B., Steffen, S., & Teichmann, D. (2015). Does Lack of Financial Stability Impair the Transmission of Monetary Policy? HIT-REFINED Working Paper Series.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Adrian, T., & Shin, H. S. (2010). Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics, Ch. 12. In Friedman, B. M. & Woodford, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Monetary Economics (vol. 3, pp. 601–650). Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Agénor, P. R. (2000). The Economics of Adjustment and Growth. New York: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Ahearne, A., Gagnon, J., Haltmaier, J., Kamin, S., Erceg, C., Faust, J., Guerrieri, L., Hemphill, C., Kole, L., Roush, J., Rogers, J., Sheets, N., & Wright, J. (2002). Preventing Deflation: Lessons from Japan’s Experience in the 1990s. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers (729).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (1988). Credibility and Politics. European Economic Review, 32 (2–3), 542–550.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Altavilla, C., Carboni, G., & Motto, R. (2015). Asset Purchase Programmes and Financial Markets: Lessons from the Euro Area. ECB Working Paper Series (1864).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andrade, P., Cahn, C., Fraisse, H., & Mesonnier, J. S. (2015). Can the Provision of Long-Term Liquidity Help to Avoid a Credit Crunch? Evidence from the Eurosystem’s LTRO. Banque de France Working Paper.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Angelini, P., Nobili, A., & Picillo, C. (2011). The Interbank Market after August 2007: What Has Changed, and Why? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43 (5), 923–958.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arnone, M., Bernard, L., & Segalotto, J.-F. (2006a). The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy: Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence. IMF Working Papers, 06 (227), 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arnone, M., Bernard, L., & Segalotto, J.-F. (2006b). Measures of Central Bank Autonomy: Empirical Evidence for OECD, Developing, and Emerging Market Economies. IMF Working Papers, 06 (228), 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arnone, M., & Romelli, D. (2013). Dynamic Central Bank Independence Indices and Inflation Rate: A New Empirical Exploration. Journal of Financial Stability, 9 (3), 385–398.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Backus, D., & Driffill, J. (1985). Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime. The Review of Economic Studies, 52 (2), 211–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bagehot, W. (1873). Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.Google Scholar
Bailey, M. J. (1956). The Welfare Cost of Inflationary Finance. Journal of Political Economy, 64 (2), 93–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baldwin, R. E. (2019). The Globotics Upheaval: Globalisation, Robotics and the Future of Work. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Baldwin, R. E., & Robert-Nicoud, F. (2007). Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers. Journal of the European Economic Association, 5 (5), 1064–1093.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ball, C. (2023). The How, Why and What Next of the Silicon Valley Bank Failure. Global Economics Blog. https://globalecon.substack.com/p/the-how-why-and-what-next-of-the?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=emailGoogle Scholar
Banerjee, R., & Hofmann, B. (2018). The Rise of Zombie Firms: Causes and Consequences. BIS Quarterly Review (September), 67–78.Google Scholar
Bank for International Settlement. (2009). Issues in the Governance of Central Banks., cited as BIS.Google Scholar
Barro, R. J. (1995). Inflation and Economic Growth. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 35, 166–176.Google Scholar
Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983a). A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model. Journal of Political Economy, 91 (4), 589–610.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983b). Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 12 (1), 101–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bauer, M. D., & Rudebusch, G. D. (2014). The Signaling Channel for Federal Reserve Bond Purchases. International Journal of Central Banking, 10 (3), 233–289.Google Scholar
Baumeister, C., & Benati, L. (2013). Unconventional Monetary Policy and the Great Recession: Estimating the Macroeconomic Effects of a Spread Compression at the Zero Lower Bound. International Journal of Central Banking, 9 (2), 165–212.Google Scholar
Bean, C., Paustian, M., Penalver, A., & Taylor, T. (2010). Monetary Policy after the Fall. Proceedings – Economic Policy Symposium – Jackson Hole, 267–328. http://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedkpr/y2010p267-328.htmlGoogle Scholar
Bech, M., & Malkhozov, A. (2016). How have Central Banks Implemented Negative Policy Rates? BIS Quarterly Review March, 31–44.Google Scholar
Belke, A., Freytag, A., Keil, J., & Schneider, F. (2014). The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s International Review of Economics and Finance, 217–227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Belke, A., & Polleit, T. (2010). How Much Fiscal Banking Must the ECB Have? The Euro Area Is Not (yet) the Philippines. International Economics, 124, 5–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benati, L. (2009). Long Run Evidence on Money Growth and Inflation. Working Paper Series 1027, European Central Bank.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berger, H., de Haan, J., & Eijffinger, S. C. W. (2001). Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15 (1), 3–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berman, S., & McNamara, K. R. (1999). Bank on Democracy: Why Central Banks Need Public Oversight. Foreign Affairs, 78 (2), 2–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernanke, B. S. (2004). The Great Moderation. The Federal Reserve Board, Remarks at the Eastern Economic Association, Washington D.C., February 20, 2004.Google Scholar
Bernanke, B. S. (2005). The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit. St Louis, Homer Jones Lecture, St. Louis, Missouri, USA, 14 April, 2005.Google Scholar
Bernanke, B. S. (2008). Housing, Mortgage Markets, and Foreclosures. Speech 437, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).Google Scholar
Bernanke, B. S. (2009). Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk. Speech 448, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).Google Scholar
Bernanke, B. S. (2010). Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability. Speech at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies International Conference, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, 25 May 2010.Google Scholar
Bernanke, B., Laubach, T., Mishkin, F. S., & Posen, A. S. (1999). Inflation Targeting. Lessons from the International Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Bernholz, P. (1995). Necessary and Sufficient Conditions to End Hyperinflations. In Siklos, P. L. (Ed.), Great Inflations of the 20th Century (pp. 257–287). Cheltenham: Edward Elagar.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernoth, K., Köning, P., & Raab, C. (2015). Large-Scale Asset Purchases by Central Banks II: Empirical Evidence. Politik im Fokus, 61, 1–8.Google Scholar
Best, J. (2017). Bring Politics Back to Monetary Policy – How Technocratic Exceptionalism Fuels Populism. Foreign Affairs, December 2017, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2017-12-06/bring-politics-backmonetary-policy.(6).Google Scholar
Bianchi, F., Lettau, M., & Ludvigson, S. C. (2022). Monetary Policy and Asset Valuation. The Journal of Finance, 77 (2), 967–1017.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bini Smaghi, L. (1998). The Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank. BNL Quarterly Review, 51 (205), 119–143.Google Scholar
Blinder, A. S. (1996). Central Banking in a Democracy. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, 82 (4), 1–14.Google Scholar
Blinder, A. S. (2000a). Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Ware? How Do We Build It? American Economic Review, 90 (5), 1421–1431.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blinder, A. S. (2000b). The Internet and the New Economy. Brookings Institute Policy Brief. No 60. June 2000. Washington, DC.Google Scholar
Blot, C., Creel, J., Hubert, P., & Labondance, F. (2015). The QE Experience: Worth a Try? OFCE Briefing Paper (10), 1–21.Google Scholar
Bodea, C., & Hicks, R. (2015). Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions. International Organization, 69 (1), 35–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bofinger, P., Hellwig, M. F., Hüther, M., Schnitzer, M., Schularick, M., & Wolff, G. (2020). Gefahr für die Unabhängigkeit der Notenbank. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) (29 May 2020), 18.Google Scholar
Böhm-Bawerk, E. (1914). Unsere Passive Handelsbilanz. In Weiss, F. X. (Ed.), Gesammelte schriften von Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk. Salzwasser-Verlag.Google Scholar
Bordo, M. D. (2010). The Federal Reserve: Independence Gained, Independence Lost … Shadow Open Market Committee, March 26, 2010.Google Scholar
Bordo, M. D., & Schwartz, A. J. (1999). Monetary Policy Regimes and Economic Performance: The Historical Record. In Taylor, J. B. & Woodford, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1 (pp. 149–234). Amsterdam: Elsevier.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Borio, C., & Disyatat, P. (2010). Unconventional Monetary Policies: An Appraisal. Manchester School, 78 (SUPPL. 1), 53–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bork, L. (2015). A Large-Dimensional Factor Analysis of the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2618378 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2618378CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brash, D. T. (1996, July 1996). Reducing Inflation in New Zealand: Some Practical Issues. Annual Symposium of the Kansas City Fed, Jackson Hole, Wyoming.Google Scholar
Breedon, F., Chadha, J. S., & Waters, A. (2012). The Financial Market Impact of UK Quantitative Easing. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 28 (4), 702–728.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brennan, G. H., & Buchanan, J. M. (1981). Monopoly in Money and Inflation: The Case for a Constitution to Discipline Government. London: Institute for Economic Affairs. Hobart Paper (Vol. 88).Google Scholar
Briault, C. B., Haldane, A., & King, M. A. (1996). Independence and accountability. Bank of England working papers, Bank of England.Google Scholar
Broaddus, J. A. J. (1995). Reflections on Monetary Policy. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, 81 (2), 1–11.Google Scholar
Brunetti, C., Di Filippo, M., & Harris, J. H. (2011). Effects of Central Bank Intervention on the Interbank Market during the Subprime Crisis. Review of Financial Studies, 24 (6), 2053–2083.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buiter, W. H. (1999). Alice in Euroland. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (2), 181–209.Google Scholar
Buiter, W. H. (2009). What’s Left of Central Bank Independence? Financial Times. http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/05/whats-left-ofcentralbankindependence/#axzz3RhiPobiYGoogle Scholar
Burns, A. F. (1979). The Anguish of Central Banking (The 1979 Per Jacobsson Lecture). In Cirovic, M. & Polak, J. J.. Belgrade: The Per Jacobsson Foundation.Google Scholar
Butt, N., Domit, S., McLeay, M., & Thomas, R. (2012). What Can the Money Data Tell us about the Impact of QE? Bank of England (1), 321–331.Google Scholar
Caballero, R. J., Hoshi, T., & Kashyap, A. K. (2008). Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan. American Economic Review, 98 (5), 1943–1977.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cagan, P. (1956). The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation. In Friedman, M. (Ed.), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (pp. 25–117). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Capie, F., Fischer, S., Goodhart, C., & Schnadt, N. (1994). The Future of Central Banking: The Tercentenary Symposium of the Bank of England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Capie, F., & Wood, G. (2013). Central Bank Independence: Can It Survive a Crisis? In Humpage, Owen F. (Ed.), Current Federal Reserve Policy Under the Lens of Economic History (pp. 126–150). Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Carpinelli, L., & Crosignani, M. (2015). The Effect of Central Bank Liquidity Injections on Bank Credit Supply. Working Paper.Google Scholar
Catalão-Lopes, M. (2010). Fixed- and Variable-Rate Tenders in the Management of Liquidity by the Eurosystem: Implications of the Recent Credit Crisis. International Journal of Central Banking, 6 (2), 199–230.Google Scholar
Cecchetti, S. G. (1998). Policy Rules and Targets: Framing the Central Banker’s Problem. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 18 (37), 1–14.Google Scholar
Cecchetti, S. G., & Wynne, M. A. (2003). Inflation Measurement and the ECB’s Pursuit of Price Stability: A first Assessment. Economic Policy (October), 395–434.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chappel, H. W. J., McGregor, R. R., & Vermilyea, T. (2004). Majority Rule, Consensus Building, and the Power of the Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36 (3), 407–422.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christensen, J. H. E., & Krogstrup, S. (2015). Transmission of Asset Purchases: The Role of Reserves.Google Scholar
Chung, H., Laforte, J. P., Reifschneider, D., & Williams, J. C. (2012). Have We Underestimated the Likelihood and Severity of Zero Lower Bound Events? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44 (SUPPL. 1), 47–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Churm, R., Joyce, M., Kapetanios, G., & Theodoridis, K. (2015). Unconventional Monetary Policies and the Macroeconomy: The Impact of the United Kingdom’s QE2 and Funding for Lending Scheme. Bank of England Staff Working Paper (No. 542).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clarida, R., Gali, J., & Gertler, M. (2000). Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and some Theory. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (1), 147–180.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coats, W. (2019). Modern Monetary Theory: A Critique. Cato Journal, 39, 563–576.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooper, R., & Williamson, J. (1994). The Political Economy of Policy Reform. Foreign Affairs, 73 (3), 154.Google Scholar
Ćorić, T., & Cvrlje, D. (2009). Central Bank Independence: The Case of Croatia. University of Zagreb Working Paper Series (14), 1–14.Google Scholar
Cour-Thimann, P., & Winkler, B. (2012). The ECB’s Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures: The Role of Institutional Factors and Financial Structure. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 28 (4), 765–803.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cross, M., Fisher, P., & Weeken, O. (2010). The Bank’s Balance Sheet during the Crisis. Bank of England Quarterly Report (February), 34–42.Google Scholar
Crowe, C. (2006). Goal-Independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate? IMF Working Papers, 256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crowe, C., & Meade, E. E. (2007). The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21 (4), 69–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crowe, C., & Meade, E. E. (2008). Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness. European Journal of Political Economy, 24 (4), 763–777.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cukierman, A. (1992). Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Cukierman, A. (2000). Establishing a Reputation for Dependability by Means of Inflation Targets. Economics of Governance, 1, 53–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cukierman, A., Miller, G. P., & Neyapti, B. (2002). Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies: An International Perspective. Journal of Monetary Economics, 49 (2), 237–264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cukierman, A., & Webb, S. B. (1995). Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence. The World Bank Economic Review, 9 (3), 397–423.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cukierman, A. S. (1995). Rapid Inflation: Deliberate Policy or Miscalculation? In Siklos, P. L. (Ed.), Great Inflations of the 20th Century (pp. 125–182). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Curdia, V., Ferrero, A., & Chen, H. (2012). The Macroeconomic Effects of Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programs. Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, 122 (564), 289–315, November.Google Scholar
d’Amico, S., English, W., López‐Salido, D., & Nelson, E. (2012). The Federal Reserve’s Large‐Scale Asset Purchase Programmes: Rationale and Effects. The Economic Journal, 122 (564), F415–F446.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Darracq-Paries, M., & De Santis, R. A. (2015). A Non-Standard Monetary Policy Shock: The ECB’s 3-year LTROs and the Shift in Credit Supply. Journal of International Money and Finance, 54, 1–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davis, S. J. K., & James, A. (2008). Interpreting the Great Moderation: Changes in the Volatility of Economic Activity at the Macro and Micro Levels. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22 (4), 155–180.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Gregorio, J. (1992). The Effects of Inflation on Economic Growth. European Economic Review, 36 (2–3), 417–425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Haan, J., Amtenbrink, F., & Eijffinger, S. C. W. (1998). Accountability of Central Banks: Aspects and Quantifications. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 52 (209), 169–193.Google Scholar
De Jong, E. (2002). Why Are Price Stability and Statutory Independence of Central Banks Negatively Correlated? The Role of Culture. European Journal of Political Economy, 18 (4), 675–694.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Larosière, J., & Marsh, D. (2021). Central Banks Need to Change Gear. Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum. www.omfif.org/2021/02/central-banks-need-to-change-gear/Google Scholar
De Long, J. B. (2000). The Triumph of Monetarism? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (1), 83–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Michelis, A., & Iacoviello, M. (2016). Raising an Inflation Target: The Japanese Experience with Abenomics. European Economic Review, 16, 1–33.Google Scholar
Debelle, G., & Fischer, S. (1994). How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? In Fuhrer, J. C. (Ed.), Goals, Guidelines, and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers (pp. 195–225). Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.Google Scholar
Del Negro, M., Eggertsson, G., Ferrero, A., & Kiyotaki, N. (2017). The Great Escape? A Quantitative Evaluation of the Fed’s Liquidity Facilities. The American Economic Review, 107 (3) (March 2017), 824–857 (34 pages).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Del Negro, M., & Sims, C. A. (2015). When Does a Central Bank’s Balance Sheet Require Fiscal Support? Journal of Monetary Economics, 73, 1–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dempsey, H. (2021). Superyacht Market Surges as Wealthy Seek Luxury and Seclusion. Financial Times, 29 May 2021.Google Scholar
Destefanis, S., & Rizza, M. O. (2007). Central Bank Independence and Democracy: Does Corporatism Matter? Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, 115 (4), 477–502.Google Scholar
Dicecio, R., & Gascon, C. S. (2008). New Monetary Policy Tools? Monetary Trends (May).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dincer, N. N., & Eichengreen, B. (2013). Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures. Bank of Korea Working Paper No. 2013–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dluhosch, B., Freytag, A., & Krüger, M. (1996). International Competitiveness and the Balance of Payments: Do Current Account Deficits and Surpluses Matter? Cheltenham: Edward Elgarl.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Draghi, M. (2017). Structural Reforms in the Euro Area. Introductory remarks by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, at the ECB conference ‘Structural reforms in the euro area’, Frankfurt am Main, 18 October 2017.Google Scholar
Drazen, A. (2002). Central Bank Independence, Democracy, and Dolarization. Journal of Applied Economics, 5 (1), 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Driffill, J. (2016). Unconventional Monetary Policy in the Euro Zone. Open Economies Review, 27, 387–404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Du Plessis, S. A. 2012. Assets Matter: A New and Old View of Monetary Policy. Presidential Address prepared for the Annual General Meeting of the Economic Society of South Africa. 25 September 2012. Presented at the University of Johannesburg.Google Scholar
Du Plessis, S. A., & Kotze, K. (2010). The Great Moderation of the South African Economy. Economic History of Developing Regions, 25, 105–125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dudley, W. C. (2013). Unconventional Monetary Policies and Central Bank Independence. No 119, Speech, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.Google Scholar
Dvorsky, S. (2000). Measuring Central Bank Independence in Selected Transition Countries and the Disinflation Process. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1016043CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Easterly, W., & Fischer, S. (2001). Inflation and the Poor. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33 (2), 160–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Edmonds, T., Jarrett, T., & Woodhouse, J. (2010). The Credit Crisis: A Timeline. House of Commons Standard Note, SN/BT/4991. researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN04991/SN04991.pdfGoogle Scholar
Edwards, S. (2019). Modern Monetary Theory: Cautionary Tales from Latin America. Cato Journal, 39, 529–561.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., Gürkaynak, R. S., & Swanson, E. T. (2010). Convergence and Anchoring of Yield Curves in the Euro Area. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93 (1), 350–364.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eichengreen, B. (2015). Secular Stagnation: The Long View. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 105 (5), 66–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eser, F., & Schwaab, B. (2016). Evaluating the Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures: Empirical Evidence from the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme. Journal of Financial Economics, 119 (1), 147–167.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eucken, W. (1923). Kritische Betrachtungen zum deutschen Geldproblem. Jena: Gustav Fischer.Google Scholar
European Commission. (2019). A European Green Deal – Striving to be the First Climate-Neutral Continent. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en.Google Scholar
Falagiarda, M., & Reitz, S. (2015). Announcements of ECB Unconventional Programs: Implications for the Sovereign Spreads of Stressed Euro Area Countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, 53, 276–295.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Falagiarda, M., & Saia, A. (2013). Credit, Endogenous Collateral and Risky Assets: A DSGE Model. Working Papers wp916, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita’ di Bologna.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fawley, B. W., & Neely, C. J. (2013). Four Stories of Quantitative Easing. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 95, 51–88. https://doi.org/10.20955/r.95.51-88Google Scholar
Filardo, A., & Grenville, S. (2012). Central Bank Balance Sheets and Foreign Exchange Rate Regimes: Understanding the Nexus in Asia. BIS Papers 66, 76–110. www.bis.org/events/cbbsap/filardogrenville.pdfGoogle Scholar
Fischer, S. (1995). Modern Approaches to Central Banking. Boston. NBER Working Paper No. 5064.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fischer, S. (2015). Conducting Monetary Policy with a Large Balance Sheet. Speech 837, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).Google Scholar
Fischer, S., Sahay, R., & Végh, C. A. (2002). Modern Hyper- and High Inflations. Journal of Economic Literature, 40 (3), 837–880.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forder, J. (1996). On the Assessment and Implementation of ‘Institutional’ Remedies. Oxford Economic Papers, 48, 39–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forder, J. (1998). Central bank Independence-Conceptual Clarifications and Interim Assessment. Oxford Economic Papers, 50 (3), 307–334.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forder, J. (2005). Why Is Central Bank Independence So Widely Approved? Journal of Economic Issues, 39 (4), 843–865.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Franzese, R. T. J. (1999). Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation. American Journal of Political Science, 43 (3), 681–706.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Freedman, C. (1993). Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability. A Comment. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39 (2), 85–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Freytag, A. (2001). Does Central Bank Independence Reflect Monetary Commitment Properly? – Methodical Considerations. BNL Quarterly Review, 54, 181–208.Google Scholar
Freytag, A. (2005). The Credibility of Monetary Reform – New Evidence. Public Choice, 124 (3–4), 391–409.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Freytag, A. (2020). Sprengt das Bundesverfassungsgericht die Europäische Union? Wirtschaftswoche online, www.wiwo.de/politik/europa/freytags-frage-sprengt-das-bundesverfassungsgericht-die-europaeische-union/25829884.html.Google Scholar
Freytag, A., & Renaud, S. (2007). From Short-Term to Long-Term Orientation? Political Economy of the Policy Reform Process. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 17 (4), 433–449.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Freytag, A., & Schnabl, G. (2017). Monetary Policy Crisis Management as a Threat to Economic Order. Credit and Capital Markets, 50 (2), 151–169.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Freytag, A., & Voll, S. (2010). Staatsbankrott einmal anders: Argentinien 2010. WirtschaftsWoche (11/2010 of March 13, 2010), 43.Google Scholar
Friedman, B. M. (2002). The Use and Meaning of Words in Central Banking: Inflation Targeting, Credibility, and Transparency. Boston. NBER Working Paper No. 8972.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, M. (1948). A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability. American Economic Review, 38, 245–264.Google Scholar
Friedman, M. (1962). Should There Be an Independent Monetary Authority? In Yeager, L. B. (Ed.), In Search of a Monetary Constitution (pp. 429–445). Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Friedman, M. (1970). The Counter-Revolution in Monetary Theory. Institute of Economic Affairs, London, IEA Occasional Paper, No. 33.Google Scholar
Friedman, M. (1977). Nobel Lecture: Inflation and Unemployment. Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), 451–472.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, M., & Schwartz, A. J. (1963). Money and Business Cycles. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 45 (2), 32–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fry, M., Goodhart, C., & Almeida, A. (1996). Central Banking in Developing Countries. Routledge.Google Scholar
Fujiki, H., Okina, K., & Shiratsuka, S. (2001). Monetary Policy under Zero Interest Rate: Viewpoints of Central Bank Economists. Monetary and Economic Studies, 19 (1), 89–130.Google Scholar
Fukuda, S.-I. (2015). Abenomics: Why Was It So Successful in Changing Market Expectations? Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 37, 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gaettens, R. (1955). Inflationen: das Drama der Geldentwertungen vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart. R. Pflaum.Google Scholar
Gagnon, J., Raskin, M., Remache, J., & Sack, B. (2011). The Financial Market Effects of the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases. International Journal of Central Banking, 7 (1), 3–43.Google Scholar
Gambacorta, L. (2009). Monetary Policy and the Risk-Taking Channel. BIS Quarterly Review, 2009 (December), 43–53.Google Scholar
Gambacorta, L., Hofmann, B., & Peersman, G. (2014). The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Cross-Country Analysis. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 46 (4), 615–642.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
García Posada, M., & Marchetti, M. (2015). The Bank Lending Channel of Unconventional Monetary Policy: The Impact of the VLTROs on Credit Supply in Spain.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ghosh, A., & Phillips, S. (1998). Warning: Inflation May Be Harmful to Your Growth. Staff Papers – International Monetary Fund, 45 (4), 672.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ghysels, E., Idier, J., Manganelli, S., & Vergote, O. (2014). A High Frequency Assessment of the ECB Securities Markets Programme. ECB Working Paper Series, 1642 (February).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giannone, D., Lenza, M., Pill, H., & Reichlin, L. (2011). Non-Standard Monetary Policy Measures and Monetary Developments (9781139044233). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1739051Google Scholar
Giannone, D., Lenza, M., Pill, H., & Reichlin, L. (2012). The ECB and the Interbank Market. Economic Journal, 122 (564), F467–F486.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbon, E. (1787). The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Volume I). London: Frederick Warne & Co.Google Scholar
Gischer, H., Herz, B., & Menkhoff, L. (2005). Geld, Kredit und Banken – Eine Einführung (2nd ed.). Springer.Google Scholar
Glick, R., & Leduc, S. (2012). Central Bank Announcements of Asset Purchases and the Impact on Global Financial and Commodity Markets. Journal of International Money and Finance, 31 (8), 2078–2101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goodfriend, M. (2007). Elements of Effective Central Banking: Theory, Practice, and History. http://ideas.repec.org/p/ess/wpaper/id1245.htmlGoogle Scholar
Goodfriend, M. (2014). Monetary Policy as a Carry Trade. Monetary and Economic Studies, 32, 29–44.Google Scholar
Goodhart, C. A. E. (2011). The Changing Role of Central Banks. Financial History Review, 18 (2), 135–154.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gordon, R. J. (2015). Secular Stagnation: A Supply Side View. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 105, 54–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greenspan, A. (1997). Remarks at the 15th Annual Anniversary Conference of the Center for Economic Policy Research. In Stanford University, 5 September 1997.Google Scholar
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., Malinvaud, E., & Pagano, M. (1991). Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries. Economic Policy, 6 (13), 342–392.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grimes, A. (1991). The Effects of Inflation on Growth: Some International Evidence. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 127 (4), 631–644.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Griswold, D., & Freytag, A. (2023). Balance of Trade, Balance of Power How the Trade Deficit Reflects U.S. Influence in the World, Cato Policy Analysis, April.Google Scholar
Haas, J., Neely, C. J., & Emmons, W. R. (2020). Responses of International Central Banks to the COVID-19 Crisis. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review. Fourth Quarter 2020, 102 (4) 339–384.Google Scholar
Haidar, J. I., & Hoshi, T. (2015). Implementing Structural Reforms in Abenomics: How to Reduce the Cost of Doing Business in Japan. Boston. NBER Working Paper Series.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, R. E., & Mankiw, N. G. (1994). Nominal Income Targeting. In Mankiw, N. G. (Ed.), NBER Studies in Business Cycles (pp. 71–94). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Hamilton, J. D., & Wu, J. C. (2012). The Effectiveness of Alternative Monetary Policy Tools in a Zero Lower Bound Environment. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 44 (SUPPL. 1), 3–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansen, A. H. (1941). Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.Google Scholar
Hausman, J. K., & Wieland, J. F. (2015). Overcoming the Lost Decades? Abenomics after Three Years. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 510.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hayek, F. A. (1990). Denationalisation of Money – The Argument Refined. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. Hobart Paper Special (Vol. 70).Google Scholar
Hayo, B. (1998). Inflation Culture, Central Bank Independence and Price Stability. European Journal of Political Economy, 14 (2), 241–263.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hayo, B., & Hefeker, C. (2002). Reconsidering Central Bank Independence. European Journal of Political Economy, 18 (4), 653–674.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hazlitt, H. (1964). What You Should Know About Inflation. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.Google Scholar
Hetzel, R. L. (1997). The Case for a Monetary Rule in a Constitutional Democracy. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, 83 (2), 45–65.Google Scholar
Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review, 100 (4), 1467–1487.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hielscher, K., & Markwardt, G. (2012). The Role of Political Institutions for the Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence. European Journal of Political Economy, 28 (3), 286–301.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hiroshi, U. (2015). Transmission Channels and Welfare Implications of Unconventional Monetary Easing Policy in Japan. Working Papers e102, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.Google Scholar
Hoffmann, A., & Schnabl, G. (2016). Adverse Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy. Cato Journal, 36 (3), 449–484.Google Scholar
Horn, K. (2020). In einer außergewöhnlichen Situation sind außergewöhnliche Maßnahmen erforderlich – Interview mit Isabel Schnabel. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 21 (2), 137–148.Google Scholar
Hoshi, T., & Kashyap, A. K. (2011). Why Did Japan Stop Growing? Report for the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA).Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1777). Of Money, and Other Economic Essays. Reprint. Independently published 2022.Google Scholar
Imai, K. (2016). A Panel Study of Zombie SMEs in Japan: Identification, Borrowing and Investment Behavior. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 39, 91–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
IMF. (2019). Staff Proposal to Update the Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code IMF Policy Paper (May 2019). Washington, DC: IMF.Google Scholar
IMF. (2020). Central Bank Support to Financial Markets in the Coronavirus Pandemic. Monetary and Capital markets. Special Series on COVID-19. Washington, DC: IMF.Google Scholar
Issing, O. (1999). The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or ‘Willem in Euroland’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (3), 503–519.Google Scholar
Ito, T., & Mishkin, F. S. (2006). Two Decades of Japanese Monetary Policy and the Deflation Problem. In Ito, Takatoshi & Rose, Andrew K. (Eds.), Monetary Policy with Very Low Inflation in the Pacific Rim (pp. 131–202). Chicago: University lof Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
James, M. H. (1996). International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.Google Scholar
Jevons, W. S. (1863). A Serious Fall in the Value of Gold Ascertained, and Its Social Effects Set Forth. London: E. Stanford Ltd.Google Scholar
Jevons, W. S. (1865). On the Variation of Prices and the Value for the Currency since 1782. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 28, 294–325.Google Scholar
Johnson, H. G. (1977). A Note on the Dishonest Government and the Inflation Tax. Journal of Monetary Economics, 3 (3), 375–377.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jones, E., & Matthijs, M. (2019). Rethinking Central Bank Independence. Journal of Democracy, 30, 127–141.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Joyce, M., Miles, D., Scott, A., & Vayanos, D. (2012). Quantitative Easing and Unconventional Monetary Policy: An Introduction. The Economic Journal, 122 (564), F271–F288.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Joyce, M. A. S., & Woods, R. (2011). The United Kingdom’s Quantitative Easing Policy: Design, Operation and Impact. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 51 (Quarter 3), 200–212.Google Scholar
Kapetanios, G., Mumtaz, H., Stevens, I., & Theodoridis, K. (2012). Assessing the Economy-Wide Effects of Quantitative Easing. Economic Journal, 122 (564), F316–F347.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kasper, W., & Streit, M. E. (1998). Institutional economics: Social Order and Public Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
Kiehling, H. (2004). Die Ansteckung der Realwirtschaft durch den Aktien-Crash – der Beginn einer neuen Ära? In Schuster, L. et al. (Eds.), Wege aus der Banken- und Börsenkrise (pp. 239–255). Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kirchgässner, G. (1996). Geldpolitik und Zentralbankverhalten aus der Sicht der Neuen Politischen Ökonomiè In Bofinger, P. & Ketterer, K. H. (Eds.), Neuere Entwicklungen in der Geldtheorie und Geldpolitik (pp. 21–41). Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck).Google Scholar
Klein, B. (1974). The Competitive Supply of Money. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 6 (4), 423–453.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klomp, J., & de Haan, J. (2010). Central Bank Independence and Inflation Revisited. Public Choice, 144 (3–4), 445–457.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krishnamurthy, A., Nagel, S., & Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2014). ECB Policies Involving Government Bonds Purchases: Impact and Channels. NBER Working Paper Series, 1–57. http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/vissing/efa_krishnamurthy_nagel_vissingjorgensen.pdf%5Cnpapers2://publication/uuid/8953AEE7-7111-42E2-B109-13008F56ACFAGoogle Scholar
Krishnamurthy, A., & Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2011). The Effects of Quantitative Easing on Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2011 (2), 215–287.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krueger, A. (2020). Financial Repression Revisited. Project Syndicate. www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/financial-repression-for-us-debt-after-covid19-by-anne-krueger-2020-08?utm_source=Project+Syndicate+Newsletter&utm_campaign=057940dd79-sunday_newsletter_23_08_2020&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_73bad5b7d8-057940dd79-107185814&mc_cid=057940dd79&mc_eid=1d5c86659f(August 20, 2020).Google Scholar
Krugman, P. (1998). It Baaack: Japan’s Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1998 (2), 137–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krugman, P. (2000). Thinking About the Liquidity Trap. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 14 (4), 221–237.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kumar, N., & Barua, A. (2013). The Impact of Fed Tapering in Emerging Economies: Struggling with the Ebb. Global Economic Outlook 7.Google Scholar
Kuttner, K. (2014). Monetary Policy during Japan’s Great Recession: From Self-Induced Paralysis to Rooseveltian Resolve. Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief 14-4, 2014.Google Scholar
Kwon, H. U. N., Narita, F., & Narita, M. (2015). Resource Allocation and Zombie Lending in Japan in the 1990s. Review of Economic Dynamics, 18, 709–732.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kydland, F. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1977). Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), 473–491.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kydland, F. E., & Wynne, M. A. (2002). Alternative Monetary Constitutions and the Quest for Price Stability. Economic & Financial Policy Review, 1 (1), 1–19.Google Scholar
Labonte, M. (2015). Monetary Policy and the Federal Reserve: Current Policy and Conditions. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 1, 1–20.Google Scholar
Laidler, D., & Parkin, M. (1975). Inflation: A Survey. The Economic Journal, 85 (340), 741.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lenza, M., Pill, H., Reichlin, L., & Ravn, M. (2010). Monetary Policy in Exceptional Times. CEPR Press Discussion Paper No. 7669.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lerner, A. (1943). Functional Finance and the Federal Debt. Social Research, 10, 38–51.Google Scholar
Lucas, R. E. (1996). Nobel Lecture: Monetary Neutrality. Journal of Political Economy, 104 (4), 661–682.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lucas, R. E. (2003). Macroeconomic Priorities. American Economic Review, 93 (1), 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mankiw, N. G. (2020). A Skeptic’s Guide to Modern Monetary Theory. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 110, 141–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Matsuki, T., Sugimoto, K., & Satoma, K. (2015). Effects of the Bank of Japan’s Current Quantitative and Qualitative Easing. Economics Letters, 133, 112–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCallum, B. (1995). Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 85, 207–211.Google Scholar
McDonough, W. J. (1994). An Independent Central Bank in a Democratic Country: The Federal Reserve Experience. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic Quarterly, 19 (1), 1–6.Google Scholar
McKinnon, R. I., & Ohno, K. (1997). Resolving Economic Conflict between the United States and Japan. The MIT Press.Google Scholar
McLaren, N., Banerjee, R. N., & Latto, D. (2014). Using Changes in Auction Maturity Sectors to Help Identify the Impact of QE on Gilt Yields. Economic Journal, 124 (576), 453–479.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meaning, J., & Zhu, F. (2011). The Impact of Recent Central Bank Asset Purchase Programmes. BIS Quarterly Review, 2011, 73–83.Google Scholar
Meier, A. (2009). Panacea, Curse, or Nonevent? Unconventional Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom. IMF Working Paper (09/163).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meinusch, A., & Tillmann, P. (2015). The Macroeconomic Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy Shocks. Journal of Macroeconomics, 47 (PA), 58–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mishkin, F. S. (2000). What Should Central Banks Do? Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Economic Review (November/December), 1–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mishkin, F. S., & Savastano, M. A. (2002). Monetary Policy Strategies for Emerging Market Countries: Lessons from Latin America. Comparative Economic Studies, 44 (2–3), 45–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Momma, K., & Kobayakawa, S. (2014). Monetary Policy after the Great Recession: Japan’s Experience. In Vallés, J. (Ed.), Monetary Policy after the Great Recession. Madrid, Spain: FUNCAS Social and Economic Studies.Google Scholar
Morris, R., Ongena, H., & Schuknecht, L. (2006). The Reform and Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. ECB Occasional Paper Series, 47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mosser, P. C. (2020). Central Bank Responses to COVID-19. Business Economics, 55, 191–205.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mundell, R. A. (2000). A Reconsideration of the Twentieth Century. American Economic Review, 90 (3), 327–340.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1991). The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (2) (May): 503.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Neely, C. J. (2015). Unconventional Monetary Policy Had Large International Effects. Journal of Banking and Finance, 52, 101–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42 (April), 169–190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D. C. (1984). Transaction Costs, Institutions, and Economic History. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140, 7–17.Google Scholar
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Obstfeld, M., & Rogoff, K. (1994). The Intertemporal Approach to the Balance of Payments. Boston. NBER Working Paper No. 4893.Google Scholar
Okina, K., & Shiratsuka, S. (2004). Policy Commitment and Expectation Formation: Japan’s Experience under Zero Interest Rates. North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 15 (1), 75–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olson, M. (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, & Social Rigidities. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
O’Rourke, K., & Eichengreen, B. (2010). What Do the New Data Tell Us? VOXEU column, 8 March 2010. Available at: https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/what-do-new-data-tell-us.Google Scholar
Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2004). Regulating Finance: Balancing Freedom and Risk. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parkin, M. (1978). Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policies: A Preliminary Investigation. Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, Research Report 7804.Google Scholar
Pattipeilohy, C., van den End, J. W., Tabbae, M., Frost, J., & de Haan, J. (2013). Unconventional Monetary Policy of the ECB during the Financial Crisis: An Assessment and New Evidence. DNB Working Paper Series, May (381).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paulin, G. (2000). The Changing Face of Central Banking in the 1990s. Bank of Canada Review (Summer), 3–13.Google Scholar
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1999). Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy. In Taylor, J. B. & Woodford, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Phillips, A. W. (1950). Mechanical Models in Economic Dynamics. Economica, 17, 283–305.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pill, H., & Reichlin, L. (2014). Exceptional Policies for Exceptional Times: The ECB’s Response to the Rolling Crises of the Euro Area, and how it Has Brought Us Towards a new Bargain. CEPR Discussion Paper (No. 10193), 39.Google Scholar
Plosser, C. I. (2009). Ensuring Sound Monetary Policy in the Aftermath of Crisis. Speech 24, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.Google Scholar
Polo, M. (1930). The Travels of Marco Polo (The Venetian). New York: Liveright Publishing Corp.Google Scholar
Pooter, D., Desimone, R., Martin, R. F., & Pruitt, S. (2015). Cheap Talk and the Efficacy of the ECB’ s Securities Market Programme: Did Bond Purchases Matter? International Finance Discussion Papers (1139).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Posen, A. (1998). Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link? Oxford Economic Papers, 50 (3), 335–359.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reinhart, C. M. (2021). Monetary Policy in an Era of High Debt. Karl Brunner Distinguished Lecture. Zurich, Swiss National Bank. September 2021.Google Scholar
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2002). The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation. Boston. NBER Working Paper No. 8963.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reis, R. (2015). Different Types of Central Bank Insolvency and the Central Role of Seignorage. Boston. NBER Working Paper No. 21226.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ricardo, D. (1824). Plan for the Establishment of a National Bank. London: John Murray.Google Scholar
Rieth, M., & Wittich, J. (2020). The Impact of ECB Policy on Structural Reform. European Economic Review, 122, 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rodríguez, C., & Carrasco, C. A. (2014). ECB Policy Responses between 2007 and 2014: A Chronological Analysis and a Money Quantity Assessment of Their Effects. FESSUD Working Paper, 65.Google Scholar
Rogers, J. H., Scotti, C., & Wright, J. H. (2014). Evaluating Asset-Market Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy: A Cross-Country Comparison. No 1101, International Finance Discussion Papers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rogoff, K. (1985). The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (4), 1169.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosa, C. (2012). How ‘Unconventional’ Are Large-Scale Asset Purchases? The Impact of Monetary Policy on Asset Prices. FRB of New York Staff Report No. 560.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rose, A. K. (2007). A Stable International Monetary System Emerges: Inflation Targeting Is Bretton Woods, Reversed. Journal of International Money and Finance, 26 (2007), 663–681.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rossi, S. (2013). Post-crisis Challenges to Central Bank Independence. Speech at the LBMA/LPPM Precious Metals Conference 2013, Rome, 30 September 2013.Google Scholar
Sack, B. P. (2009). The Fed’s Expanded Balance Sheet. Remarks at the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York City.Google Scholar
Sack, B. P. (2010). Reflections on the TALF and the Federal Reserve’s Role as Liquidity Provider. Remarks at the New York Association for Business Economics, New York, 9 June 2010.Google Scholar
Saft, J. (2014). You Must Be Joking, Mr. Bernanke. Reuters. http://blogs.reuters.com/james-saft/2014/01/16/you-must-be-joking-mr-bernanke/Google Scholar
Samuelson, P. A., & Solow, R. M. (1960). Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy. American Economic Review, 50 (2), 177–194.Google Scholar
Sargent, T. J. (2017). The Ends of Four Big Inflations. In Sargent, T. J. (Ed.), Rational Expectations and Inflation, 3rd ed. (Princeton, NJ, 2013; online ed., Princeton Scholarship Online, October 19, 2017).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sargent, T. J., & Wallace, N. (1981). Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5 (3), 1–17.Google Scholar
Scheide, J. (1993). Preisniveaustabilität: Geldmengenregeln auch für unabhängige Notenbanken. Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 42 (1–3), 97–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schenkelberg, H., & Watzka, S. (2013). Real Effects of Quantitative Easing at the Zero Lower Bound: Structural VAR-based Evidence from Japan. Journal of International Money and Finance, 33, 327–357.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schnabl, G. (2017). The Impact of Japanese Monetary Policy Crisis Management on the Japanese Banking Sector. CESifo Working Paper (6440).Google Scholar
Scholtes, B. (2019). Staatliche Goldreserven – Wie Regierungen versuchen, aus Gold Geld zu machen. Deutschlandfunk (March 30, 2019). www.deutschlandfunk.de/staatliche-goldreserven-wie-regierungen-versuchen-aus-gold.724.de.html?dram:article_id=445066Google Scholar
Schwartz, A. J. (1973). Secular Price Changes in Historical Perspective. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 5 (February, Part II), 243–269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sengupta, R., & Tam, Y. (2008). The LIBOR-OIS spread as a summary indicator. Monetary Trends, Issue Nov.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shimizu, Y. (2019). Monetary Easing Policy and Stable Growth: A Theoretic Approach. International Journal of Economic Policy Studies, 13, 359–382.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shirakawa, M. (2013). Central Banking: Before, During, and After the Crisis. International Journal of Central Banking, 9 (SUPPL.1), 373–387.Google Scholar
Siklos, P. L. (2008). No Single Definition of Central Bank Independence Is Right for all Countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 24 (4), 802–816.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siklos, P. (2017). Central Banks into the Breach – From Triumph to Crisis and the Road Ahead. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Simon, H. A. (1966). Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioural Science. New York: Springern.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simons, H. C. (1936). Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy. Journal of Political Economy, 44 (1), 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smith, A. (1776 [1981]). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Volume I. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.Google Scholar
Smith, V. C. (1936/1990). The Rationale of Central Banking and the Free Banking Alternative. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.Google Scholar
Stals, C. (1997). ‘Mr. Stals Looks at the Effects of the Changing Financial Environment on Monetary Policy in South Africa Address by the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank,’ Dr. C. Stals, at the Annual Dinner of the Pretoria branch of the Economic Society of South Africa held in Pretoria on 15/5/97.Google Scholar
Stark, J. (2020). Die EZB ist auf die schiefe Bahn geraten – Jürgen Stark im Gespräch. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) (27 July 2020), www.faz.net/aktuell/finanzen/was-juergen-stark-ueber-die-ezb-sagt-16876012.html?premium.Google Scholar
Steeley, J. M. (2015). The Side Effects of Quantitative Easing: Evidence from the UK Bond Market. Journal of International Money and Finance, 51, 303–336.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sterne, G. (1999). The Use of Explicit Targets for Monetary Policy: Practical Experience of 91 Economies in the 1990s. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q3 September (August), 272–281.Google Scholar
Steuer, W. (1997). Gibt es eine europäische Stabilitätskultur? Wirtschaftsdienst, 77 (2), 86–93.Google Scholar
Stiglitz, J. E. (1998). Central Banking in Democratic Society. De Economist, 146 (2), 199–226.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Summers, L. (1991). How Should Long-Term Monetary Policy Be Determined? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 23 (3), 625–631.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Summers, L. H. (2015). Demand Side Secular Stagnation. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 105 (5), 60–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Svensson, L. E. O. (1999). How Should Monetary Policy Be Conducted in an Era of Price Stability? New Challenges for Monetary Policy, 277–316.Google Scholar
Svensson, L. E. O., Houg, K., Haakon, O. A., & Steigum, E. (2002). An Independent Review of Monetary Policy and Institutions in Norway. Oslo: Centre for Monetary Economics at the Norwegian School of Management.Google Scholar
Szczerbowicz, U. (2015). The ECB Unconventional Monetary Policies: Have They Lowered Market Borrowing Costs for Banks and Governments? International Journal of Central Banking, 11 (4), 91–127.Google Scholar
Takahashi, W. (2013). Japanese Monetary Policy: Experience from the Lost Decades. International Journal of Business, 18 (4), 288–306.Google Scholar
Tappe, A. (2020). Former Fed Officials Slam Trump’s Central Bank Pick and Urge Senate to Reject Her Nomination. CNN Business, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/08/21/economy/federal-reserve-judy-shelton-nomination/index.html (21 August, 2020).Google Scholar
Taylor, J. B. (1993). Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39 (2), 195–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Taylor, J. B. (2000). Using Monetary Policy Rules in Emerging Market Economies. 75th Anniversary Conference, ‘Stabilization and Monetary Policy: The International Experience’, Bank of Mexico.Google Scholar
Taylor, J. B. (2009). Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.Google Scholar
Trichet, J.-C. (2009). The ECB’s Enhanced Credit Support. CESifo Working Paper, 2833.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G., & McKenzie, R. B. (1985). The New World of Economics. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.Google Scholar
Ueda, K. (2005). The Bank of Japan’s Struggle with the Zero Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates: Exercises in Expectations Management. International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, 8 (2), 329–350, August.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ueda, K. (2013). The Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy under Abenomics. Asian Economic Policy Review, Japan Center for Economic Research, 8 (2), 252–269, December.Google Scholar
Ugai, H. (2007). Effects of the Quantitative Easing Policy: A Survey of Empirical Analyses. Monetary and Economic Studies, 25 (1), 1–47.Google Scholar
Ulate, M. (2021). Going Negative at the Zero Lower Bound: The Effects of Negative Nominal Interest Rates. American Economic Review, 111 (1), 1–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Valiante, D. (2015). The ‘Visible Hand’ of the ECB’s Quantitative Easing. CEPS Working Document (407).Google Scholar
van’t Klooster, J. (2018). Democracy and the European Central Bank’s Emergency Powers. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 42, 270–293.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vaubel, R. (1986). A Public Choice Approach to International Organization. Public Choice, 51 (1), 39–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vayanos, D., & Vila, J.-L. (2009). A Preferred-Habitat Model of the Term Structure of Interest rates. NBER Working Paper No. 15487.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Végh, C. A. (1995). Stopping High Inflation: An Analytical Overview. In Siklos, P. L. (Ed.), Great Inflations of the 20th Century (pp. 35–93). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vogel, E. (2016). Forward Looking Behavior in ECB Liquidity Auctions: Evidence from the Pre-Crisis Period. Journal of International Money and Finance, 61, 120–142.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vollmer, U., & Bebenroth, R. (2012). The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan. The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 9, 51–77.Google Scholar
Vuletin, G., & Zhu, L. (2011). Replacing a ‘Disobedient’ Central Bank Governor with a ‘Docile’ One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43 (6), 1185–1215.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Walsh, C. E. (1995). Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers. American Economic Review, 85 (1), 150–167.Google Scholar
Weale, M., & Wieladek, T. (2016). What Are the Macroeconomic Effects of Asset Purchases? Journal of Monetary Economics, 79, 81–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weymark, D. N. (2007). Inflation, Government Transfers, and Optimal Central Bank Independence. European Economic Review, 51, 297–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
White, L. H. (1999). The Theory of Monetary Institutions. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.Google Scholar
Willgerodt, H., Domsch, A., Hasse, R., & Merx, V. (1972). Wege und Irrwege zur europäischen Währungsunion. Freiburg: Rombach.Google Scholar
Woodford, M. (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Woodford, M. (2012). Methods of Policy Accommodation at the Interest-Rate Lower Bound. Paper presented at the Jackson Hole Symposium, ‘The Changing Policy Landscape’, 31 August to 1 September 2012, Jackson Hole, Wyoming.Google Scholar
Wray, L. R. (2015). Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary Systems. Houndmills and New York. Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd volume.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yellen, J. L. (2011). Commodity Prices, the Economic Outlook, and Monetary Policy. Paper delivered at The Economic Club of New York. New York. USA. Retrieved from www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20110411a.html.Google Scholar
Yellen, J. L. (2013). Challenges Confronting Monetary Policy. Speech at the 2013 National Association for Business Economics Policy Conference, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
Yellen, J. L. (2015). Normalizing Monetary Policy: Prospects and Perspectives. Speech at ‘The New Normal Monetary Policy,’ A research conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, California.Google Scholar
Yellen, J. L. (2016). The Outlook, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy. Speech at the Economic Club of New York, New York, New York.Google Scholar