Chapter 7 - The relation of prudence and synderesis to happiness in the medieval commentaries on Aristotle's ethics

Summary

Aristotle's two accounts of the nature of happiness in Nicomachean Ethics I and X have caused much disagreement concerning the precise constitution of human goodness, or happiness. In comparing contemplation with practice, Aristotle notes how the former is loved for its own sake, but the latter produces virtues within political and military realms that aim at external ends. The Pseudo-Pecham claims happiness is prior to virtue, and virtue is ordered to happiness as its prize. Virtue can only be a disposition to the supreme good. Happiness, as described by Aristotle, must be that which is most perfect in a human being within the limits of a human life. It contains a combination of all virtues steadfastly practiced over a lengthy period of time. Albert's extensive discussion of the various positions concerning the nature of synderesis summarizes the philosophical-theological deliberations on the topic in the first half of the thirteenth century.