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Chapter 2 - Correspondence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 November 2022

Hasok Chang
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
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Summary

Before developing my ideas further I must explain why I object to the common metaphysical picture behind standard scientific realism, which I call ‘correspondence realism’: the assumption that there is well-defined reality ‘out there’ with all its constituents existing mind-independently. This picture can be put under effective critical scrutiny if we disambiguate the notion of mind-independence. All entities that we can even think about are ‘mind-framed’ (characterized in terms of some concepts supplied by the mind), but real entities are not ‘mind-controlled (they do not do as we wish). The ‘fallacy of pre-figuration’ is to mistake the lack of mind-control as the lack of mind-framing. This fallacy is at the heart of the notion of correspondence between our theories and the mind-unframed ‘world’, and the purely extensional notion of reference according to which our words simply point to pre-figured realities. Such notions are produced through a metaphorical projection of the representation relation in real practices, in which correspondence holds among mind-framed entities. In standard realist discourse in the philosophy of science the fallacy of pre-figuration is reinforced by the faith that science does give us something resembling the ultimate true picture of reality, which must be free of mind-framing.

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Realism for Realistic People
A New Pragmatist Philosophy of Science
, pp. 68 - 118
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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  • Correspondence
  • Hasok Chang, University of Cambridge
  • Book: Realism for Realistic People
  • Online publication: 08 November 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108635738.003
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  • Correspondence
  • Hasok Chang, University of Cambridge
  • Book: Realism for Realistic People
  • Online publication: 08 November 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108635738.003
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Correspondence
  • Hasok Chang, University of Cambridge
  • Book: Realism for Realistic People
  • Online publication: 08 November 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108635738.003
Available formats
×