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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Paul Milgrom
Paul Milgrom
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Stanford University, California
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Putting Auction Theory to Work , pp. 339 - 346
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

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References

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Bulow, Jeremy and Roberts, John (1989). “The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions.” Journal of Political Economy 97(5): 1060–1090CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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  • Bibliography
  • Paul Milgrom, Stanford University, California
  • Book: Putting Auction Theory to Work
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813825.014
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  • Bibliography
  • Paul Milgrom, Stanford University, California
  • Book: Putting Auction Theory to Work
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813825.014
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  • Bibliography
  • Paul Milgrom, Stanford University, California
  • Book: Putting Auction Theory to Work
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813825.014
Available formats
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