8 - The Parliament in Indonesia's Decade of Democracy: People's Forum or Chamber of Cronies?

Summary

The parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) has been at the centre of the political transformation of Indonesia since 1998. The rise in the importance of the parliament is one of the two biggest shifts in institutional power experienced in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto; the other is the empowerment of regional government. More than any other state institution, the parliament has been the major site of competition between the residual forces of the New Order elite (Robison and Hadiz 2004), the previously excluded groups who want a seat at the high table and those who simply want to influence the decisions that affect their lives. This dynamic power constellation has been the result of fundamental changes instituted since 1998, most notably the introduction of genuinely democratic elections. These highly competitive ballots have shifted the rules of the game and vastly increased the range of voices heard in the parliament. Whereas in Suharto' DPR one could hear only an occasional faint echo of real disputes within the elite (Datta 2002), the post-1998 institution is a lively chamber full of the clamorous noise of debate. In this sense, the new parliament has become the kind of representative legislature that is considered ‘normal’ in a capitalist democracy.

This chapter discusses the role of Indonesia' parliament in the post- Suharto polity in four steps. The first section argues that democratic elections and constitutional reform have greatly enhanced the role of the parliament, but that its power is limited by the fact that it must share the power to make laws with the executive arm of government. Consequently, concerns about an excessive shift of authority to the parliament are not justified.

In the second section, I contend that certain features of the parliamentary decision-making process inherently favour exclusive elite politics over popular and inclusive deliberations, whether wittingly or unwittingly. Parliaments around the world are, of course, weighted towards the interests of the powerful, but the Indonesian parliament' specific institutional set-up and political culture seem to be particularly supportive of cabalistic or oligarchic control. Of special concern in this regard is the compartmentalisation of decision making within the committee structure and the avoidance of open votes. These practices limit political competition and facilitate a division of political spoils among an elite group of insiders.