Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate
- 2 Multipartism, Robust Federalism, and Presidentialism in Brazil
- 3 The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia
- 4 Presidential Behavior in a System with Strong Parties: Venezuela, 1958–1995
- 5 Strong Candidates for a Limited Office: Presidentialism and Political Parties in Costa Rica
- 6 Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico
- 7 Evaluating Argentina's Presidential Democracy: 1983–1995
- 8 In Defense of Presidentialism: The Case of Chile, 1932–1970
- 9 Executive–Legislative Relations in Post–Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment
- 10 Hybrid Presidentialism and Democratization: The Case of Bolivia
- 11 Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System
- Appendix: Outlines of Constitutional Powers in Latin America
- References
- Index
2 - Multipartism, Robust Federalism, and Presidentialism in Brazil
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate
- 2 Multipartism, Robust Federalism, and Presidentialism in Brazil
- 3 The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia
- 4 Presidential Behavior in a System with Strong Parties: Venezuela, 1958–1995
- 5 Strong Candidates for a Limited Office: Presidentialism and Political Parties in Costa Rica
- 6 Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico
- 7 Evaluating Argentina's Presidential Democracy: 1983–1995
- 8 In Defense of Presidentialism: The Case of Chile, 1932–1970
- 9 Executive–Legislative Relations in Post–Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment
- 10 Hybrid Presidentialism and Democratization: The Case of Bolivia
- 11 Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System
- Appendix: Outlines of Constitutional Powers in Latin America
- References
- Index
Summary
In this chapter, I argue that Brazilian presidentialism has been affected by the combination of three institutional features that Shugart and I (Chapter 1 and the Conclusion, this volume) discuss and one that we do not. First, presidents have had sweeping constitutional powers, especially under the 1988 constitution. The 1988 constitution gives presidents exceptionally strong proactive and some significant reactive powers; the 1946 constitution gave presidents strong reactive powers. Second, a highly fragmented party system has also affected Brazilian presidentialism. With a highly fragmented party system, presidents are usually in a situation of informal coalition government or (exceptionally) of minority presidentialism. Because their parties control a minority of seats, presidents need to build cross-party coalitions to implement most major policies. Third, comparatively undisciplined catchall parties make it difficult for the president to rely exclusively on party channels of support. When presidents are popular, politicians of all stripes and colors support them, but when they lose favor, they often have difficulty winning support for their projects. Defections in hard times make it difficult for presidents to implement major reforms. Finally, federalism has also shaped the functioning of Brazilian presidentialism. The logic of politicians and parties in Brazil is deeply engrained with robust federalism, which reinforces the dispersion of power created by the highly fragmented party system. With this institutional combination, presidents have sweeping consti tutional powers (especially under the 1988 constitution) but weak partisan powers.
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- Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America , pp. 55 - 109Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1997
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