Preface

Summary

In late 2002 an increasingly heated debate arose within the United Nations Security Council about the merits of using force to disarm and depose Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. The Bush Administration gave the Council an ultimatum: uphold the rule of international law, expressed in numerous Council resolutions calling on the regime to disarm, or follow the League of Nations into the dustbin of history. If the Council would not license the use of force, the United States would lead a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ to defend the rule of law and protect international security. Despite the immense material resources commanded by the United States, the majority of Council members remained unpersuaded. Most did not accept that the regime posed an imminent threat to international security and favoured a strategy of deterrence combined with an invigorated system of weapons inspections. They were also suspicious of American motives. It was clear to even the most casual observer that the Bush Administration was at least as interested in regime change as it was disarmament.

The Administration's position came to be seen, therefore, not as essential to upholding the rule of international law but as a threat to that rule. When the weapons inspectors returned to Iraq their reports failed to support the Administration's claims that Iraq posed an imminent threat (thus warranting Chapter 7 action), America's not-so-veiled commitment to regime change threatened the fundamental principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, and the Administration was threatening the unilateral use of force outside of the UN framework.