Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Weak and Strong States in Historical Perspective
- 2 Gaining Force
- 3 Restricting Power
- 4 Political Regimes and Credit Risk
- 5 Two Mechanisms
- 6 Letting the Data Speak for Themselves
- 7 Estimating the Fiscal Effects of Political Regimes
- 8 The Institutional Balance of Modern Fiscal States
- Appendices
- Works Cited
- Index
3 - Restricting Power
From Absolutism to Limited Government
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 October 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Weak and Strong States in Historical Perspective
- 2 Gaining Force
- 3 Restricting Power
- 4 Political Regimes and Credit Risk
- 5 Two Mechanisms
- 6 Letting the Data Speak for Themselves
- 7 Estimating the Fiscal Effects of Political Regimes
- 8 The Institutional Balance of Modern Fiscal States
- Appendices
- Works Cited
- Index
Summary
By eliminating local tax free-riding, fiscal centralization should have increased the ability of national governments to collect greater revenues. Since rulers retained control over state expenditures, however, the consolidation of fiscal powers may have exacerbated problems of executive discretion. Spending constraints were thus necessary.
This chapter examines the second fundamental political transformation that European states underwent, from absolutism to limited government, which restricted the ways in which rulers could use public funds. It begins by characterizing the problem of unconstrained absolutism. It then describes the coding process for political change and identifies the dates for constitutional reform across sample countries.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Political Transformations and Public FinancesEurope, 1650–1913, pp. 24 - 31Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011