Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Weak and Strong States in Historical Perspective
- 2 Gaining Force
- 3 Restricting Power
- 4 Political Regimes and Credit Risk
- 5 Two Mechanisms
- 6 Letting the Data Speak for Themselves
- 7 Estimating the Fiscal Effects of Political Regimes
- 8 The Institutional Balance of Modern Fiscal States
- Appendices
- Works Cited
- Index
2 - Gaining Force
From Fragmentation to Centralization
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 October 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Weak and Strong States in Historical Perspective
- 2 Gaining Force
- 3 Restricting Power
- 4 Political Regimes and Credit Risk
- 5 Two Mechanisms
- 6 Letting the Data Speak for Themselves
- 7 Estimating the Fiscal Effects of Political Regimes
- 8 The Institutional Balance of Modern Fiscal States
- Appendices
- Works Cited
- Index
Summary
Fiscal fragmentation and absolutism plagued Old Regime states. This chapter examines fiscal centralization, the first fundamental political transformation that European states underwent. It begins by characterizing the problem of fiscal fragmentation in both qualitative and quantitative terms. It then describes the coding process for institutional reform and identifies the dates for fiscal centralization for each sample country.
The Fragmented Old Regime
Most polities in Europe were fiscally fragmented before the nineteenth century. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, early modern monarchs confronted a host of incumbent local institutions that reduced their fiscal powers. To illustrate, this section examines France, Spain, the Netherlands, and England, four of the most celebrated cases in the literature on state formation in Europe.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Political Transformations and Public FinancesEurope, 1650–1913, pp. 10 - 23Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011
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