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FOURTEEN - Constitutional Rules and Agricultural Policy Outcomes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2011

By
Alessandro Olper  and
Valentina Raimondi
Edited by
Kym Anderson
Alessandro Olper
Affiliation:
University of Milan
Valentina Raimondi
Affiliation:
University of Milan
Kym Anderson
Affiliation:
University of Adelaide
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Summary

The literature concerning political and economic determinants of agricultural protection tends to ignore the role that constitutional rules play in shaping agricultural policies. In contrast, the newly emerging field of comparative political economics places growing emphasis on the effect of political institutions on public policy outcomes. The inclusion of political institutions – such as electoral rules and forms of government – in formal political economy models has produced several testable hypotheses firmly motivated by theory. One of the most influential lines of research in this area is by Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003), who look at how constitutional rules shape policy outcomes. Other recent contributions along the same research line are those by Grossman and Helpman (2005), who studied the effect of “party discipline” on trade policy, and by Persson (2005), Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2008), Besley and Persson (2008) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2008) who, among others, look at the economic and political effects of different forms of democracy and the origins of “State Capacity.”

Evidence that links political institutions to agricultural policy outcomes (e.g., Beghin and Kherallah 1994, Swinnen, Banerjee and de Gorter 2001, Henning, Krause and Struve 2002, Olper 2001, Thies and Porsche 2007) provides a weak link with this “new generation” of political economy models, lessening our understanding of the mechanism in place and, consequently, its policy implications. Some contributions have tried to go further, closing the gap between theory and evidence (see Henning 2004, Olper and Raimondi 2004).

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Chapter
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The Political Economy of Agricultural Price Distortions , pp. 358 - 392
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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References

Acemoglu, D. (2005), “Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's ‘The Economic Effect of Constitutions’,”Journal of Economic Literature 43(4): 1025–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A (2001), “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,”American Economic Review 91(5): 1369–1401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2000), “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 1167–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2008), “Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions”, American Economic Review 98(1): 267–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aghion, P., Alesina, A. and Trebbi, F. (2008), “Democracy, Technology and Growth,” in Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Alesina, A., Roubini, N. and Cohen, G.D. (1997), Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Anderson, K. (1995), “Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries,”Economic Development and Cultural Change 43(2): 401–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, K., Kurzweil, M., Martin, W., Sandri, D. and Valenzuela, E. (2008), “Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, Revisited,”World Trade Review 7(4): 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, K., and Valenzuela, E. (2008), Global Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, 1955 to 2007, database available at http://www.worldbank.org/agdistortionsGoogle Scholar
Banerji, A. and Ghanem, H. (1997), “Does the Type of Political Regime Matter for Trade and Labor Market Policies?”World Bank Economic Review 11(1): 171–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barro, R. J. (1997), Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-country Empirical Study, Cambridge MA: MIT PressGoogle Scholar
Bates, R.H. (1983), “Patterns of Market Intervention in Agrarian Africa,”Food Policy 8: 297–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bates, R.H. (1989), Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A. and Keefer, P. (2001), “New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions,”World Bank Economic Review 15(1): 165–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beghin, J.C. and Kherallah, M. (1994), “Political Institutions and International Patterns of Agricultural Protection,”Review of Economics and Statistics 76: 482–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E. and Mullainathan, S. (2004), “How Much Should We Trust Difference-in-difference Estimates?”Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 249–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2008), “The Origin of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics,” NBER Working Paper No. 13028 (forthcoming in American Economic Review).
Bureau, J.C. and Kalaitzandonakes, N.G. (1995), “Measuring Effective Protection as a Superlative Index Number: An Application to European Agriculture,”American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77(2): 279–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haan, J. and Sturm, J. (2003), “Does More Democracy Lead to Greater Economic Freedom? New Evidence for Developing Countries,”European Journal of Political Economy 19(3): 547–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dutt, P. and Mitra, D. (2002), “Endogenous Trade Policy Through Majority Voting: An Empirical Investigation,”Journal of International Economics 58: 107–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dutt, P. and Mitra, D. (2005), “Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation,”Review of Economics and Statistics 87(1): 59–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dutt, P. and Mitra, D. (2010), “Impacts of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance”, Ch. 11 in this volume.
Giavazzi, F. and Tabellini, G. (2005), “Economic and Political Liberalization,”Journal of Monetary Economics 52: 1297–1330.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glaeser, E.L., Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silane, F. and Shleifer, A. (2004), “Do Institutions Cause Growth, “Journal of Economic Growth 9(3): 271–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (2005), “A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(4): 1239–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (2008), “Separation of Powers and the Budget Process,”Journal of Public Economics 92(3–4): 407–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, R.E. and Jones, C. (1999), “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?”Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1): 83–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hatfield, J.W. and Hauk, W.R. (2003), “The Effect of the Electoral Regime on Trade Policy,” SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 03–20, Stanford University.
Henning, C.H.C.A. (2004), “The Role of Institutions in Agricultural Protectionism,”, pp. 137–51 in Huylenbroeck, G., Verbeke, W. and Lauwers, L. (eds.), Role of Institutions in Rural Policies and Agricultural Markets, Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Henning, C.H.C.A. (2008), “Determinants of Agricultural Protection in an International Perspective: The Role of Political Institutions,” Working Paper, University of Kiel, February.
Henning, C.H.C.A., Krause, K.C. and Struve, C. (2002), “Institutional Foundation of Agricultural Protection: The Case of EU-Accession and Agricultural Policy in Eastern European Countries,” Annual Meeting of AAEA, Long Beach, California.
Henning, C.H.C.A. and Struve, C. (2007), “Postelection Bargaining and Special Interest Politics in Parliamentary Systems: The Case of Agricultural Protection,” pp. 45–84 in Hinich, M. and Barnett, W. (eds.), Topics in Analytical Political Economy, Volume 17 of International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995), “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures,”Economics and Politics 7: 207–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kontopoulos, Y. and Perotti, R. (1999), “Government Fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: Evidence from the OECD Countries”, in Poterba, J. and Hagen, J. (eds.), Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Preference, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Lijphart, A. (1990), “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–1985,”American Political Science Review 84: 481–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lindert, P.L. (1991), “Historical Patterns of Agricultural Policy”, pp. 29–83 in Timmer, C.P. (ed.), Agriculture and the State: Growth, Employment, and Poverty in Developing Countries, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Lizzeri, A. and Persico, N. (2001), “The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives,”American Economic Review 91(1): 225–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lundell, K. and Karvonen, L. (2003), “A Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions,” Department of Political Science Occasional Papers Series Nr. 19/2003, Abo Akademi University, Åbo, Finland.
Milesi-Ferretti, G-M., Perotti, R. and Rostagno, M. (2002), “Electoral Systems and the Composition of Public Spending,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 609–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milner, H.V. and Kubota, K. (2005), “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries,”International Organization 59: 107–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mulligan, C.B., Gil, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (2004), “Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies Than Non-democracies,”Journal of Economic Perspective 18(1): 51–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olper, A. (2001), “Determinants of Agricultural Protection: The Role of Democracy and Institutional Setting,”Journal of Agricultural Economics 52(2): 75–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olper, A. (2007), “Land Inequality, Government Ideology and Agricultural Protection,”Food Policy 32(1): 67–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olper, A. and Raimondi, V. (2004), “Political Institutions and Milk Policy Outcomes in OECD Countries,” pp. 153–68 in Huylenbroeck, G., Verbeke, W. and Lauwers, L. (eds.), Role of Institutions in Rural Policies and Agricultural Markets, Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Olper, A. and Swinnen, J. (2008), “The Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Agricultural and Food Policies,” Working Paper, DEPA, University of Milan, February.
Papaioannou, E. and Siourounis, G. (2008), “Democratization and Growth,”Economic Journal 118, 1520–51, October.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T. (2005), “Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development,” Working Paper, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, January.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1999), “The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians, 1998 Marshall Lecture,”European Economic Review 43: 699–734.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000), Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003), The Economic Effects of Constitution: What Do the Data Say?Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2004), “Constitutions and Economic Policy,”Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(1): 75–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2006), “Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details,”American Economic Review 96: 319–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2008), “The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is it Heterogeneous and How Can it be Estimated?” in Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (1997), “Separation of Power and Political Accountability,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 310–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (2000), “Comparative Politics and Public Finance,”Journal of Political Economy 108: 1121–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (2007), “Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies,”Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2: 155–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Przeworsky, A. (1991), Democracy and the Market, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rodrik, D. and Wacziarg, R. (2005), “Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?”American Economic Review 95(2): 50–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roelfsema, H. (2004), “Political Institutions and Trade Protection,” Discussion Paper Series 04–06, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht University.
Rogowski, R. and Kayser, M.A. (2002), “Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power. Price-Level Evidence from the OECD Countries,”American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 526–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swinnen, J. (1994), “A Positive Theory of Agricultural Protection,”American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76(1): 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swinnen, J. (2010), “Political Economy of Agricultural Distortions: The Literature to Date,” Ch. 3 in this volume.
Swinnen, J.F., Banerjee, A.N. and Gorter, H. (2001), ”Economic Development, Institutional Change, and the Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: An Econometric Study of Belgium Since the 19th Century,”Agricultural Economics 26(1): 25–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swinnen, J., Gorter, H., Rausser, G.C. and Banerjee, A.N. (2000), “The Political Economy of Public Research Investment and Commodity Policy in Agriculture: An Empirical Study,”Agricultural Economics 22(1): 111–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thies, C.G. and Porche, S. (2007), “The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection,”Journal of Politics 69: 116–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weingast, B. and Marshall, W. (1988), “The Industrial Organization of Congress; Or, Why Legislators as Firms are Not Organized as Markets,”Journal of Political Economy 96: 379–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wiberg, M. (2006), “On the Indeterminacy of Trade Policy Under Different Electoral Rules,” Working paper, Department of Economics, Stockholm University.
Acemoglu, D. (2005), “Constitutions, Politics and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's ‘The Economic Effect of Constitutions’,”Journal of Economic Literature 43(4): 1025–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A (2001), “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,”American Economic Review 91(5): 1369–1401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2000), “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 1167–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2008), “Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions”, American Economic Review 98(1): 267–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aghion, P., Alesina, A. and Trebbi, F. (2008), “Democracy, Technology and Growth,” in Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Alesina, A., Roubini, N. and Cohen, G.D. (1997), Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Anderson, K. (1995), “Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries,”Economic Development and Cultural Change 43(2): 401–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, K., Kurzweil, M., Martin, W., Sandri, D. and Valenzuela, E. (2008), “Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, Revisited,”World Trade Review 7(4): 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, K., and Valenzuela, E. (2008), Global Estimates of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives, 1955 to 2007, database available at http://www.worldbank.org/agdistortionsGoogle Scholar
Banerji, A. and Ghanem, H. (1997), “Does the Type of Political Regime Matter for Trade and Labor Market Policies?”World Bank Economic Review 11(1): 171–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barro, R. J. (1997), Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-country Empirical Study, Cambridge MA: MIT PressGoogle Scholar
Bates, R.H. (1983), “Patterns of Market Intervention in Agrarian Africa,”Food Policy 8: 297–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bates, R.H. (1989), Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A. and Keefer, P. (2001), “New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions,”World Bank Economic Review 15(1): 165–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beghin, J.C. and Kherallah, M. (1994), “Political Institutions and International Patterns of Agricultural Protection,”Review of Economics and Statistics 76: 482–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E. and Mullainathan, S. (2004), “How Much Should We Trust Difference-in-difference Estimates?”Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 249–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besley, T. and Persson, T. (2008), “The Origin of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics,” NBER Working Paper No. 13028 (forthcoming in American Economic Review).
Bureau, J.C. and Kalaitzandonakes, N.G. (1995), “Measuring Effective Protection as a Superlative Index Number: An Application to European Agriculture,”American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77(2): 279–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haan, J. and Sturm, J. (2003), “Does More Democracy Lead to Greater Economic Freedom? New Evidence for Developing Countries,”European Journal of Political Economy 19(3): 547–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dutt, P. and Mitra, D. (2002), “Endogenous Trade Policy Through Majority Voting: An Empirical Investigation,”Journal of International Economics 58: 107–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dutt, P. and Mitra, D. (2005), “Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation,”Review of Economics and Statistics 87(1): 59–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dutt, P. and Mitra, D. (2010), “Impacts of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance”, Ch. 11 in this volume.
Giavazzi, F. and Tabellini, G. (2005), “Economic and Political Liberalization,”Journal of Monetary Economics 52: 1297–1330.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glaeser, E.L., Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silane, F. and Shleifer, A. (2004), “Do Institutions Cause Growth, “Journal of Economic Growth 9(3): 271–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (2005), “A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(4): 1239–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (2008), “Separation of Powers and the Budget Process,”Journal of Public Economics 92(3–4): 407–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, R.E. and Jones, C. (1999), “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?”Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1): 83–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hatfield, J.W. and Hauk, W.R. (2003), “The Effect of the Electoral Regime on Trade Policy,” SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 03–20, Stanford University.
Henning, C.H.C.A. (2004), “The Role of Institutions in Agricultural Protectionism,”, pp. 137–51 in Huylenbroeck, G., Verbeke, W. and Lauwers, L. (eds.), Role of Institutions in Rural Policies and Agricultural Markets, Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Henning, C.H.C.A. (2008), “Determinants of Agricultural Protection in an International Perspective: The Role of Political Institutions,” Working Paper, University of Kiel, February.
Henning, C.H.C.A., Krause, K.C. and Struve, C. (2002), “Institutional Foundation of Agricultural Protection: The Case of EU-Accession and Agricultural Policy in Eastern European Countries,” Annual Meeting of AAEA, Long Beach, California.
Henning, C.H.C.A. and Struve, C. (2007), “Postelection Bargaining and Special Interest Politics in Parliamentary Systems: The Case of Agricultural Protection,” pp. 45–84 in Hinich, M. and Barnett, W. (eds.), Topics in Analytical Political Economy, Volume 17 of International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995), “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures,”Economics and Politics 7: 207–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kontopoulos, Y. and Perotti, R. (1999), “Government Fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: Evidence from the OECD Countries”, in Poterba, J. and Hagen, J. (eds.), Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Preference, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Lijphart, A. (1990), “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–1985,”American Political Science Review 84: 481–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lindert, P.L. (1991), “Historical Patterns of Agricultural Policy”, pp. 29–83 in Timmer, C.P. (ed.), Agriculture and the State: Growth, Employment, and Poverty in Developing Countries, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Lizzeri, A. and Persico, N. (2001), “The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives,”American Economic Review 91(1): 225–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lundell, K. and Karvonen, L. (2003), “A Comparative Data Set on Political Institutions,” Department of Political Science Occasional Papers Series Nr. 19/2003, Abo Akademi University, Åbo, Finland.
Milesi-Ferretti, G-M., Perotti, R. and Rostagno, M. (2002), “Electoral Systems and the Composition of Public Spending,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 609–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milner, H.V. and Kubota, K. (2005), “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries,”International Organization 59: 107–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mulligan, C.B., Gil, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (2004), “Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies Than Non-democracies,”Journal of Economic Perspective 18(1): 51–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olper, A. (2001), “Determinants of Agricultural Protection: The Role of Democracy and Institutional Setting,”Journal of Agricultural Economics 52(2): 75–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olper, A. (2007), “Land Inequality, Government Ideology and Agricultural Protection,”Food Policy 32(1): 67–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olper, A. and Raimondi, V. (2004), “Political Institutions and Milk Policy Outcomes in OECD Countries,” pp. 153–68 in Huylenbroeck, G., Verbeke, W. and Lauwers, L. (eds.), Role of Institutions in Rural Policies and Agricultural Markets, Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Olper, A. and Swinnen, J. (2008), “The Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Agricultural and Food Policies,” Working Paper, DEPA, University of Milan, February.
Papaioannou, E. and Siourounis, G. (2008), “Democratization and Growth,”Economic Journal 118, 1520–51, October.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T. (2005), “Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development,” Working Paper, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, January.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1999), “The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians, 1998 Marshall Lecture,”European Economic Review 43: 699–734.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000), Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003), The Economic Effects of Constitution: What Do the Data Say?Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2004), “Constitutions and Economic Policy,”Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(1): 75–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2006), “Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details,”American Economic Review 96: 319–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2008), “The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is it Heterogeneous and How Can it be Estimated?” in Helpman, E. (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (1997), “Separation of Power and Political Accountability,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 310–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (2000), “Comparative Politics and Public Finance,”Journal of Political Economy 108: 1121–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Persson, T., Roland, G. and Tabellini, G. (2007), “Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies,”Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2: 155–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Przeworsky, A. (1991), Democracy and the Market, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rodrik, D. and Wacziarg, R. (2005), “Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?”American Economic Review 95(2): 50–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roelfsema, H. (2004), “Political Institutions and Trade Protection,” Discussion Paper Series 04–06, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht University.
Rogowski, R. and Kayser, M.A. (2002), “Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power. Price-Level Evidence from the OECD Countries,”American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 526–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swinnen, J. (1994), “A Positive Theory of Agricultural Protection,”American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76(1): 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swinnen, J. (2010), “Political Economy of Agricultural Distortions: The Literature to Date,” Ch. 3 in this volume.
Swinnen, J.F., Banerjee, A.N. and Gorter, H. (2001), ”Economic Development, Institutional Change, and the Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: An Econometric Study of Belgium Since the 19th Century,”Agricultural Economics 26(1): 25–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swinnen, J., Gorter, H., Rausser, G.C. and Banerjee, A.N. (2000), “The Political Economy of Public Research Investment and Commodity Policy in Agriculture: An Empirical Study,”Agricultural Economics 22(1): 111–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thies, C.G. and Porche, S. (2007), “The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection,”Journal of Politics 69: 116–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weingast, B. and Marshall, W. (1988), “The Industrial Organization of Congress; Or, Why Legislators as Firms are Not Organized as Markets,”Journal of Political Economy 96: 379–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wiberg, M. (2006), “On the Indeterminacy of Trade Policy Under Different Electoral Rules,” Working paper, Department of Economics, Stockholm University.

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