Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Notes on contributors
- 1 Introduction: understanding police innovation
- Part I Community policing
- Part II Broken windows policing
- Part III Problem-oriented policing
- Part IV Pulling levers policing
- Part V Third-party policing
- 10 Advocate The case for third-party policing
- 11 Critic Third-party policing: a critical view
- Part VI Hot spots policing
- Part VII Compstat
- Part VIII Evidence-based policing
- 18 Conclusion: Police innovation and the future of policing
- Index
- References
11 - Critic Third-party policing: a critical view
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Notes on contributors
- 1 Introduction: understanding police innovation
- Part I Community policing
- Part II Broken windows policing
- Part III Problem-oriented policing
- Part IV Pulling levers policing
- Part V Third-party policing
- 10 Advocate The case for third-party policing
- 11 Critic Third-party policing: a critical view
- Part VI Hot spots policing
- Part VII Compstat
- Part VIII Evidence-based policing
- 18 Conclusion: Police innovation and the future of policing
- Index
- References
Summary
According to Lorraine Mazerolle and Janet Ransley (2003), “third-party policing” describes police efforts to persuade or to coerce third parties, such as landlords, parents, local government regulators, and business owners to take on some responsibility for preventing crime or reducing crime problems. Obviously this definition seeks to distinguish policing directed at those who are and who might be criminal offenders from policing efforts directed at non-offending “others.” Thus, the definition emphasizes the affinities that third-party policing has with other forms of civil regulation. Examples of such regulation abound. In an effort to ensure that corporations do not defraud stockholders, regulators place constraints, both civil and criminal, on accountants and lawyers. In an effort to make sure that employers do not violate civil rights laws, legislators have structured statutes so that violators pay plaintiffs' attorneys fees should the plaintiffs win. In this way, plaintiffs are persuaded to become “private attorneys general” helping public officials to enforce the law. In an effort to ensure that athletes do not take illegal drugs, the National Football League requires teams to complete random urine tests of players. The federal government is now pressuring the Major League Baseball to do the same. In this way, the sports leagues become third-party enforcers of laws prohibiting the use of certain drugs.
Given the pervasive forms of such regulation today, that such “third-party” efforts are becoming common in the enterprise of street crime control should hardly be surprising.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Police InnovationContrasting Perspectives, pp. 207 - 222Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006
References
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