Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction: Just Getting Started
- Mind and Madness: New Directions in the Philosophy of Psychiatry
- Emotion and Memory: The Second Cognitive Revolution
- Meaning and Mechanism in Psychotherapy and General Psychiatry
- Making Sense on the Boundaries: On Moving Between Philosophy and Psychotherapy
- Mental Disorder, Illness and Biological Disfunction
- Integrity, Boundary and the Ecology of Personal Processes
- Multiple Personality and Computational Models
- Psychology and Politics: Lies, Damned Lies and Self-Deception
- Personal Identity and Psychiatric Illness
- Vices and the Self
- Wild Beasts and Idle Humours: Legal Insanity and the Finding of Fault
- Dangerousness and Mental Disorder
- Problems with the Doctrine of Consent
- Homosexuality
- Nietzsche and Music
- References
- Notes on Contributors
Mental Disorder, Illness and Biological Disfunction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction: Just Getting Started
- Mind and Madness: New Directions in the Philosophy of Psychiatry
- Emotion and Memory: The Second Cognitive Revolution
- Meaning and Mechanism in Psychotherapy and General Psychiatry
- Making Sense on the Boundaries: On Moving Between Philosophy and Psychotherapy
- Mental Disorder, Illness and Biological Disfunction
- Integrity, Boundary and the Ecology of Personal Processes
- Multiple Personality and Computational Models
- Psychology and Politics: Lies, Damned Lies and Self-Deception
- Personal Identity and Psychiatric Illness
- Vices and the Self
- Wild Beasts and Idle Humours: Legal Insanity and the Finding of Fault
- Dangerousness and Mental Disorder
- Problems with the Doctrine of Consent
- Homosexuality
- Nietzsche and Music
- References
- Notes on Contributors
Summary
Introduction
This paper will be about the relationship between mental disorder and physical disorder. I shall also be concerned with the connection between these notions and the notion of ‘illness’.
I shall begin with the ‘anti-psychiatry’ view that the lack of a physical basis excludes many familiar mental disorders from the category of ‘illness’. My response to this argument will be that anti-psychiatrists are probably right to hold that most mental disorders do not involve any physical disorder, but that they are wrong to conclude from this that these mental disorders are not illnesses.
My arguments in this paper will be philosophical rather than empirical. My conclusions will be informed by recent philosophical analyses of notions like ‘mental state’ and ‘biological purpose’. How they might apply to particular mental disorders, such as depression, say, or schizophrenia, is not for me to say. This will depend on the detailed empirical nature of such disorders, and this is something about which I am relatively ignorant, and about which even the experts disagree. My aim here is to clear away some of the more abstract issues, so that we will know better what to say if we ever are in full command of the empirical facts.
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- Philosophy, Psychology and Psychiatry , pp. 73 - 82Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1995
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