Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- The philosophy of animal minds: an introduction
- 1 What do animals think?
- 2 Attributing mental representations to animals
- 3 Chrysippus' dog as a case study in non-linguistic cognition
- 4 Systematicity and intentional realism in honeybee navigation
- 5 Invertebrate concepts confront the generality constraint (and win)
- 6 A language of baboon thought?
- 7 Animal communication and neo-expressivism
- 8 Mindreading in the animal kingdom
- 9 The representational basis of brute metacognition: a proposal
- 10 Animals, consciousness, and I-thoughts
- 11 Self-awareness in animals
- 12 The sophistication of non-human emotion
- 13 Parsimony and models of animal minds
- 14 The primate mindreading controversy: a case study in simplicity and methodology in animal psychology
- Glossary of key terms
- References
- Index
- References
References
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- The philosophy of animal minds: an introduction
- 1 What do animals think?
- 2 Attributing mental representations to animals
- 3 Chrysippus' dog as a case study in non-linguistic cognition
- 4 Systematicity and intentional realism in honeybee navigation
- 5 Invertebrate concepts confront the generality constraint (and win)
- 6 A language of baboon thought?
- 7 Animal communication and neo-expressivism
- 8 Mindreading in the animal kingdom
- 9 The representational basis of brute metacognition: a proposal
- 10 Animals, consciousness, and I-thoughts
- 11 Self-awareness in animals
- 12 The sophistication of non-human emotion
- 13 Parsimony and models of animal minds
- 14 The primate mindreading controversy: a case study in simplicity and methodology in animal psychology
- Glossary of key terms
- References
- Index
- References
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- The Philosophy of Animal Minds , pp. 284 - 305Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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