Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-8bhkd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-04T19:05:27.319Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

9 - The Relationship between Autonomous and Morally Responsible Agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 December 2009

James Stacey Taylor
Affiliation:
Louisiana State University
Get access

Summary

What is the relationship between the concepts of autonomous and morally responsible agency? For those who acknowledge the legitimacy of each, the assumption has been that the connection is quite tight: Either it is thought that they entail each other or, more conservatively, that autonomous agency is necessary for morally responsible agency. I shall argue that, on one reasonable account of autonomy, neither is necessary for the other. My argument turns upon establishing two theses: First, the epistemic condition for autonomous agency involves less than what is required for morally responsible agency. Second, the control condition for autonomous agency involves more than what is required for morally responsible agency. If the first thesis is correct, it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for autonomous agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding epistemic condition for morally responsible agency. This would prove that morally responsible agency is not necessary for autonomous agency. If the second thesis is correct, it is possible for a person to satisfy all of the conditions for morally responsible agency and yet fail to satisfy the more demanding control condition for autonomous agency. This would prove that autonomous agency is not necessary for morally responsible agency.

TWO CONCEPTS: AUTONOMOUS AGENCY AND MORALLY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

To begin, let us treat autonomous agency in terms of self-rule, and let us assume that it is not a necessary condition of personhood but merely demarcates a special class of persons. Parsed accordingly, it is possible that some persons are nonautonomous.

Type
Chapter
Information
Personal Autonomy
New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy
, pp. 205 - 234
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×