8 - Nonrevolution in Post-Soviet Presidential Systems

Summary

The previous chapter has shown that once a single-pyramid system was initially built in a post-Soviet presidentialist polity, patronal presidents have fallen primarily as they simultaneously encountered a lame-duck syndrome and low popular support. The present chapter addresses post-Soviet presidentialist polities that have not so far experienced the ouster of their dominant presidential network. It shows they stand out from the bulk of cases in the previous chapter in at least one of three ways. First, some presidents have never become lame-ducks despite allowing at least some opposition to compete in the most important elections. Second, others experienced a lame-duck syndrome and even a dramatic competing-pyramid situation but had presidents or handpicked successors who were popular enough to win the competition. Third, two countries emerged from the Soviet breakup as outright dictatorships rather than hybrid regimes. Full dictatorship does not make a regime immune to patronal presidential ouster, as discussed in Chapter 4, but does essentially keep elections from serving as key focal points that can facilitate coordinated defection among elites anticipating succession under an unpopular incumbent. Other focal points can arise in full dictatorships, but they are likely to be much fewer and farther between and less predictable in form and timing. In short, full autocracies are most likely to feature irregular regime cycles or regular “long regime cycles” linked to the age of the dictators.

These cases of presidential network nonouster provide telling control cases that reinforce our conclusions as to when revolution or other forms of dominant network turnover are likely in patronal presidential countries. Just as the previous chapter found a lame-duck syndrome and low popular support combining in every case of patronal presidential network ouster since the first single-pyramid systems were built after the Soviet breakup, so the present chapter shows that in the absence of either of these factors (popular support or a lame-duck syndrome) neither revolution nor any other kind of ouster was forthcoming. Moreover, as expected, we find that the countries in this set experiencing lame-duck syndromes did in fact often display succession-related tensions and sometimes even outbreaks of open elite contestation to influence it, but that patterns of popular support were important in ensuring victory for the incumbent networks.