Book contents
- Organization outside Organizations
- Organization outside Organizations
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part 1 Rules, Sanctions, Membership
- Part 2 Organization in and around Markets
- 5 The Partial Organization of Markets
- 6 The Organization of Digital Marketplaces: Unmasking the Role of Internet Platforms in the Sharing Economy
- 7 Organizing for Independence
- 8 Queues: Tensions between Institution and Organization
- Part 3 Networks and Other Social Relationships
- Part 4 Social Movements and Collective Action
- Part 5 The Partial Organization of Formal Organizations
- Conclusion
- Index
- References
7 - Organizing for Independence
from Part 2 - Organization in and around Markets
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2019
Book contents
- Organization outside Organizations
- Organization outside Organizations
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part 1 Rules, Sanctions, Membership
- Part 2 Organization in and around Markets
- 5 The Partial Organization of Markets
- 6 The Organization of Digital Marketplaces: Unmasking the Role of Internet Platforms in the Sharing Economy
- 7 Organizing for Independence
- 8 Queues: Tensions between Institution and Organization
- Part 3 Networks and Other Social Relationships
- Part 4 Social Movements and Collective Action
- Part 5 The Partial Organization of Formal Organizations
- Conclusion
- Index
- References
Summary
In this chapter we investigate how certification and accreditation organizations put much effort in constructing an image of independence for the outside world to see and endorse. It is difficult for an organization to proclaim its own independence; rather, a fundamental way of convincing others of its independence is through entering dependency relationships with other formal organizations that grant the organization independence, like the dubbing of knights. We analyse the character of organizational dependencies with respect to rules, sanctions, hierarchy, monitoring, and membership and conclude that the search for independence result in the addition of elements to elements, driving more and more organization. We discuss how the adding of elements form a complex system of interdependent organizations, which resembles a rational, authoritative Weberian bureaucracy. Although this bureaucratic system may be understood as organization – a decided and systematized order – it is not a discernible entity. It is partial and as such it lacks a central authority to govern and to which an overall responsibility could be ascribed. Paradoxically, the efforts aiming at ensuring independence resulted in the organizations becoming dependent not only on each other, but also on the decided order surrounding them.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Organization outside OrganizationsThe Abundance of Partial Organization in Social Life, pp. 155 - 176Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
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