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9 - Pragmatic arguments

from Theological arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2016

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Summary

So far only epistemological or truth-directed reasons have been considered for believing that God exists. It is now time to consider pragmatic reasons based on the desirable consequences of belief. There is the big question, which will not be considered, of whether individuals, as well as society at large, are better off having religious faith. While religion and the faith it inspires has a mixed track record, having been among the causes of man's greatest and basest deeds, we have no way of determining whether things overall would have gone, or will go, better with it than without it. My interest, however, is not with questions of empirical fact but with the conditional question “If overall there were to be desirable consequences of believing that God exists, would that justify, that is, constitute a sufficient reason for, one's believing?”

The desirable consequences can take different forms and thereby serve as the basis for different types of pragmatic argument. They can be prudentially desirable if they satisfy the needs, wants, or interests of the believer. Or they might be desirable on moral grounds either by enabling us to engage in the practice of morality, that is, following moral rules even when doing so sacrifices our own self-interest, or making the believer and/or her society morally better. Kant's moral argument for believing is an example of the former: The demands of morality to follow the categorical imperative make sense only if we assume that there exists a God who will bring it about that those who do so are rewarded with happiness, something that rarely happens in this life. Because this justification of faith takes us so deeply into the nature of morality, it will not be possible to consider it in this book, nor am I up to tackling it. Given that it is rational or reasonable to promote one's own interests as well as those of morality, both sorts of consequences can serve as a justification or sufficient reason for believing. Pragmatic arguments from prudence will be discussed first, then those from morality.

Pragmatic arguments from prudence

The most influential of the prudential-type pragmatic arguments for faith is Pascal's “wager” in his Pensées.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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