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from Part 2 - Anglo-American Relations and the Diplomacy of German Unification (1989–1990)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 February 2018
The special relationship evaporates: Britain's search for a European bloc
‘To strive for German unification is not a bargaining device but the condition for European stability’
(Henry Kissinger, July 1959)‘I don't want to see us decoupled from Europe; I don't want to see us pull out of Europe’
(George H. W. Bush, 16 December 1989)‘We find ourselves in the same situation as the leaders in France and Britain before the war, who didn't react to anything. We can't repeat Munich!’
(François Mitterrand, 8 December 1989)‘We do not want to wake up one morning and find that … German reunification is to all intents and purposes on us’
(Charles Powell, 8 December 1989)‘We beat you twice, and now you are here again’
(Margaret Thatcher, 8 December 1989)‘When the historic moment allows it, let us have unity in our country’
(Helmut Kohl, 19 December 1989)Thatcher, Mitterrand and the EEC Strasbourg Council
This chapter explores Anglo-American views on the German question from late December 1989 until the spring of 1990. It shows how the Federal government's determination to press ahead with its version of German unity rapidly turned into a motive of Anglo- American controversy. While Whitehall denounced the risks of a hastened path towards unification, by mid-January 1990 the Bush administration backed Kohl's fast-track approach. Washington also endeavoured to reassure the Russians and its West European allies. Unable to influence American views, Thatcher initially turned to France, then she tried to delay unification with the Kremlin's help. Nonetheless, the British failed to work out an arrangement with either Paris or Moscow and London's initiatives to slow down unification were countered by the Bush administration. The US government pressed for a solution that would allow the two German states to play a role alongside the Four Powers in the unification process. In contrast, Whitehall tried to hold on to the remnants of Four Power sovereignty and only in the final stages of the negotiations supported US views.
In December 1989 Bonn's public calls for German unification had become a cause of serious concern in a number of European countries. These concerns had emerged first in early December at the NATO Brussels summit. On this occasion, the Italians and the British had expressed significant reservations about Kohl's ten points and Baker's four points.
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