Chapter 12 - Expressivism and convention-relativism about epistemic discourse

Summary

In this chapter, the author motivates anti-realism about epistemic normativity by appeal to philosophical naturalism, articulated convention-relativism about epistemic discourse, and defended convention-relativism. Realism and anti-realism are metaphysical views, about the explanatory relationship (if there is one) between epistemic value (for example) and the appropriateness of epistemic value attributions. In recent years, anti-realists about epistemic normativity have defended expressivist accounts of epistemic discourse, on which epistemic discourse is understood as expressive of non-cognitive attitudes of endorsement, acceptance, approval, or valuation. The chapter describes the expressivism about epistemic discourse and articulates the proposed alternative, convention-relativism about epistemic discourse. It presents an argument for convention-relativism, and offers an account of the apparent normativity of epistemic discourse. The doxastic conception of the epistemic is a natural assumption for those realists about epistemic normativity who appeal to the normativity of belief.