Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-6bf8c574d5-qdpjg Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-03-02T20:52:46.506Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2020

Francesco Ducci
Francesco Ducci
Affiliation:
New York University
Get access

Summary

A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Chapter
Information
Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets , pp. 167 - 182
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Primary Sources

Baumol, William J., Panzar, John C., and Willig, Robert D.. Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982).Google Scholar
Berg, Sanford V. and Tschirhart, John. Natural Monopoly Regulation: Principles and Practice, Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).Google Scholar
Blair, Roger D. and Sokol, D. Daniel, eds. The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bork, Robert H. The Antitrust Paradox, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1993).Google Scholar
Botsman, Rachel and Rogers, Roo. What’s Mine Is Yours: The Rise of Collaborative Consumption (New York: HarperCollins, 2010).Google Scholar
Chandler, Alfred D. Jr The Visible Hand (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).Google Scholar
Chopra, Sunil and Meindl, Peter. Supply Chain Management: Strategy, Planning, and Operation (Pearson: London, 2014).Google Scholar
Christensen, Clayton M. The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997).Google Scholar
Croley, Steven P. Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory Government (Cambridge, MA: Princeton University Press, 2009).Google Scholar
Elhauge, Einer and Geradin, Damien. Global Antitrust Law and Economics, 2nd ed., University Casebook Series (New York: Foundation Press Thomson/West 2011).Google Scholar
Evans, David and Schmalensee, Richard. Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2016).Google Scholar
Ezrachi, Ariel and Stucke, Maurice E.. Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fox, Eleanor M. and Trebilcock, Michael J.. The Design of Competition Law Institutions, Global Norms, Local Choices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).Google Scholar
Galloway, Scott. The Four: The Hidden DNA of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google (London: Penguin, 2017).Google Scholar
Goldin, Claudia and Katz, Lawrence F.. The Race Between Education and Technology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).Google Scholar
Kahn, Alfred. The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).Google Scholar
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tirole, Jean. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).Google Scholar
Lanier, Jaron. Who Owns The Future? (London: Penguin, 2013).Google Scholar
Letwin, William. Law and Economic Policy in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).Google Scholar
Marx, Karl. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1859).Google Scholar
McKee, Derek and Scassa, Teresa, eds. Law and the “Sharing Economy”: Regulating Online Market Platforms (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2018).Google Scholar
Motta, Massimo. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).Google Scholar
Parker, Geoffrey G., Van Alstyne, Marshall W., and Choudary, Sangeet Paul. Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets Are Transforming the Economy and How to Make Them Work for You (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016).Google Scholar
Peltzman, Sam and Winston, Clifford. Deregulation of Network Industries: What’s Next? (Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2000).Google Scholar
Posner, Richard. Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).Google Scholar
Ramanadham, V. V. The Economics of Public Enterprise (London: Routledge, 1991).Google Scholar
Rifkin, Jeremy. The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism (New York: Macmillan, 2014).Google Scholar
Roth, Alvin E. Who Gets What and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015).Google Scholar
Scherer, F. M. and Ross, David. Industrial Market structure and Economic Performance, 3rd ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1990).Google Scholar
Schmalensee, Richard. The Control of Natural Monopolies (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1979).Google Scholar
Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (London: Harper & Brothers, 1942).Google Scholar
Seager, Henry Rogers and Gulick, Charles Adams. Trust and Corporation Problems (New York: Harper, 1929).Google Scholar
Sharkey, William W. The Theory of Natural Monopoly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).Google Scholar
Shy, Oz. The Economics of Network Industries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).Google Scholar
Slee, Tom. What’s Yours Is Mine: Against the Sharing Economy (New York: Penguin, 2016).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Srinivasan, Bhu. Americana: A 400-Year History of American Capitalism (New York: Penguin, 2017).Google Scholar
Stone, Brad. The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon (New York: Little, Brown, 2013).Google Scholar
Sundararajan, Arun. The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016).Google Scholar
Susskind, Richard. The Future of Law: Facing the Challenges of Information Technology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Susskind, Richard and Susskind, Daniel. The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the Work of Human Experts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).Google Scholar
Taplin, Jonathan. Move Fast and Break Things: How Facebook, Google, and Amazon Cornered Culture and Undermined Democracy (New York: Little, Brown, 2017).Google Scholar
Tepper, Jonathan. The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death of Competition (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2018).Google Scholar
Tirole, Jean. Economics for the Common Good (Cambridge, MA: Princeton University Press, 2017).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trebilcock, Michael J., Winter, Ralph A., and Iacobucci, Edward M.. The Law and Economics of Canadian Competition Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).Google Scholar
Van, Parijs, Philippe and Vanderborght, Yannick. Basic Income, A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).Google Scholar
Vickers, John and Yarrow, George K.. Privatization: An Economic Analysis, MIT Press Series on the Regulation of Economic Activity 18 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver E. Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization (New York: Free Press, 1975).Google Scholar
Wu, Tim. The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010).Google Scholar
Wu, Tim. The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2018).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Secondary Sources

Abrahamson, Zachary. “Essential Data” (2014) 124, no. 3, Yale Law Journal, available at https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol124/iss3/7.Google Scholar
Aghion, Philippe, Bloom, Nick, Bundell, Richard, Griffith, Rachel, and Howitt, Peter. “Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship” (2005) 120, no. 2, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 701.Google Scholar
Akman, Pinar. “The Theory of Abuse in Google Search: A Positive and Normative Assessment Under EU Competition Law,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2811789 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2016).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alarie, Benjamin, Niblett, Anthony, and Yoon, Albert H.. “Law in the Future” (2016) 66, no. 4, UTLJ, 423.Google Scholar
Alchian, Armen and Demsetz, Harold. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization” (1972) 62, no. 5, American Economic Review, 777.Google Scholar
Amelio, Andrea and Jullien, Bruno. “Tying and Freebies in Two-Sided Markets” (2012) 30, no. 5, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 436.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Amelio, Andrea, Karlinger, Liliane, and Valletti, Tommaso. “Exclusionary Practices and Two-sided Platforms.” Note by Andrea Amelio, Liliane Karlinger, and Tommaso Valletti, “Hearing on Re-Thinking the Use of Traditional Antitrust Enforcement Tools in Multi-Sided Markets,” DAF/COMP/WD(2017)34/FINAL (OECD, 2017).Google Scholar
Anchustegui, Ignacio Herrera and Julian Nowag. “Buyer Power in the Big Data and Algorithm Driven World: the Uber and Lyft Example” (2017) CPI Antitrust Chronicle, available at www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CPI-Anchustegui-Nowag.pdf.Google Scholar
Andreu, Enrique and Padilla, Jorge. “Quantifying Horizontal Merger Efficiencies in Multi-Sided Markets: An Application to Stock Exchange Mergers” – Note by Enrique Andreu and Jorge Padilla, “Hearing on Re-Thinking the Use of Traditional Antitrust Enforcement Tools in Multi-Sided Markets,” DAF/COMP/WD(2017)37/FINAL (2017).Google Scholar
Areeda, Phillip. “Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles” (1989) 58 no. 3, Antitrust Law Journal, 841.Google Scholar
Argentesi, Elena and Filistrucchi, Lapo. “Estimating Market Power in a Two-Sided Market: The Case of Newspapers” (2007) 22, no. 7, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 1247.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Argentesi, Elena and Ivaldi, Marc. “Market Definition in the Printed Media Industry: Theory and Practice,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 779107 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2005).Google Scholar
Argenton, Cédric and Jens Prüfer, . “Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities” (2012) 8, no. 1 Jnl of Competition Law & Economics, 73.Google Scholar
Armstrong, Mark. “Competition in Two-Sided Markets” (2006) 37, no. 3, RAND Journal of Economics, 668.Google Scholar
Armstrong, Mark and Sappington, David E. M.. “Regulation, Competition and Liberalization” (2006) 44, no. 2, Journal of Economic Literature, 325.Google Scholar
Armstrong, Mark and Wright, Julian. “Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts” (2007) 32, no. 2, Economic Theory, 353.Google Scholar
Arrow, Kenneth. “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention” in The Rate and Direction of Economic Activities: Economic and Social Factors (Cambridge, MA: Princeton University Press, 1962).Google Scholar
Autor, David, Dorn, David, Katz, Lawrence F., Patterson, Christina, and Van Reenen., John “Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share” (2017) 107, no. 5, American Economic Review, 180.Google Scholar
Autor, David, Dorn, David, Katz, Lawrence F., Patterson, Christina, and Van Reenen., John. “The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms” (2017) Working Paper, available at https://scholar.harvard.edu/lkatz/publications/fall-labor-share-and-rise-superstar-firms.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Azar, José, Raina, Sahil, and Schmalz, Martin C. “Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2710252 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2016).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Azar, José, Schmalz, Martin C., and Tecu, Isabel. “Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2427345 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2018).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baker, Jonathan B. “Market Power in the U.S. Economy Today” (March 20, 2017), available at https://equitablegrowth.org/market-power-in-the-u-s-economy-today/.Google Scholar
Baker, Jonathan B. and Chevalier, Judith A.. “The Competitive Consequences of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions” (2012) 27, Antitrust, 20.Google Scholar
Baker, Jonathan B. and Morton, Fiona Scott. “Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform MFNs” (2018) 127, no. 7, Yale LJ, 2176.Google Scholar
Baker, Jonathan, Rose, Nancy, Salop, Steven, and Morton, Fiona Scott. “Five Principles for Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy,” Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works 2148–2019 (2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351391.Google Scholar
Barkai, Simcha. “Declining Labor and Capital Shares” (2017) Working Paper, available at www.london.edu/faculty-and-research/academic-research/d/declining-labor-and-capital-shares.Google Scholar
Baxter, William F. “Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives” (1983) 26, no. 3, Journal of Law and Economics, 541.Google Scholar
Behringer, Stefan and Filistrucchi, Lapo. “Areeda–Turner in Two-Sided Markets” (2015) 46, no. 3, Rev Ind Organ, 287.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Belleflamme, Paul and Peitz, Martin. “Platforms and Network Effects,” Working Papers 16–14 (University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, 2016).Google Scholar
Benkler, Yochai. “Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production” (2004) 114 Yale LJ, 273.Google Scholar
Bessen, James E. “Information Technology and Industry Concentration,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3044730 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2017).Google Scholar
Blonigen, Bruce A. and Pierce, Justin R.. “Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016–082 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), 2016).Google Scholar
Boffa, Federico and Filistrucchi, Lapo. “Optimal Cartel Prices in Two-Sided Markets” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2506510 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2014).Google Scholar
Boik, Andre and Corts, Kenneth S.. “The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Competition and Entry” (2016) 59, no. 1, Journal of Law and Economics, 105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bortolotti, B., Fantini, M, and Siniscalco, D. “Privatisation Around the World: Evidence from Panel Data” (2004) 88, no. 1–2, Journal of Public Economics, 305.Google Scholar
Bower, Joseph and Christensen, Clayton. “Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave” (1995) 73 Harvard Business Review, 43.Google Scholar
Brekke, Kurt. “Measuring Market Power in Multi-Sided Markets” – Note by Kurt Brekke, “Hearing on Re-Thinking the Use of Traditional Antitrust Enforcement Tools in Multi-Sided Markets,” DAF/COMP/WD(2017)31/FINAL (OECD, 2017).Google Scholar
Brill, Julie. “Statement of the Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices” Statement 111–0163 (Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission, 2013).Google Scholar
Brin, S. and Page, L. “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine” (1998) 30 Computer Networks and ISDN Systems, 107–117.Google Scholar
Budzinski, Oliver and Köhler, Karoline Henrike. “Is Amazon the Next Google?” Working Paper 97 (Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers, 2015).Google Scholar
Caillaud, Bernard and Jullien, Bruno. “Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers” (2003) 34, no. 2 RAND Journal of Economics, 309.Google Scholar
Cairns, Robert and Liston-Heyes, Catherine. “Competition and Regulation in the Taxi Industry” (1996) 59, no. 1, Journal of Public Economics, 1.Google Scholar
Carlton, Dennis W. and Waldman, Michael. “The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries” (2002) 33, no. 2 RAND Journal of Economics, 194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carlton, Dennis W. and Winter, Ralph A.. “Vertical MFN’s and the Credit Card No-Surcharge Rule,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2982115 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2018).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Casey, Anthony J. and Niblett, Anthony. “Self-Driving Laws” (2016) 66, no. 4, UTLJ, 429.Google Scholar
Cetin, Tamer and Deakin, Elizabeth. “Regulation of Taxis and the Rise of Ridesharing” (2017) Transport Policy, available at www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967070X17300409.Google Scholar
Chandra, Ambarish and Collard‐Wexler, Allan. “Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application to the Canadian Newspaper Industry” (2009) 18, no. 4, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1045.Google Scholar
Choi, Jay Pil and Jeon, oh-Shin. “A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2834821 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2016).Google Scholar
Coase, R. H. “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4, no. 16 Economica, 386.Google Scholar
Codagnone, Cristiano and Martens, Bertin. “Scoping the Sharing Economy: Origins, Definitions, Impact and Regulatory Issues,” JRC Technical Reports Institute for Prospective Technological Studies Digital Economy Working Paper JRC100369 (2016).Google Scholar
Collyer, Kate, Mullan, Hugh, and Timan, Natalie. “Measuring Market Power in Multi-Sided Markets” – Note by Kate Collyer, Hugh Mullan and Natalie Timan, DAF/COMP/WD(2017)35/FINAL (2017).Google Scholar
Cohen, Molly and Sundararajan, Arun. “Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy” (2015) 82 U Chi L Rev Dialogue, 116.Google Scholar
Cohen, Peter, et al. “Using Big Data to Estimate Consumer Surplus: The Case of Uber” (2016), available at awww.datascienceassn.org/sites/default/files/Using%20Big%20Data%20to%20Estimate%20Consumer%20Surplus%20at%20Uber.pdf.Google Scholar
Cornière, Alexandre de and Greg, Taylor. “Integration and Search Engine Bias” (2014) 45, no. 3, RAND Journal of Economics, 576.Google Scholar
Crane, Daniel A. “Balancing Effects Across Markets” (2015) 80, no. 2, Antitrust Law Journal, 397.Google Scholar
De Loecker, Jan, Eeckhout, Jan, and Unger, Gabriel. “The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications,” Draft, November 22, 2018.Google Scholar
Decker, Ryan, Haltiwanger, John, Jarmin, Ron, and Miranda, Javier. “The Role of Entrepreneurship in US Job Creation and Economic Dynamism” (2014) 28, no. 3, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3.Google Scholar
Decker, Ryan, Haltiwanger, John, Jarmin, Ron, and Miranda, Javier.“The Secular Decline in Business Dynamism in the U.S.,” Working Paper (Ann Arbor: University of Maryland, 2014).Google Scholar
Delbono, Flavio and Lambertini, Luca. “Innovation and Product Market Concentration: Schumpeter, Arrow and the Inverted-U Shape Curve,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2981677 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2017).Google Scholar
Demsetz, Harold. “The Cost of Transacting” (1968) 82, no. 1, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 33.Google Scholar
Demsetz, Harold. “Why Regulate Utilities?” (1968) 11, no. 1, Journal of Law and Economics, 55.Google Scholar
Demsetz, Harold. “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint” (1969) 12 J Law Econ, 1.Google Scholar
Dempsey, Paul Stephen. “Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation, and Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2241306 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 1996).Google Scholar
Dewenter, Ralf, Haucap, Justus, and Wenzel, Tobias. “Semi-Collusion in Media Markets” (2011) 31, no. 2, International Review of Law and Economics, 92.Google Scholar
Dolmans, Maurits and Graf, Thomas. “Analysis of Tying Under Article 82 EC: The European Commission’s Microsoft Decision in Perspective” (2004) 27, no. 2, World Competition, 225.Google Scholar
Dou, Zhicheng, Song, Ruihua, and Wen, Ji-Rong. “A Large-scale Evaluation and Analysis of Personalized Search Strategies” (2007) New York: ACM, available at https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1242651Google Scholar
Dube, Aindrajit, et al. “Monopsony in On-line Labor Markets” (2018) Draft (Paper under Preparation).Google Scholar
Ducci, Francesco. “Procedural Implications of Market Definition in Platform Cases” (jnz017, 2019) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement.Google Scholar
Ducci, Francesco and Michael, Trebilcock. “The Revival of Fairness Discourse in Competition Policy” (2019) 64 The Antitrust Bulletin, 79–104.Google Scholar
Economides, Nicholas and Lianos, Ioannis. “The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases” (2009) 76 Antitrust Law Journal, 483–567.Google Scholar
Edelman, Benjamin G. “Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?” (2015) 11, no. 2, Journal of Competition Law and Economics.Google Scholar
Edelman, Benjamin G. and Geradin, Damien. “Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber” (2015) 19 Stan Tech L Rev, 293.Google Scholar
Edelman, Benjamin G. and Wright, Julian. “Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2513513 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2015).Google Scholar
Einav, Liran, Farronato, Chiara, and Levin, Jonathan. “Peer-to-Peer Markets” (2016) 8, no. 1, Annual Review of Economics, 615.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elhauge, Einer. “Horizontal Shareholding” (2015) 129 Harv L Rev, 1267.Google Scholar
Evans, David S. “The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets” (2003) 20 Yale J on Reg, 325.Google Scholar
Evans, David S.. “Multisided Platforms, Dynamic Competition, and the Assessment of Market Power for Internet-Based Firms,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2746095 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2016).Google Scholar
Evans, David S.. “Why the Dynamics of Competition for Online Platforms Leads to Sleepless Nights But Not Sleepy Monopolies,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3009438 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2017).Google Scholar
Evans, David S. and Noel, Michael. “Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate Two-Sided Platforms” (2005) 2005 Colum Bus L Rev, 667.Google Scholar
Evans, David S. and Schmalensee., Richard “The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms,” NBER Working Paper No. 11603 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005).Google Scholar
Evans, David S. and Schmalensee., Richard. “The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-sided Platform Businesses” in Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).Google Scholar
Evans, David S. and Schmalensee., Richard. “Debunking the ‘Network Effects’ Bogeyman,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3148121 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2017).Google Scholar
Evans, David S. and Schmalensee., Richard. “Network Effects: March to the Evidence Not to the Slogans,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3027691 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2017).Google Scholar
Evans, David S. and Schmalensee., Richard. “Ignoring Two-Sided Business Reality Can Also Hurt Plaintiffs” (2018) Competition Policy International.Google Scholar
Ezrachi, Ariel and Stucke, Maurice E. “Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition” (2017) 2017 U Ill L Rev, 1775.Google Scholar
Farrell, Joseph and Katz, Michael L. “Competition or Predation? Consumer Coordination, Strategic Pricing and Price Floors in Network Markets” (2005) 53, no. 2, Journal of Industrial Economics, 203.Google Scholar
Farrell, Joseph and Saloner, Garth. “Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation” (1985) 16, no. 1, RAND Journal of Economics, 70.Google Scholar
Farronato, Chiara and Fradkin, Audrey. “Market Structure with the Entry of Peer-to-Peer Platforms: The Case of Hotels and Airbnb” (2016) Unpublished Draft, available at https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=IIOC2016&paper_id=285.Google Scholar
Filistrucchi, Lapo. “How Many Markets Are Two-Sided?” (2011) 1 Antitrust Chronicle, available at https://econpapers.repec.org/article/cpiatchrn/1.1.2011_3ai=5804.htm.Google Scholar
Filistrucchi, Lapo.“Market Definition in Multi-Sided Markets” – Note by Dr Lapo Filistrucchi, “Hearing on Re-Thinking the Use of Traditional Antitrust Enforcement Tools in Multi-Sided Markets,” DAF/COMP/WD(2017)27/FINAL (OECD, 2017).Google Scholar
Filistrucchi, Lapo, Geradin, Damien, and Eric, Van Damme. “Identifying Two-Sided Markets” (2013) 36 World Competition, 33.Google Scholar
Filistrucchi, Lapo, Geradin, Damien, Damme, Eric Van, and Affeldt, Pauline. “Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: Theory And Practice” (2014) 10, no. 2, Jnl of Competition Law & Economics, 293.Google Scholar
Filistrucchi, Lapo, Klein, Tobias J., and Michielsen, Thomas O.. “Assessing Unilateral Merger Effects In a Two-Sided Market: An Application to the Dutch Daily Newspaper Market” (2012) 8, no. 2, Jnl of Competition Law & Economics, 297.Google Scholar
Fletcher, Amelia. “Predatory Pricing in Two-Sided Markets: A Brief Comment,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 987875 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2007).Google Scholar
Gal, Michal and Rubinfeld, Daniel L.. “The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement” (2016) 80, no. 401, Antitrust Law Journal, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2529425.Google Scholar
Gallick, Edward C. and Sisk, David E.. “A Reconsideration of Taxi Regulation” (1987) 3, no. 1, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 117.Google Scholar
Gallick, Edward C. and Sisk, David E.. “Specialized Assets and Taxi Regulation: An Inquiry into the Possible Efficiency Motivation of Regulation,” Working Paper No. 119 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 1984).Google Scholar
Gegax, Douglas and Nowotny, Kenneth. “Competition and the Electric Utility Industry: An Evaluation” (1993) 10, no. 1, Yale Journal on Regulation, available at https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjreg/vol10/iss1/4.Google Scholar
Gibbons, Robert. “Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?” (2005) 58, no. 2, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, Victor P. “Regulation and Administered Contracts” (1976) 7, no. 2, Bell Journal of Economics, 426.Google Scholar
Goolsbee, Austan and Chevalier, Judith. “Measuring Prices and Price Competition Online: Amazon and Barnes and Noble,” NBER Working Papers 9085 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2002).Google Scholar
Greenfield, Rebecca. “Why Google Pays Apple $1 Billion a Year”, The Atlantic (February 12, 2013), available at www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/02/why-google-pays-apple-1-billion-year/318451/.Google Scholar
Grossman, Sanford J. and Hart, Oliver D.. “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration” (1986) 94, no. 4. Journal of Political Economy, 691.Google Scholar
Grullon, Gustavo, Larkin, Yelena, and Michaely, Roni. “Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated?,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2612047 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2018).Google Scholar
Hagiu, Andrei and Wright, Julian. “Marketplace or Reseller?” (2014) 61, no. 1, Management Science, 184.Google Scholar
Hagiu, Andrei and Wright, Julian. “Multi-Sided Platforms,” Working Paper No. 15–037 (Harvard Business School, 2014).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hart, Oliver and Moore, John. “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm” (1990) 98, no. 6, Journal of Political Economy, 1119.Google Scholar
Hart, Oliver and Moore, John. “Contracts as Reference Points” (2008) 123, no. 1, Q J Econ, 1.Google Scholar
Holmstrom, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul. “The Firm as an Incentive System” (1994) 84, no. 4, American Economic Review, 972.Google Scholar
Hoofnagle, Chris Jay and Whittington, Jan. “Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular Price” (2013) 61 UCLA L Rev, 606.Google Scholar
Hu, H., et al. “Toward Scalable Systems for Big Data Analytics: A Technology Tutorial” (2014) 2 IEEE Access, 652.Google Scholar
Hunt, Robert M. “An Introduction to the Economics of Payment Card Networks” (2003) 2, no. 2, Review of Network Economics, available at www.degruyter.com/view/j/rne.2003.2.issue-2/rne.2003.2.2.1020/rne.2003.2.2.1020.xml.Google Scholar
Iacobucci, Edward. “Tying as Quality Control: A Legal and Economic Analysis,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 293602 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2001).Google Scholar
Iacobucci, Edward. “The Superior Propane Saga: The Efficiencies Defence in Canada” in Competition Law Around the World in Fourteen Stories (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2013).Google Scholar
Iacobucci, Edward and Ducci, Francesco. “The Google Search Case in Europe: Tying and the Single Monopoly Profit Theorem in Two-Sided Markets” (2019) 47, no. 1, European Journal of Law and Economics, 15.Google Scholar
Iacobucci, Edward M. and Trebilcock, Michael J.. “The Design of Regulatory Institutions for the Canadian Telecommunications Sector” (2007) Canadian Public Policy, available at www.utpjournals.press/doi/abs/10.3138/cpp.33.2.127.Google Scholar
Iacobucci, Edward M. and Trebilcock, Michael J..“The Role of Crown Corporations in the Canadian Economy: An Analytical Framework” (2012), available at https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/handle/1807/89449.Google Scholar
Jiang, Yabing. “E-Book Platform Competition in the Presence of Two-Sided Network Externalities,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2164395 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2012).Google Scholar
Joskow, Paul. “Regulation of Natural Monopoly” in Handbook of Law and Economics (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), p. 1227.Google Scholar
Joskow, Paul. “Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks” in Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), p. 291.Google Scholar
Jullien, Bruno. “Competition in Multi-sided Markets: Divide and Conquer” (2011) 3, no. 4, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 186.Google Scholar
Karabarbounis, Loukas and Neiman, Brent. “The Global Decline of the Labor Share” (2014) 129, no. 1, Q J Econ, 61.Google Scholar
Katz, Michael. “Exclusionary Conduct in Multi-Sided Markets” – Note by Michael Katz (OECD, 2017).Google Scholar
Katz, Michael and Sallet, Jonathan, “Multisided Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement (2017) 127 Yale Law Journal, 2142.Google Scholar
Katz, Michael L. and Shapiro, Carl. “Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility” (1985) 75, no. 3, American Economic Review, 424.Google Scholar
Khan, Lina M. “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox” (2016) 126 Yale L J, 710.Google Scholar
Kirkwood, John B. “Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-Books, and Antitrust Policy” (2014) 69 U Miami L Rev, 1.Google Scholar
Klein, Benjamin, Crawford, Robert G. and Alchian, Armen A.. “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process” (1978) 21, no. 2, Journal of Law and Economics, 297.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lao, Marina. “Networks, Access, and Essential Facilities: From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft” (2009) 62 SMU L Rev, 557.Google Scholar
Lao, Marina. “Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal” (2012) 11 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 275.Google Scholar
Lao, Marina. “‘Neutral’ Search as a Basis for Antitrust Action?,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2245295 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2013).Google Scholar
Lee, Robin S. “Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets” (2013) 103, no. 7, American Economic Review, 2960.Google Scholar
Lefouili, Yassine and Pinho, Joana. “Collusion in Two-Sided Markets,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3049356 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2017).Google Scholar
Lerner, Andres V. “The Role of ‘Big Data’ in Online Platform Competition,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2482780 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2014).Google Scholar
Lipsky, Abbott B. Jr and Gregory Sidak, J. “Essential Facilities” (1998) 51 Stan L Rev, 1187.Google Scholar
Luca, Michael, et al. “Does Google Content Degrade Google Search? Experimental Evidence,” Harvard Business School Working Paper 16–035 (Harvard Business School, 2016).Google Scholar
Luchetta, Giacomo. “Is the Google Platform a Two-Sided Market?” (2014) 10, no. 1, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 185.Google Scholar
Maurer, Stephen M. and Scotchmer, Suzanne. “The Essential Facilities Doctrine: The Lost Message of Terminal Railroad,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2407071 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2014).Google Scholar
Medvedovsky, Konstantin. “Antitrust Chronicle – Hipster Antitrust” (April 18, 2018), available at Competition Policy International www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/antitrust-chronicle-hipster-antitrust/.Google Scholar
Moore, Adrian T. and Balaker, Ted. “Do Economists Reach a Conclusion on Taxi Deregulation?” (2006) 3, no. 2, Econ J Watch, 109.Google Scholar
Munoz, Cecilia, Smith, Megan, and Patil, D. J.. “Big Data: A Report on Algorithmic Systems,” Opportunity, and Civil Rights, Obama Administration’s Big Data Working Group (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, 2016).Google Scholar
Naidu, Suresh, Posner, Eric A., and Glen Weyl, E. “Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3129221 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2018).Google Scholar
Netter, Jeffry M. and Megginson, William L.. “From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization” (2001) 39, no. 2, Journal of Economic Literature, 321.Google Scholar
Ohlhausen, Maureen K. “Antitrust Enforcement in the Digital Age” (2017) Remarks Before the Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium Georgetown University.Google Scholar
Pagano, Anthony M. and McKnight, Claire E.. “Economies of Scale in the Taxicab Industry: Some Empirical Evidence from the United States” (1983) 17, no. 3, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 299.Google Scholar
Parker, Geoffrey G. and Van Alstyne, Marshall W.. “Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design” (2005) 51, no. 10, Management Science, 1494.Google Scholar
Pasquale, Frank and Bracha, Oren. “Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness and Accountability in the Law of Search” (2008) 93 Cornell Law Review, 1149.Google Scholar
Peltzman, Sam. “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation” (1976) 19, no. 2, Journal of Law and Economics, 211.Google Scholar
Pitofsky, Robert, Patterson, Donna, and Hooks, Jonathan. “The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under United States Antitrust Law” (2002) 70 Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works, 443.Google Scholar
Pollock, Rufus. “Is Google the Next Microsoft: Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Online Search” (2010) 9, no. 4, Review of Network Economics, available at www.degruyter.com/view/j/rne.2010.9.issue-4/rne.2010.9.4.1240/rne.2010.9.4.1240.xml.Google Scholar
Posner, Eric A. “Why Uber Will – And Should – Be Regulated” Slate (January 5, 2015), available at: www.law.uchicago.edu/news/eric-posner-why-uber-will-and-should-be-regulated.Google Scholar
Posner, Eric A., Scott Morton, Fiona M., and Weyl, E. Glen. “A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2872754 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2017).Google Scholar
Posner, Richard. “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation” (1973) Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics, 335.Google Scholar
Rauch, Daniel and Schleicher, David. “Like Uber, But for Local Governmental Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2549919 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2015).Google Scholar
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Tirole, Jean. “An Economic Analysis of the Determination of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems” (2003) 2, no. 2, Review of Network Economics, 69.Google Scholar
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Tirole, Jean. “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets” (2003) 1, no. 4, Journal of the European Economic Association, 990.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Tirole, Jean. “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report” (2006) 37, no. 3, RAND Journal of Economics, 645.Google Scholar
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Tirole, Jean. “Tying-in Two-Sided Markets and the Honour All Cards Rule,” CEPR Discussion Papers 6132 (2007) C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.Google Scholar
Rohlfs, Jeffrey. “A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service” (1974) 5, no. 1, Bell Journal of Economics, 16.Google Scholar
Romanyuk, Gleb and Smolin, Alex. “Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, available at www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20170154.Google Scholar
Rosse, James N. “Daily Newspapers, Monopolistic Competition, and Economies of Scale” (1967) 57, no. 2, American Economic Review, 522.Google Scholar
Ruhmer, Isabel. “Platform Collusion in Two-Sided Markets” (Frankfurt a. M.: Verein für Socialpolitik, 2010).Google Scholar
Rysman, Marc. “Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages” (2004) 71, no. 2, Rev Econ Stud, 483.Google Scholar
Rysman, Marc. “The Economics of Two-Sided Markets” (2009) 23, no. 3, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 125.Google Scholar
Salop, Steven C. “Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3052332 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2018).Google Scholar
Shapiro, Carl. “Antitrust in a Time of Populism,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3058345 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2017).Google Scholar
Shapiro, Carl. “Protecting Competition in the American Economy: Merger, Control, Tech Titans, Labour Markets” (2019) 33 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 69.Google Scholar
Shelanski, Howard A. and Gregory Sidak, J. “Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries” (2001) 68 U Chi L Rev, 1.Google Scholar
Shleifer, Andrei. “State versus Private Ownership” (1998) 12, no. 4, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 133.Google Scholar
Smith, D., Andrew, C, and Trebilcock, Michael J. “State-Owned Enterprises in Less Developed Countries: Privatization and Alternative Reform Strategies” (2001) 12, no. 3, European Journal of Law and Economics, 217.Google Scholar
Stigler, George. “The Theory of Economic Regulation” (1971) 2, no. 1, Bell Journal of Economics, 3.Google Scholar
Stiglitz, Joseph. “Toward a Broader View of Competition Policy” in Competition Policy for the New Era: Insights from the BRICS Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 4.Google Scholar
Stucke, Maurice E. and Ezrachi, Ariel. “When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines” (2016) 18 Yale JL & Tech, 70.Google Scholar
Stucke, Maurice E. and Grunes, Allen P.. “Debunking the Myths Over Big Data and Antitrust” (2015) Legal Studies Research Paper Series Research Paper, 276 University of Tennessee.Google Scholar
Taplin, Jonathan. “Opinion: Is It Time to Break Up Google?”, New York Times (January 20, 2018), available at www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/opinion/sunday/is-it-time-to-break-up-google.html.Google Scholar
Thepot, Florence. “Market Power in Online Search and Social Networking: A Matter of Two-Sided Markets” (2013) 36, no. 2, World Competition, 195.Google Scholar
Trebilcock, Michael J. “The Fracturing of the Post-War Free Trade Consensus: The Challenges of Reconstructing a New Consensus,” Paper Delivered at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law (2017).Google Scholar
Tucker, Darren S. and Wellford, Hill. “Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2549044 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2014).Google Scholar
Varian, Hal R. “Economics of Information Technology” (2003) University of California, Berkeley, available at http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/mattioli/mattioli.pdf.Google Scholar
Waller, Spencer and Frischmann, Brett. “Revitalizing Essential Facilities” (2008) 74, no. 1, Faculty Publications & Other Works, available at https://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs/72.Google Scholar
Ward, Patrick “Testing for Multisided Platform Effects in Antitrust Market Definition” (2017) 84 University of Chicago Law Review, 2059.Google Scholar
Werden, Gregory J. “The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine” (1987) 32 St Louis U LJ, 433.Google Scholar
Werden, Gregory J.. “Cross-Market Balancing of Competitive Effects: What Is the Law, and What Should It Be” (2017) 43 J Corp L, 119.Google Scholar
Weyl, E. Glen. “A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms” (2010) 100, no. 4, American Economic Review, 1642.Google Scholar
Weyl, E. Glen and White, Alexander. “Let the Right ‘One’ Win: Policy Lessons from the New Economics of Platforms” (2014) Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics No. 709–2014.Google Scholar
Wismer, Sebastian and Rasek, Arno. “Market Definition in Multi-sided Markets” – Note by Sebastian Wismer and Arno Rasek, “Hearing on Re-Thinking the Use of Traditional Antitrust Enforcement Tools in Multi-Sided Markets,” DAF/COMP/WD(2017)33/FINAL (2017).Google Scholar
Whinston, Michael. “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion” (1990) 80, no. 4, American Economic Review, 837.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver. “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs” (1968) 58, no. 1, American Economic Review, 18.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver. “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations” (1971) 61, no. 2, American Economic Review, 112.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver. “Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies-in General and with Respect to CATV” (1976) 7, no. 1, Bell Journal of Economics, 73.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver. “Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach” (1979) 127, no. 4, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 953.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver. “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations” (1979) 22, no. 2, Journal of Law and Economics, 233.Google Scholar
Winston, Clifford. “Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists” (1993) 31, no. 3, Journal of Economic Literature, 1263.Google Scholar
Wright, Joshua and John, Yun, “Burdens and Balancing in Multisided Markets: The First Principles Approach of Ohio v. American Express” (forthcoming, 2019) Review of Industrial Organization.Google Scholar
Wu, Tim. “Antitrust via Rulemaking: Competition Catalysts,” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3058114 (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2017).Google Scholar
Wu, Tim. “After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The ‘Protection of Competition’ Standard in Practice” (2018) CPI Antitrust Chronicle, available at www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CPI-Wu.pdf.Google Scholar
Wu, Tim. “The American Express Opinion, Tech Platforms & the Rule of Reason” (forthcoming, 2018) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326667.Google Scholar
Zervas, Georgios, Proserpio, Davide, and Byers, John W.. “The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry” (2017) 54, no. 5, Journal of Marketing Research, 687.Google Scholar
Zhu, Feng and Liu, Quihong. “Competing with Complementors: An Empirical Look at Amazon.com” (2015), available at https://mackinstitute.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Zhu-Feng-Liu-Qihong_Competing-with-Complementors.-An-Empirical-Look-at-Amazon.com_.pdf.Google Scholar
Zingales, Luigi. “Towards a Political Theory of the Firm” (2017) 31, no. 3, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 113.Google Scholar
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report (2019).Google Scholar
Autorité de la Concurrence & the Bundeskartellamt. Competition Law and Data (2016).Google Scholar
Bundeskartellamt. Amazon Removes Price Parity Obligation for Retailers on Its Marketplace Platform, Case Report B6-46/12 (2013).Google Scholar
Competition Act, RSC, 1985, c. C. 34.Google Scholar
Competition Bureau of Canada. Big Data and Innovation: Implications for Competition Policy in Canada, Draft for Public Consultation (Gatineau: QC, 2017).Google Scholar
European Commission. Communication from the Commission – Notice – Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), Guidelines Document 52004XC0427(07) (European Commission, 2004).Google Scholar
European Commission.. Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, Guidance Document OJ C 45, 24.2.2009 (Brussels: European Commission, 2009).Google Scholar
European Commission.. Antitrust: Commission Probes Allegations of Antitrust Violations by Google, Press Release IP/10/1624 (Brussels: European Commission, 2010).Google Scholar
European Commission.. Antitrust: Commission Seeks Feedback on Commitments Offered by Google to Address Competition Concerns, Press Release (Brussels: European Commission, 2013).Google Scholar
European Commission..Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Investigation Against Google in Relation to Android Mobile Operating System, Fact Sheet Memo/15/4782 (Brussels: European Commission, 2015).Google Scholar
European Commission..Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google on Comparison Shopping Service, Fact Sheet Memo/15/4781 (Brussels: European Commission, 2015).Google Scholar
European Commission.. Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google on Comparison Shopping Service; Opens Separate Formal Investigation on Android, Press Release (Brussels: European Commission, 2015).Google Scholar
European Commission..Antitrust: Commission Takes Further Steps in Investigations Alleging Google’s Comparison Shopping and Advertising-Related Practices Breach EU Rules, Press Release (Brussels: European Commission, 2016).Google Scholar
European Commission..Mergers: Commission Alleges Facebook Provided Misleading Information About WhatsApp Takeover, Press Release (Brussels: European Commission, 2016).Google Scholar
European Commission.. Antitrust: Commission Accepts Commitments from Amazon on E-books, Press Release IP/17/1223 (2017).Google Scholar
European Commission.. Mergers: Commission Fines Facebook €110 Million for Providing Misleading Information About WhatsApp Takeover, Press Release (Brussels: European Commission, 2017).Google Scholar
European Commission..Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, Working Document (Brussels: European Commission, 2017).Google Scholar
European Commission..Competition Policy for the Digital Era, Final Report (April 4, 2019).Google Scholar
European Union. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2016] OJ C202/1.Google Scholar
Federal Trade Commission. FTC Consumer Protection Staff Updates Agency’s Guidance to Search Engine Industry on the Need to Distinguish Between Advertisements and Search Results, Press Release (Washington, D.C., 2013).Google Scholar
Federal Trade Commission. Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion? Understanding the Issues, FTC Report (2016).Google Scholar
Ramirez, Edith, Ohlhausen, Maureen K., and McSweeny, Terrell P.. The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants & Regulators, Federal Trade Commission Staff Report (Federal Trade Commission, 2016).Google Scholar
ILSR Report. Mitchell, Stacy and Olivia, LaVecchia. Report: How Amazon’s Tightening Grip on the Economy Is Stifling Competition, Eroding Jobs, and Threatening Communities (November 29, 2016) Institute for Local Self-Reliance.Google Scholar
OECD. Two Sided Markets. Report and supporting documents (2009).Google Scholar
OECD. Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value. OECD Digital Economy Papers No. 22 (2013).Google Scholar
OECD. Data-Driven Innovation (2015).Google Scholar
OECD. Disruptive Innovations and Their Effect on Competition (2015).Google Scholar
OECD. Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era (2016).Google Scholar
OECD. Working Party on Measurement and Analysis of the Digital Economy. New Forms of Work in the Digital Economy, Background Report JT03398022 (Committee on Digital Economy Policies CDEP, 2016).Google Scholar
OECD. Rethinking Antitrust Tools for Multi-Sided Platforms (2018).Google Scholar
Price Waterhouse Coopers. The Sharing Economy, Consumer Intelligence Series (2015).Google Scholar
Sherman Act, 1890, USC.Google Scholar
University of Chicago Booth School of Business – George Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, Report by the Committee for the Study of Digital Platforms Market Structure and Antitrust Subcommittee (2019).Google Scholar
UK Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, Unlocking Digital Competition (2019).Google Scholar
US Council of Economic Advisers. Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power, Issues Brief (Washington, DC: Obama White House, 2016).Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Bibliography
  • Francesco Ducci, New York University
  • Book: Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets
  • Online publication: 30 June 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108867528.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Bibliography
  • Francesco Ducci, New York University
  • Book: Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets
  • Online publication: 30 June 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108867528.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Bibliography
  • Francesco Ducci, New York University
  • Book: Natural Monopolies in Digital Platform Markets
  • Online publication: 30 June 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108867528.008
Available formats
×