Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Perceptual, Reflective and Affective Consciousness as Existence?
- The Domain of Folk Psychology
- Minds, Persons and the Unthinkable
- Moderately Massive Modularity
- A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts
- Free Will and the Burden of Proof
- Materialism and the First Person
- Language, Belief and Human Beings
- Human Minds
- Non-Personal Minds
- Personal Agency
- Mental Substances
- Mind and Illusion
- Index
Human Minds
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Perceptual, Reflective and Affective Consciousness as Existence?
- The Domain of Folk Psychology
- Minds, Persons and the Unthinkable
- Moderately Massive Modularity
- A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts
- Free Will and the Burden of Proof
- Materialism and the First Person
- Language, Belief and Human Beings
- Human Minds
- Non-Personal Minds
- Personal Agency
- Mental Substances
- Mind and Illusion
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Humans are part of the animal kingdom, but their minds differ from those of other animals. They are capable of many things that lie beyond the intellectual powers of the rest of the animal realm. In this paper, I want to ask what makes human minds distinctive. What accounts for the special powers that set humans aside from other animals?
Unfortunately, I shall not fare particularly well in answering this question. I shall explore some possible answers, but none will prove fully satisfactory. In effect, then, this paper will tell the story of a failure. Still, it is a story worth telling, for it is an interesting failure, I think, and one with significant morals for the study of human minds.
Before proceeding, let me put to one side one familiar answer to my question. Most people, if asked what distinguishes humans from animals, would probably answer—‘language’. Now, I certainly do not want to deny that our uniquely human facility with language plays some part in differentiating us intellectually from other animals. But it seems to me that, on its own, ‘language’ does not add up to a satisfying answer to my question. For we still need to know what humans do with language. Does language matter to human cognition because it enhances communication of facts, or because it facilitates social coordination, or because it allows records to be kept, or inferences to be drawn, or what?
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- Minds and Persons , pp. 159 - 184Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003
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