5 - Measures

Summary

As a preliminary to discussing the idea that, for Aristotle, sensibility and intelligence are “measures” of their respective objects, in this chapter I discuss Aristotle’s conception of “measure.” Though the devil is in the details, the fundamental point is tolerably clear. It is that measures for knowing the objects of some genus are prior to – enter into the very idea of – certain particular forms of that genus. The inch, for example, is a measure of length, and it enters into the very idea of certain particular lengths, e.g. one inch, two inches, three inches, and so on. Similarly, if straight is the measure of linear shape, it enters into the very idea of certain particular shapes, e.g. straight and curved. In this way and in this sense, measures are “forms of forms”: that is, what it is to be certain particular quantities or qualities of a genus is to stand in some relation to the “measure” of that genus.