7 - The politics of positivism: disinterested predictions from interested agents

Summary

Politics in “The methodology”

Of the six sections composing “The methodology of positive economics” (F53), the first (“The relation between positive and normative economics”) is apparently the least discussed in the F53 literature, probably as a result of it being not only the shortest section, but also the least relevant for the issue of realism. In view of Milton Friedman's subsequent career as a political preacher, one wonders whether this first section ruled it in the way the other five directed Friedman's scientific performance. After all, the role of prediction in defining positive economics was already advanced therein: when an economist predicts, his or her results are “independent of any particular ethical position or normative judgments.” This is also why positive economics is a politically relevant discipline: as long as the differences about economic policy — among disinterested citizens — derive only from different predictions about the economic consequences of taking action, these differences could be eliminated by the progress of positive economics. Our plan in this chapter is to present, in the first place, the role of political motivations in the development of Friedman's methodological stance. As we will discuss in section 2, Friedman was involved in the policy-making process right from the beginning of his professional career, and was able to experience at first hand the relevance of economic predictions in generating a consensus not only among politicians or the public opinion, but among the profession itself. Conversely, Friedman could also appreciate how difficult it was to reach a consensus on a particular policy when the economists disagreed on its practical consequences.