5. - Godfrey of Fontaines (d. ca. 1306), Quodlibet II, q. 4:

Summary

In this text, Godfrey asks whether a created substance can be the immediate principle of its operation. ‘Power’ and ‘immediate principle of operation’ are synonymous terms here. Hence, the question that Godfrey raises is this: is a substance a power? Godfrey’s answer is nuanced. Like Albert and Aquinas, Godfrey adheres to the view that powers like sight and the intellect are propria or necessary accidents distinct from the soul. However, he openly rejects Aquinas’ Category Argument for the distinction theory because he finds Henry’s regress argument against the claim that a power must be in the same category as its act convincing. The regress argument also leads Godfrey to argue that there is, in addition to such powers as the intellect and sight, what we might call a higher-order power of the soul. This higher-order power is the soul’s power to bear such powers as the intellect and sight. Unlike the intellect and sight, this power to bear powers is identical to the soul, Godfrey thinks. Thus, Godfrey defends the Thomistic distinction theory; but he also makes a concession to Henry by arguing that the soul is at least one power through its essence, namely, a higher-order power.