Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T02:22:59.665Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Searching for a “creative peace”: European integration and the origins of the Marshall Plan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2009

Get access

Summary

The marshall plan rested squarely on an American conviction that European economic recovery was essential to the long-term interests of the United States. These interests were interdependent and mutually reinforcing, so much so that public officials saw little need to rank them in the order that subsequent historians have tried to establish. They included economic interests. Policymakers in the Truman administration were convinced that a “dynamic economy” at home required American trade and investment abroad, which in turn required the reconstruction of major trading partners in Europe and their reintegration into a multilateral system of world trade. These requirements summed up a world view rooted in political conviction as well as in economic interests. American leaders envisioned an open international economy founded on the principles of liberal capitalism, such as free trade and equal opportunity. But they also equated these principles with democratic forms of government, associated autarkic economic policies with totalitarian political regimes, and assumed that “enemies in the market place” could not be “friends at the council table.” “The political line up followed the economic line up,” as Cordell Hull once put it.

Strategic interests paralleled those of an economic and political nature. American policymakers viewed European markets, sources of supply, manpower resources, and industrial capacity as strategic assets that must not be controlled by a hostile power or coalition. The recent war had demonstrated the threat to American security inherent in such a development and the concomitant need to preserve American access to Europe's resources while denying them to potential rivals.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Marshall Plan
America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952
, pp. 26 - 53
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1987

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×