Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editors' preface
- Preface
- Introduction: Toward the Marshall Plan: from New Era designs to New Deal synthesis
- 1 Searching for a “creative peace”: European integration and the origins of the Marshall Plan
- 2 Paths to plenty: European recovery planning and the American policy compromise
- 3 European union or middle kingdom: Anglo–American formulations, the German problem, and the organizational dimension of the ERP
- 4 Strategies of transnationalism: the ECA and the politics of peace and productivity
- 5 Changing course: European integration and the traders triumphant
- 6 Two worlds or three: the sterling crisis, the dollar gap, and the integration of Western Europe
- 7 Between union and unity: European integration and the sterling–dollar dualism
- 8 Holding the line: the ECA's efforts to reconcile recovery and rearmament
- 9 Guns and butter: politics and diplomacy at the end of the Marshall Plan
- Conclusion: America made the European way
- Bibliography
- Index
5 - Changing course: European integration and the traders triumphant
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editors' preface
- Preface
- Introduction: Toward the Marshall Plan: from New Era designs to New Deal synthesis
- 1 Searching for a “creative peace”: European integration and the origins of the Marshall Plan
- 2 Paths to plenty: European recovery planning and the American policy compromise
- 3 European union or middle kingdom: Anglo–American formulations, the German problem, and the organizational dimension of the ERP
- 4 Strategies of transnationalism: the ECA and the politics of peace and productivity
- 5 Changing course: European integration and the traders triumphant
- 6 Two worlds or three: the sterling crisis, the dollar gap, and the integration of Western Europe
- 7 Between union and unity: European integration and the sterling–dollar dualism
- 8 Holding the line: the ECA's efforts to reconcile recovery and rearmament
- 9 Guns and butter: politics and diplomacy at the end of the Marshall Plan
- Conclusion: America made the European way
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The first half of 1949 saw unmistakable signs of progress toward the strategic and economic goals on the American agenda for Western Europe. Policymakers began to coordinate their economic and military policies and negotiate agreements looking toward the formation of a West German government. They also extended the transnational pattern of public–private power sharing, further strengthened the OEEC, and helped to revise the intra-European payments plan. In addition, industrial output in the OEEC countries climbed 18 percent above 1938 figures, agricultural production went up, Western Europe's overall volume of trade recovered to prewar levels, and many participating countries made progress in curbing inflation and balancing budgets. These gains came in part because member states were investing approximately one-fifth of their gross national income in new capital goods. Compared to this kind of self-help, as Paul Hoffman admitted to Congress, American assistance was playing a “marginal” role in Western Europe's revitalization. Still, the United States had extended $5 billion in Marshall aid to participating countries and this aid, according to Hoffman, had provided the critical margin on which all other investment depended. It enabled participating countries to cover their deficits in trade with the Western Hemisphere and thus to import the essential commodities that made self-help possible.
Hoffman's remarks came in the midst of a stormy congressional debate over a bill to extend the Economic Cooperation Act for another year. As in 1948, the debate revolved around the cost of the Marshall Plan, the plan's impact on the American economy, and the general objectives being pursued.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Marshall PlanAmerica, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952, pp. 189 - 237Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1987