Book contents
- The Malayan Emergency
- Cambridge Military Histories
- The Malayan Emergency
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables and Charts
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Note On the Text: Language, Terminology and Measures
- Abbreviations
- Additional material
- 1 Introduction and Overview
- 2 Fatal Decisions
- 3 Terror, Counter-Terror and Pressure
- 4 Bureaucratic Counter-Terror and MNLA Main Forces
- 5 The Briggs Plan
- 6 Chin Peng and Communist Plans
- 7 Templer
- 8 Optimising Counterinsurgency
- 9 Politics, Decolonisation and Counterinsurgency
- 10 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Emergency Statistics, 1948 to 1960
- Appendix 2 The Second Emergency, 1968 to 1989
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Bureaucratic Counter-Terror and MNLA Main Forces
January 1949 to February 1950
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2021
- The Malayan Emergency
- Cambridge Military Histories
- The Malayan Emergency
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables and Charts
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Note On the Text: Language, Terminology and Measures
- Abbreviations
- Additional material
- 1 Introduction and Overview
- 2 Fatal Decisions
- 3 Terror, Counter-Terror and Pressure
- 4 Bureaucratic Counter-Terror and MNLA Main Forces
- 5 The Briggs Plan
- 6 Chin Peng and Communist Plans
- 7 Templer
- 8 Optimising Counterinsurgency
- 9 Politics, Decolonisation and Counterinsurgency
- 10 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Emergency Statistics, 1948 to 1960
- Appendix 2 The Second Emergency, 1968 to 1989
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Revisionist literature portrays a British counter-terror stretching across 1948–9, if not longer. This chapter shows how, in fact, counter-terror was ‘bureacratised’ in 1949, becoming far more controlled but also larger-scale, with ‘structural violence’ (slow-burn long-term reduction in life chances due to deportation, huts burned etc.) taking off as excess killings declined. Meanwhile, the insurgents tried, and failed, to establish main bases and larger forces. On failing, they switched to attempting to build multiple, local-based company-level forces, more indirect roots towards growing their strength. This sent incident levels soaring again. This chapter therefore revises the revisionist accounts, but just as importantly tells a cohrent story about the main-base strategy that the MCP hoped would set it on the path to victory, and its replacement strategy of building from more numerous, smaller base areas.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Malayan EmergencyRevolution and Counterinsurgency at the End of Empire, pp. 139 - 190Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021