Book contents
- The Macroeconomics of Decarbonisation
- Reviews
- The Macroeconomics of Decarbonisation
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Boxes
- Introduction
- 1 Understanding Deep Decarbonisation over the Long Run
- 2 Understanding Decarbonisation’s Short-Term Disruptions to Economic Activity
- 3 The Distributional Effects of Climate Policy
- 4 Public Finances and Decarbonisation
- 5 Greening Innovation, Industrial and Competition Policies
- 6 Mobilising the Financial System for Decarbonisation
- 7 Decarbonisation and Labour Markets
- 8 Greening Central Banks
- Conclusions
- Index
- References
8 - Greening Central Banks
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 February 2024
Book contents
- The Macroeconomics of Decarbonisation
- Reviews
- The Macroeconomics of Decarbonisation
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Boxes
- Introduction
- 1 Understanding Deep Decarbonisation over the Long Run
- 2 Understanding Decarbonisation’s Short-Term Disruptions to Economic Activity
- 3 The Distributional Effects of Climate Policy
- 4 Public Finances and Decarbonisation
- 5 Greening Innovation, Industrial and Competition Policies
- 6 Mobilising the Financial System for Decarbonisation
- 7 Decarbonisation and Labour Markets
- 8 Greening Central Banks
- Conclusions
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter illustrates how decarbonisation is likely to have implications for the business cycle. In this context, it discusses how decarbonisation can change the effectiveness of monetary policy. It also discusses what is the scope for monetary policy to be more actively engaged in the decarbonisation effort, both from an economic but also from an institutional perspective.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Macroeconomics of DecarbonisationImplications and Policies, pp. 291 - 314Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024
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