Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-cphqk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-06T15:43:43.209Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

18 - Computational Neural Modeling and the Philosophy of Ethics

Reflections on the Particularism–Generalism Debate

from PART IV - APPROACHES TO MACHINE ETHICS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2011

By
Marcello Guarini
Edited by
Michael Anderson  and
Susan Leigh Anderson
Michael Anderson
Affiliation:
University of Hartford, Connecticut
Susan Leigh Anderson
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut
Get access

Summary

Introduction

There are different reasons why someone might be interested in using a computer to model one or more dimensions of ethical classification, reasoning, discourse, or action. One reason is to build into machines the requisite level of “ethical sensitivity” for interacting with human beings. Robots in elder care, nannybots, autonomous combat systems for the military – these are just a few of the systems that researchers are considering. In other words, one motivation for doing machine ethics is to support practical applications. A second reason for doing work in machine ethics is to try to better understand ethical reasoning as humans do it. This paper is motivated by the second of the two reasons (which, by the way, need not be construed as mutually exclusive).

There has been extensive discussion of the relationship between rules, principles, or standards, on the one hand, and cases on the other. Roughly put, those stressing the importance of the former tend to get labeled generalists, whereas those stressing the importance of the latter tend to get labeled particularists. There are many ways of being a particularist or a generalist. The dispute between philosophers taking up these issues is not a first-order normative dispute about ethical issues. Rather, it is a second-order dispute about how best to understand and engage in ethical reasoning. In short, it is a dispute in the philosophy of ethics.

Type
Chapter
Information
Machine Ethics , pp. 316 - 334
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Dancy, J. 2006. Ethics without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Elman, J. 1990. “Finding Structure in Time.” Cognitive Science 14, 179–211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garfield, J. 2000. “Particularity and Principle: The Structure of Moral Knowledge,” in Moral Particularism, Hooker, B. and Little, M., eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Guarini, M. 2009. “Computational Theories of Mind, and Fodor's Analysis of Neural Network Behaviour.” Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 21, no.2, 137–153.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guarini, M. 2010. “Particularism, Analogy, and Moral Cognition.” Minds and Machines 20, no. 3, 385–422.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henderson, D. and Horgan, T. 2000. “Iceberg Epistemology.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, no. 3, 497–535.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. 2007. “Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgement.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10, 279–295.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. 2009. “What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us about Normativity?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12, 25–51.
Jackson, F., Petit, P. and Smith, M. 2000. “Ethical Particularism and Patterns,” in Moral Particularism, Hooker, B. and Little, M., eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Little, M. O. 2000. “Moral Generalities Revisited” in Moral Particularism, Hooker, B. and Little, M., eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
McKeever, S. and Ridge, M. 2005. “The Many Moral Particularisms.” The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35, 83–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McNaughton, D. and Rawling, P. 2000. “Unprincipled Ethics” in Moral Particularism, Hooker, B. and Little, M., eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×