Two Theories of Names

Summary

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to assess the relative merits of two accounts of the semantics of proper names. The enterprise is of particular interest because the theories are very similar in fundamental respects. In particular, they can agree on three major features of names: names are rigid designators; different co-extensive names can have different cognitive significance; empty proper names can be meaningful. Neither theory by itself offers complete explanations of all three features. But each theory is consistent with them and goes some way towards explaining them.

Both theories are reasonably elegant and economical and make no undue demands on semantic theory. There doesn't seem to be much wrong with either of them. For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that at least one of the theories is on the right track. I will not offer a detailed defence of this assumption, for my aim is not to defend either theory against all competitors. Rather it is to assess the relative empirical plausibility of two particular theories that agree on the main properties of names, but disagree about their semantics.

There are theorists with an ecumenical approach to semantics who would in principle be happy to allow that both theories are right. Donald Davidson would be a case in point (e.g. Davidson 1977, 1979).

I prefer a more sectarian approach, one that proceeds on the assumption that at most one of the theories could be right. The sectarian approach generates fruitful enquiry, whether it is demonstrably correct or not.