1 - Authoritarian Politics and Founding Elections

Summary

Authoritarian regimes vary with respect to regime–opposition relations, along a continuum of more open to more closed, focusing on the degree of competition the regime permits during elections. The particular political opportunity structure facing any individual opposition group varies according to the strategies that the regime uses in dealing with that particular group: inclusion, co-optation, or exclusion. The microfoundations of both party formation and political mobilization do not operate in isolation or in the same way as they do in established democracies, but in fact interact with the effects of the political opportunity structure that existed during the prior authoritarian era. An examination of the common competing explanations for party formation and political mobilization show that, while each explanation arguably does play a role in shaping these outcomes, they are limited in their comparative utility and frequently fail to explain the actual variation observed in these cases. Instead, mechanisms link the structure of state–opposition relations and the political opportunity structure facing different groups to their relative decisions around party formation as well as to the tactics and effectiveness of political mobilization in founding elections. Finally, the common causes of opposition group dissolution interact with the opportunity structure of the authoritarian era.

It is difficult to describe the mixture of excitement, apprehension, optimism, and sense of import that surrounds the first free elections after the collapse of a long-term authoritarian regime.¹ David Kirkpatrick, reporting from Egypt, described the spirit of “duty and defiance” that gripped large crowds of Egyptians as they turned out to vote in the November 2011 founding parliamentary elections.² Press reporting from Tunisia’s first free post-uprising election in October 2011 depicted long lines of Tunisians waiting in front of polling stations and proudly showing off index fingers, stained by bright blue ink, to prove that they had voted.³ Scholars have described founding elections as “moments of great drama,”⁴ in which all bets are off because rules of the political game that have been in place for years, even decades, have lifted.

Despite the perceived and actual significance of these elections, we surprisingly lack an understanding of the factors that influence why certain political parties are more successful than others at this point in time and why some opposition groups choose not to participate in elections at all. “The announcement by those in transitional authority that they intend to convoke elections for representative positions of national significance has a profound effect … relations between contending factions and forces, inside and outside the regime, begin changing rapidly.”⁵ What determines the balance of power in these relationships, and what factors influence the likelihood that particular opposition or societal groups form into political parties once restrictions are removed? It is fair to say that each authoritarian regime is undemocratic in its own way. But does the way in which a country and its people experience authoritarianism affect its post-authoritarian politics?

In examining the dynamics of founding elections across multiple cases, it becomes clear that particular legacies of the authoritarian era persist beyond the ouster of an authoritarian ruler and shape group-level resources, advantages, and constraints at the juncture of founding elections, and that common causal factors are at work across cases. While the link between pre- and post-transition politics would seem an obvious one to draw, scholars have in many cases argued just the opposite. O’Donnell and Schmitter, for example, characterize events during regime transitions as highly contingent and argue that founding elections and political transitions defy the ability of social science to make generalizable assessments about regularity at these points in time.⁶ Scholars that do pay attention to linkages between pre- and post-transition politics tend, however, to focus on features particular to the historical and cultural characteristics of individual countries and regions.⁷ Rather than identifying generalizable causal factors that are at work across cases of founding elections, these accounts typically focus on idiosyncratic variables that, while important in individual cases, are not always relevant to other contexts.

This chapter unfolds in several parts to lay the theoretical groundwork for the empirical process tracing that follows in the case studies.⁸ First, I explore the general characteristics of political participation in authoritarian regimes and argue that an explanation that takes these characteristics into account is necessary if we are to understand party formation, political mobilization, and opposition group survival in the juncture around founding elections. Second, I show how authoritarian regimes structure state–opposition relations, focusing on how inclusive or exclusive they are, generally speaking, and how they structure the political opportunities available to different political actors (using repression, toleration, or co-optation in interactions with various societal actors). Third, I build the theoretical link between the authoritarian environment and differences among political groups by showing how the political opportunity structure of authoritarian regimes alters the kinds of activities that political groups can participate in during the authoritarian era, and how these relative constraints or permissions create different resources, incentives, and organizational attributes that opposition groups possess at the juncture of founding elections. In doing so, I theorize first the strategic decisions and resources available to different groups as they consider party formation prior to founding elections; second, the mechanisms that link the adaptations that groups made during the authoritarian era to the microfoundations of political mobilization; and third, the reasons why social movements and political parties collapse in general, and how the context of regime transition shapes these factors specifically, focusing on the ephemerality of symbolic resources, the factors shaping group cohesion or dissolution, and the roots of the resurgence of state repression.⁹ I conclude with a summary of the argument.

The Political Opportunity Structure of Authoritarian Regimes

As any observer of democratic and nondemocratic regimes is aware, political participation in authoritarian regimes is very different from participation in democratic ones because authoritarian regimes utilize a range of institutions,¹⁰ material resources,¹¹ and coercion¹² to prevent societal actors from challenging the regime’s supremacy. These boundaries and constraints around political participation in large part constitute what social movements scholars have described as the “political opportunity structure” (POS) of these polities.¹³

The theoretical construct of political opportunity structure initially grew out of attempts to explain the emergence of social movements by examining the resources possessed or developed by a given social movement organization; the institutional arrangements within which that movement operated; the historical precedent of contentious politics within that context; and the societal and other exogenous forces that created openings or barriers to that group’s emergence within the sociopolitical context.¹⁴ These environmental and institutional factors create the context within which rational collective actors make strategic choices and mobilize their adherents toward collective goals.¹⁵ Scholars have also utilized the political opportunity structure of a given polity to explain not only movement emergence but also social movement success and decline; strategies adopted by social movements and opposition groups at different points in time; variation in cross-national success of similar issue-based social movements; political party formation and success in democratic contexts; and the incidence of popular uprisings.¹⁶

Political opportunity structures by definition are in many ways unique to each national and temporal context due to the particular configuration of collective social actors, state leaders and institutions, cultural characteristics, and historical precedent. However, POS can be grouped into relatively “open” and “closed” clusters, characterized generally by the responsiveness of the state to citizen demands and political organization in the former (including open and fair elections, access to policymaking, independent civil society organizations and activities, and so on), and the lack of responsiveness to or repression of citizen demands and political organization in the latter.¹⁷

Authoritarian regimes, then, tend to have closed political opportunity structures in comparison to democratic regimes, with significant variation existing among “varieties” of nondemocratic regimes, including so-called competitive or electoral authoritarian regimes, and full authoritarian regimes that permit no political or electoral competition. The concept of “authoritarianism” itself comprises a continuum of political competition-closure defined by varying degrees of state repression, electoral competition, institutional independence, state responsiveness to policy concerns, civil liberties, independent rule of law, and the existence and independence of civic organizations.¹⁸ No authoritarian regime is identical, but the political opportunity structures of these regimes share the central role of the state in managing, or trying to manage, political actors.¹⁹ All authoritarian regimes are led by leaders, or a group of leaders, “willing to use both legal and extra-legal means to stay in power and concentrate political control,”²⁰ and challenging these efforts is frequently – if not often – met with a range of legal or physically repressive responses. As a result, citizens and organizations wishing to participate politically in authoritarian contexts typically must construct strategies that conform to tight legal and institutional constraints, or strategies that evade the controls of the state.

Some authoritarian regimes ban opposition parties altogether and exercise repression and harassment, including physical attacks, against multiple segments of society;²¹ other regimes permit opposition political parties and electoral competition (albeit not always free and not fair), which “masks (often, in part, to legitimate) the reality of the authoritarian domination.”²² When opposition political parties are allowed to form, they frequently must conform to the rules governing their operations – which typically limit their ability to campaign or conduct outreach to grassroots constituents – and frequently are unable to engage in meaningful policymaking. Due to the constraints in place on formal political parties, opposition leaders in many cases make the strategic choice to leave party politics altogether and attempt to pursue their agendas through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).²³ In this realm too, however, authoritarian regimes restrict the activities of civil society organizations, with the consequence that many such organizations in these regimes drift toward service provision organizations rather than advocacy and political organizations,²⁴ or develop codependent relationships with the state in which they pursue narrowly defined goals while simultaneously cooperating with, or even aiding, the state’s own policy goals.²⁵

Many authoritarian regimes restrict the opportunities available to NGOs through laws that determine which organizations are permitted to form by requiring them to first obtain licenses from the state and only granting permission to organizations that are deemed unthreatening. Regimes often attempt to control the members of the board of these organizations, prevent them from receiving funding from abroad, and determine when and where the organization can meet.²⁶ Authoritarian regimes typically view charitable NGOs as unthreatening and as a convenient way to make up for the regime’s own shortcomings in service delivery and the provision of public goods.²⁷ As a result, the NGO field in many authoritarian regimes is largely populated either by charitable organizations or by those groups pursuing very narrow agendas that do not directly threaten the stability or legitimacy of the regime as a whole.²⁸

In response to the constricted political opportunity structure of authoritarian regimes, individuals and movements that wish to pursue a more radical agenda directly challenging these regimes devise strategies to do so not through formal organizations but through grassroots networks and “underground” groups that cannot be easily monitored, controlled, or punished.²⁹ It is much easier for a regime to monitor an NGO with an office, a staff roster, and regular business hours than it is to follow, identify, and control a low-visibility group that operates primarily through informal networks. Therefore, social movements or political groups pursuing a transformative agenda that challenges regime authority or legitimacy frequently have more success if they operate through informal networks to avoid punishment.³⁰

Theorizing Political Opportunity Structure and Links to Founding Elections

The POS of the authoritarian regime is a central causal factor that sets in motion a series of mechanisms that shape party formation and political mobilization in the brief time period leading up to founding elections, and contributes to the likelihood of opposition successor party cohesion or dissolution after founding elections. Due to the way in which the authoritarian political opportunity structure affects the form and nature of political participation and mobilization, including the kinds of strategies and activities pursued by political parties and civil society groups and ways in which they pursue them,³¹ political actors enter the fray surrounding founding elections with very different strategic repertoires, material and organizational resources, and societal linkages.

The political opportunity structure of a given polity could refer to any number of characteristics. Here, however, two dimensions of this structure most strongly shape outcomes at the juncture of founding elections. The first dimension is how “open” or “closed” a given POS is vis- à-vis the state, operationalized as a continuum defined by how much control the regime holds over elections.³² The more open a political opportunity structure is, the more political parties are allowed to form; the more kinds of collective actors are permitted to form political parties; the fewer restrictions exist upon their actions; and the less regime electoral manipulation exists.³³ The more closed a political opportunity structure is, the fewer political parties are permitted to form; the fewer kinds of collective actors are permitted to form political parties; the more restrictions exist upon their actions; and the more regime electoral control exists.³⁴ Authoritarian regimes, in which incumbents use varied methods of manipulation and coercion to maintain power, typically have political opportunity structures that range from the closed end of the spectrum – where no opposition political parties are allowed; the state holds a high degree of electoral control or no elections at all; and all opposition groups are excluded from political participation of any sort – to a central position along the spectrum,³⁵ where opposition political parties may exist alongside a ruling party; elections of varying competitiveness may occur; the opposition may win surprising electoral victories occasionally; and the state cannot or does not control or manipulate all political participation. In our theory-building case of Egypt, the Mubarak regime, which was ousted in 2011, was a more open authoritarian regime, in which a select group of opposition political parties was allowed to compete against the ruling National Democratic Party in legislative elections (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Open–closed continuum of authoritarian regimes

The second facet of the authoritarian POS that shapes outcomes at this juncture is the regime’s particular relationship with any given actor – in other words the particular POS for that actor.³⁶ Due to the individual characteristics of any given authoritarian regime, regime incumbents view particular societal or opposition actors with varying degrees of wariness, and use different tools to manage each of these groups. In more closed regimes, the state may use a broad lens to view nearly all societal groups and all opposition groups as threatening, and will use manipulation and repression to control or attempt to control all groups within the polity, what Lust-Okar terms “undivided, exclusive political environments.”³⁷

In more open authoritarian regimes, the particular POS facing any given opposition group will vary as the regime uses different strategies to selectively include, co-opt, or repress them, thus dividing the opposition into included and excluded groups.³⁸ The regime may include certain opposition groups in the system by allowing them to participate in elections (however fraudulent or manipulated they may be); the regime may attempt to control other opposition groups through co-optation or corporatist bargains, whereby the opposition group receives benefits from the state in exchange for, sometimes implicitly, a tacit agreement not to challenge the regime politically.³⁹ Finally, the regime may use varying degrees of repression against groups that it neither includes in the formal system nor attempts to or succeeds in co-opting. This repression may vary over time, based on regime coercive capacity and opposition strategies, but repressed or excluded groups cannot collectively engage in formal political activity, nor are they collectively co-opted through corporatist bargains.

The regime’s treatment of a given opposition group or societal actor not only affects the constraints or opportunities available to that group, but also in turn affects the strategic choices that group may make about their goals and actions as a result.⁴⁰ In the prior section, I described a range of typical controls exerted by authoritarian regimes on the range of political opposition groups. These tactics, however, vary according to where a particular group falls within the structure of state–opposition relations. Included opposition groups face a more open political opportunity structure and are allowed to form political parties but, as the price of this inclusion, are typically subjected to a range of legal, institutional, and coercive restrictions that in effect prevent them from truly challenging the ruling party or the regime. They operate through visible, formal organizational structures with offices and membership lists, but authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt’s Mubarak regime, carefully monitor these parties; limit their ability to conduct outreach to potential voters; and prevent them, through fraud and by limiting their outreach, from winning a significant share of legislative seats.

Even once they win seats in parliament, included political parties are frequently blocked from policymaking that would challenge the regime through a web of institutional procedures that keep the ruling party in control of agenda setting and lawmaking. Included parties, wishing to retain the privilege of participation in the system (especially when participation carries with it financial rewards), abide by the regime’s restrictions and do not stray outside of the boundaries set for them. In contrast to excluded groups, included political groups do not suffer repression at a collective level; as a group, they are not systematically beaten, jailed, tortured, and executed in full view of their communities. Instead, they participate within the system and benefit from it. As a result, these groups have very few ties to average citizens; little experience engaging in one-on-one mobilization; and, despite being opposition political parties, are viewed by average citizens as ineffectual at best, or corrupt and complicit at worst.

Political groups that strike a corporatist bargain with the regime enter into an institutional relationship that conveys different benefits and constraints than those of included political groups. Authoritarian regimes frequently make these bargains in order to politically neuter, so to speak, a potentially powerful interest group by providing the group with benefits in exchange for effectively removing the group from the political opposition. In contrast to included political parties, co-opted groups use an institutional structure sanctioned by the state to channel the interests of its rank and file and leadership into negotiations with the regime; this form of interest representation results in selective benefits for the interest group but carries with it significant regime control as a result, as well as clear boundaries around sanctioned behavior by that organization. These co-opted groups exchange the right to make political demands (around regime change or democratic reform) for benefits that directly impact their constituencies, such as targeted wage increases, work protections, and so on. As a result, these groups have ties to their grassroots bases but few ties to other political groups.⁴¹ Furthermore, co-opted groups may come to regard themselves as apolitical, or make efforts to distance themselves from political demands that may put their benefits and existing institutional relationship in jeopardy.

Finally, excluded political groups are not permitted to participate in the party system alongside included groups, frequently because they refuse to modify their demands or they represent an identity or ideology particularly threatening to the regime. They tend to be illegal, and rely on interpersonal networks for their recruitment, communication, and coordination. These groups engage in a dance of challenge and evasion with the regime, which in turn alternately represses and tolerates the group, depending on a range of factors at any point in time. Excluded groups also pursue their agendas through activities that they believe are less likely to draw objection from the regime or are less obviously political; the regime at times believes these activities to be harmless and allows them. At other times, the regime cracks down on these groups and tries to halt their activities. During periods of toleration, excluded groups are able to engage in significant outreach and engagement with average citizens through ostensibly apolitical communal associations; they cultivate extensive grassroots interpersonal networks through which they carry out their activities. During periods of repression, these groups “fold up” their informal networks,⁴² obscure their ties to community associations and groups, and wait for the repression to pass, when they will once again activate these networks.

At the same time, excluded groups develop a positive reputation both for the activities they carry out and also as a result of the repression they suffer. Through interviews and historical accounts of repression in different authoritarian regimes, I observed repeatedly, and across cases, that opposition groups earn empathy and credibility from their communities through a peculiar logic of suffering. In an authoritarian context, most citizens know that the regime will repress any opposition that cannot be controlled or co-opted. When a group is repressed by the regime, that group is therefore viewed as challenging the regime, rather than making a bargain with the regime that benefits the group. As repression is intended to frighten and deter citizens and opponents from engaging in actions that are threatening to the regime, it often manifests in public, visual, almost performative events: public hangings and executions, public beatings by police and military officers, raids, and arrests. Even if an average individual has succumbed to a “politics of silence”⁴³ or preference falsification,⁴⁴ one cannot “exit”⁴⁵ one’s neighborhood, community, or workplace, all of which are the locations of these repressive acts. As a result, groups that were excluded from formal politics but persist in challenging the regime are repressed in full view of their communities. Community members bear witness to a neighbor being hauled away in a security services van or being beaten by police officers while taking part in a protest or strike. Due to these unique adaptations and regime responses, excluded groups forge a multitude of ties to grassroots communities through their alternative and informal engagement in a range of activities. They also escape the reputational tarnish experienced by included opposition groups, as, rather than cooperating with the regime, they are seen as opposing it and suffering the consequences for doing so (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1. Authoritarian political opportunity structures

Regime	Co-opted Groups	Included Opposition	Excluded Opposition
More Open Regimes	Groups with which the regime strikes a corporatist bargain, thus removing them from the opposition.	Select opposition political parties	• Social movements • Illegal political parties • Pro-democracy groups • Civil society organizations
More Closed Regimes	Groups with which the regime strikes a corporatist bargain, thus removing them from the opposition.	None	• Social movements • Illegal political parties • Pro-democracy groups • Civil society organizations

As we will see in detail in Chapter 2, the Mubarak regime structured the opposition into co-opted, included, and excluded groups. The co-opted groups were those that had struck a corporatist bargain with the regime, receiving selective benefits through state-sanctioned institutions in exchange for political cooperation (organized labor and syndicated professionals); the included opposition groups were the small set of legal political parties; the excluded groups were those whose ideology was deemed particularly threatening to the regime (Islamist groups, pro-democracy umbrella activist groups, and labor activists who disobeyed the restraints of the state unions). During the Mubarak era, each of these groups engaged in political and outreach activities shaped by their position within the political opportunity structure.

Linking POS to Party Formation

As we saw in the prior section, authoritarian regimes structure the opposition in different ways, forming a continuum between more open authoritarian regimes and less open authoritarian regimes. Within that structure of state–opposition relations, political groups face different constraints, depending on how the regime perceives that group and the tools that it uses to manage it, meaning that the opposition group could be included, co-opted, or excluded. In this section, I theorize the way in which this authoritarian political opportunity structure interacts with the microfoundations of party formation to shape the strategic incentives facing different kinds of political groups at this juncture.

In democratic contexts,⁴⁶ party formation and emergence are shaped by societal cleavages,⁴⁷ electoral rules,⁴⁸ and leadership charisma or the presence of individualist political campaigns.⁴⁹ Elites and voters turn to political parties for strategic reasons: Parties, as an organizational form, provide a number of “goods” to elites and voters.⁵⁰ They provide a structural link between masses and elites;⁵¹ they provide cognitive shortcuts to voters, whereby a party label represents a whole package of policies, identities, and ideologies that provide an easy means by which voters select their preferred candidate;⁵² they contribute to party system institutionalization by crystalizing a set of longer lasting loyalties referred to as “party identification”;⁵³ they provide a structure through which to coordinate the mobilization of voters across an expansive geographical or temporal space.⁵⁴ Most fundamentally, they provide an organized interest group with a way to attempt to gain access to legislative policymaking.

In the context of founding elections, however, these same factors do not always explain empirical variation in party formation by societal groups.⁵⁵ In fact, due to the impression that the rules of the game are suspended and the prior restrictions governing political competition have been lifted,⁵⁶ a multitude of new parties throw their hats into the ring, even if they have no rational possibility of winning meaningful shares of the vote. Within this context, this sudden proliferation makes sense, as does party formation by opposition groups that sought party legalization during the authoritarian era but were barred from doing so, and indeed, we observe this pattern in Egypt in 2011. What makes less sense, however, is why some groups that engaged in active, visible collective contentious action during the authoritarian era do not form parties at this juncture.

In Egypt, for example, organized labor represented a salient group with collective interests; the groups of labor activists that waged wildcat strikes and labor protests that challenged the Mubarak regime had already successfully mobilized collectively. In 2011, however, organized labor did not form a political party. There is nothing inherent about organized labor that would preclude this interest group from forming a political party. Cross-nationally, organized labor has all the prerequisites for collective mobilization: organizing and mobilizing structures in the form of labor unions; collective interests as workers that align with a clear societal cleavage; and “a politically tinged collective identity rooted in a lived history.”⁵⁷ Indeed, the British Labour Party formed from precisely such a mobilization base and set of collective interests and identities, seeking representation for its interests when blocked by the state from engaging in collective bargaining.⁵⁸ Similarly, Egyptian pro–democracy umbrella activist groups formed a sort of negative coalition with a clear set of policy demands around democratic reform and engaged in contentious collective action during the Mubarak regime. Despite organizational parallels in other authoritarian regimes (the Czechoslovak Civic Forum as one example), this coalition of activists did not form a political party in 2011. As we see in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, the authoritarian–era political opportunity structure – both the degree of closure and the individual POS facing any given organization – interacts with these dynamics of political parties at the juncture of founding elections by shaping (1) the strategic incentives facing different opposition groups to form new political parties to contest the elections (the utility of a political party for a group to achieve its goals); as well as (2) the organizational means with which to do so (the existence of a mobilizing structure and membership base through which to coordinate collective action).

First, the specific POS that a particular group faced during the authoritarian era vis-à-vis the regime – whether the actor had entered into a corporative bargain with the regime; whether the collective actor was included in the political system; and whether the group was repressed and excluded during much of the authoritarian era – plays a large role in shaping the strategic incentives facing opposition groups at this juncture, with respect to party formation. The key to remember here is that political parties provide a particular group with a set of goods that assists that group in attracting supporters and gaining access to policymaking through elections. Thus we expect the political group to form a political party only if the group needs the good that a political party provides. Groups that were included in the authoritarian era already had political parties; groups that were excluded from electoral participation during the authoritarian era but sought party status, would see the opportunity to form a political party as a way to secure seats in the legislature and influence policy in the new era.

However, if an opposition group or collective actor entered into a corporatist relationship with the state during the authoritarian era, that group will see less strategic utility in a political party to compete in founding elections because the group already has secured an institutional arrangement by which it influences state policy and gains access to resources. In other words, the group does not need to form a political party at this juncture because the corporatist arrangements already provide an institutional avenue for that interest group to influence policymaking, assuming those corporatist institutions survive the transition intact. Conversely, if the group is excluded from the formal political system during the authoritarian era, the collective actor is more likely to form a political party prior to founding elections because the party would provide the interest group with a way to secure seats and influence policy in the new era.

As we will see in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, variation in labor party formation prior to founding elections is shaped largely by the differing strategic incentives presented by the authoritarian POS facing these groups. Authoritarian regimes typically view organized labor as a potential threat to regime stability.⁵⁹ Not only does organized labor possess the potentially dangerous (from the state’s perspective) mix of organizational resources and shared interests, but organized labor is also able to hit the state where it hurts – the economy – through strikes.⁶⁰ As such, authoritarian states frequently attempt to exert control over organized labor, either through engaging in a bargain whereby the regime exerts corporatist controls over labor unions in return for selective benefits for the working class, or through laws that severely restrict and control the rights, finances, and organization of unions.⁶¹ Thus, depending on the approach taken by the state, the POS structure facing organized labor is frequently either one of a corporative relationship or exclusion from the formal political system. Organized labor leaders are incentivized to form a political party prior to founding elections when the interest group needs the goods that political parties offer. In cases where labor had entered into a corporatist relationship with the state during the authoritarian era, labor is less likely to form a political party because the corporatist bargain already provides access to policymaking and resources. In instances where labor was excluded from formal political participation, labor unions are more likely to form a political party to secure seats in parliament and influence public policy in a way that benefits their collective interests.

The second way in which the authoritarian-era POS interacts with the dynamics of political party formation is in influencing the conditions under which excluded political groups possess the organizational means and membership base with which to form a political party prior to founding elections. For new political parties to be successful, they require establishing networks; recruiting leaders and rank-and-file participants; paying for offices and publicity materials; and setting down physical infrastructure. As such, new political parties are generally only successful in providing that critical basket of goods to voters when they can utilize “a strong organizational base or, more often, some parallel, ‘pre-partisan’ organization” through which collective action and mobilization can be coordinated.⁶² One dimension of the authoritarian – opposition structure – specifically, how open or closed that structure is – shapes two critical factors that underpin party formation by excluded groups: an organizational base and the set of identities or ideologies that are rendered salient at a given point in time.

In regimes with relatively more open political opportunity structures, a select group of opposition parties are permitted to compete against the ruling party in elections, while other opposition groups are excluded from electoral competition. Some of these excluded groups are excluded precisely because they represent a particular interest group or cleavage that is threatening to the regime (Islamist organizations in the Arab world, for example), while other opposition groups are excluded because they represent a negative coalition of political demands orientated around political reform.

In regimes with relatively more closed political opportunity structures, no parties are allowed to compete against the ruling party in elections, and all political opposition is excluded from formal political participation. In these contexts, there is an incentive for multiple opposition groups – those with a salient interest group or identity, as well as those without one – to coalesce into so-called negative coalitions that share their opposition to the regime.⁶³ These pro-reform coalitions coordinate the efforts of different opposition groups and provide a common platform with which to challenge the regime, and organize strikes and protests. In both more closed and more open political opportunity structures, excluded opposition groups frequently share their membership bases with one another, and even with included political parties in the more open contexts.

Unlike organized labor, which in some cases enters into corporatist relationships with the state, these excluded opposition groups – whether identity or policy based or simply reform oriented – have strategic incentives to form political parties prior to founding elections to influence policy or the trajectory of the new government. And many of these groups do indeed form political parties, especially those that sought legal party status during the authoritarian era. Not all of the excluded groups however, will have the organizational base with which to quickly and efficiently form a political party once founding elections are announced, as a result of incentives created by the authoritarian political opposition structure.

In regimes with relatively more open political opportunity structures, legal opposition political parties coexist alongside excluded opposition groups, both interest-based and pro-reform or negative coalition groups. When these excluded groups are able to form political parties ahead of founding elections, the more ideologically salient opposition groups tend to draw large segments of the shared membership base away from other opposition groups that lack a salient ideological or policy orientation. As a result, opposition groups without a unique ideological identity frequently lose the membership base – or leadership cadre – upon which to mount a viable political party. As we see in Chapter 4, the pro-reform negative coalition activist groups lost various segments of their membership base to established political parties or new political parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, rendering the pro-reform activist group the less appealing structure through which to form a political party.

In contrast, in regimes with relatively more closed political opportunity structures, no opposition groups are permitted to form political parties to contest the ruling party in elections. In these contexts, political opposition groups, both ideologically based or issue oriented, and more generic, reform-oriented groups, are strategically united in a negative coalition in opposition to the regime, and all share common cause, regardless of policy differences. Many of these groups share membership rosters but none of them share members with opposition political parties, as none exist. In the run-up to founding elections, members of these negative coalition groups are incentivized to use the organizational structures they have already built through these pro-reform organizations, and thus are more likely to unite efforts against the regime than to lose members to competing organizations. This has the effect of pooling rather than dividing their membership bases. As we see in Chapter 5, this incentive structure leads to the formation of a political party by pro-reform groups in some of the more closed regimes.

Linking POS to Political Mobilization

We have seen how the authoritarian–era political opportunity structure shapes the incentives and organizational resources that influence various political groups’ decisions around whether or not to form a political party to compete in founding elections. Of the groups that do form political parties, why are some parties more successful at mobilizing supporters than others? In the following sections, I will theorize how the political opposition structure of the authoritarian era leads to variation in the ability to mobilize voters in founding elections.

Successful political mobilization – the process of persuading individuals to join in collective action for a certain purpose – requires creating a link between a given individual and a cause in order to inform that individual of the opportunity to participate and persuade him to do so.⁶⁴ Interpersonal contact is by far the most persuasive means of political mobilization; face-to-face contact not only increases the likelihood that an individual will be persuaded but also “increases the perceived importance of the election within that social network.”⁶⁵ Mobilization also requires overcoming the collective action problem,⁶⁶ wherein many people will conclude that it is not individually rational to participate in political activity. As such, successful mobilization becomes more likely when the individual costs of mobilization – both the physical costs of political participation and the decision costs – are lowered and the benefits are increased.⁶⁷ These individual decisions evaluating the costs and benefits of participation in collective action are influenced by material evaluations as well as social ones; the decision to join in collective action is affected by the negative incentive of the risk of losing a relationship (a punishment for not joining) and by the positive incentive provided by the perception that an existing relationship will be actively enhanced by participating in the movement together.⁶⁸ From these microfoundations, therefore, we should expect that political groups that can create more face-to-face interactions with potential voters and utilize personal connections to persuade and pressure them (as well as actively incorporate these strategies into their mobilization campaigns), will be more effective at mobilizing voters than groups that cannot do these things.

Mobilizing structures play a central role in aggregating these micro-level interactions and decisions into collective outcomes.⁶⁹ Mobilizing structures typically take one of two forms. The first is a “formal association of persons,”⁷⁰ such as political parties, professional unions, NGOs, student groups, and religious associations. The second kind of mobilizing structure is “the connective structures or interpersonal networks that link leaders and followers, centers and peripheries, and different parts of a movement sector with another, permitting coordination and aggregation, and allowing movements to persist even when formal organization is lacking.”⁷¹ Both formal associations and informal networks can constitute mobilizing structures, albeit contribute to mobilization in different ways. Formal organizations are effective at providing incentives – material and ideological – for their members to participate on behalf of a cause. This is why political parties are such efficient vehicles for groups to win office. Parties “try to mobilize the largest possible support from the general public … Available strategies range from calling upon broadly supported sets of values to the provision of selective incentives to prospective members/subscribers in the form of services, leisure-time activities, discount packages, etc.”⁷² Political parties can also lower the physical and decision costs of individual participation by bussing voters to polling stations; providing pamphlets that clearly explain electoral rules; and by making it easy for voters to identify which candidate belongs to the party.⁷³

At the same time, informal networks play an even more important role in attracting and recruiting members to movements⁷⁴ because of the way that they reinforce the bonds (and pressures) of friendships.⁷⁵ Informal networks also create powerful shared identities that increase individual commitment to the movement, which in turn increases personal follow-through in voting and other collective action.⁷⁶ Social ties between networks can also help join together ideologically distinct movements or identity groups and create the possibility for joint collective action.⁷⁷ Informal interpersonal networks, therefore, play a critical role in influencing individual-level decision-making around participation in collective action.

Mechanisms of Mobilization

The political opportunity structure during the authoritarian era interacts with the microfoundations of political mobilization – individual linkage and persuasion – to create a causal chain of mechanisms linking the political opportunity structure of the authoritarian era to relative success in voter mobilization. Excluded opposition groups are by definition not allowed to participate in electoral politics and therefore find alternative activities through which to engage with their communities and spread their messages about their vision of society and politics. Sometimes the regime tolerates these activities, allowing excluded groups to expand their links at the grassroots and establish relationships with their communities; at other times, due to changes in domestic or international politics, the regime represses these groups and cracks down on their activities. During periods of repression, excluded groups retreat into informal networks and obscure links to their grassroots organizations and activities, and those that cannot hide or are specifically targeted are visibly repressed and punished. When regime repression lifts again, these groups resume their activities at the grassroots level.

As a result of this alternating repression and toleration, excluded groups develop a significant grassroots presence and set of community interpersonal ties, the very communal bonds and connections that included political groups are prevented from developing. Excluded groups also develop a positive reputation, both as a result of their activities within their communities and interpersonal engagement, as well as the repression that they suffer and the opposition to the regime that this implied. In contrast, included groups develop a reputation for ineffectualness or, worse, cooperation with the regime.

These organizational and reputational resources then differentiate formerly excluded political groups from included or new ones during the electoral campaigns for founding elections. Parties that form from excluded groups are able to much more effectively identify potential voters; persuade them through one-on-one interactions; convince them to vote; and capitalize on their reputational resources. These advantages are observable in the kinds of campaign strategies that formerly excluded groups use, strategies that deliberately employ grassroots networks and interpersonal interaction to mobilize voters. Excluded groups are also able to use mobilizing frames that capitalize on their positive reputations.⁷⁸ In contrast, neither parties that form from formerly included groups or new political parties have the same ability to activate grassroots networks, identify and target voters, and interact with them effectively. Instead they must rely on party slogans or platforms and suffer from reputational disadvantages, as they are either not known or viewed as former collaborationists with the regime (Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2 POS and political mobilization

Authoritarian Legacies and Opposition Group Survival or Dissolution

The previous sections have theorized the processes and mechanisms that lead some political groups to form parties prior to founding elections while others do not, and that enable some political groups to more effectively mobilize voters than others in these same elections. A third puzzle of post-authoritarian mobilization is why certain opposition groups win founding elections and then go on to dissolve as organizations while others survive.

The case studies analyzed in this book exhibit variation in the survival or dissolution of the opposition successor parties that emerged from the opposition movements during the authoritarian era. Poland’s Solidarity and Czechoslovakia’s Civic Forum both dissolved in less than three years after both countries’ first free elections. Tunisia’s Al-Nahda remains a cohesive organization to date, while Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood suffered fracture and was driven underground due to renewed state repression in 2013, rather than spontaneous dissolution. Brazil’s Workers’ Party (PT), despite not winning their first fair multiparty elections in 1982, remained organizationally cohesive and went on to win the largest share of votes in successive parliamentary and presidential elections. Finally, Zambia’s Movement for Multiparty Democracy persisted as an organization, despite losing a large segment of its original organizational base. What explains these differences?

In general, social movements and opposition groups decline or collapse due to a set of causes external or internal to the group in question.⁷⁹ One external factor that could lead to opposition group dissolution is the achievement of the group’s goal. However, as the cases in this book show, in some cases where a movement or opposition group does attain its goal, some persist while others collapse. Another external causal factor draws on the resource mobilization model,⁸⁰ in which social movements decline or dissolve when they no longer have the resources to sustain themselves. State repression is one factor that deprives social movements of the necessary resources to sustain themselves, generate outside support, recruit new members, and mobilize.⁸¹ Frequently, however, state repression is a factor that explains variation in social movements’ ability to mobilize protests, rather than their existence altogether. With respect to the cases here, one group that experienced severe repression after founding elections (the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood) collapsed as a viable political party and was driven underground once again. Other groups that did not experience repression (Civic Forum and Solidarity) dissolved despite winning the first elections.

Turning to factors internal to social movements or opposition groups, member burnout – exhaustion, disillusionment, injury, stress, overload, lack of work–life balance, and financial loss – is a factor influencing why individual members stop participating in an opposition group or social movement, leading to larger group collapse if enough individuals experience these tolls.⁸² Elite factionalization, polarization, or rupture can also lead to the disintegration or collapse of a social movement organization or opposition group, when elite members disagree as to the correct or most useful course of action; diverge over critical policy matters; or the tactics with which the group should pursue its aims.⁸³ The same disagreements lead rank-and-file members to exit the group,⁸⁴ while social movements may struggle to recruit new members due to the same ideological differences.⁸⁵ In established democracies, leadership failures or disagreements create schisms between party or movement leadership and the party base, leading to widespread rank-and-file exit from the party.⁸⁶ Such disagreements most certainly occurred between voters and party members in all of the cases under consideration here, yet some organizations managed to survive this disagreement, while others did not.

Finally, the degree of institutionalization of a political party is strongly linked to its lifespan; the longer a political party exists as such, the more stable and persistent it becomes.⁸⁷ All of the cases here were new political parties, with very little opportunity to have become institutionalized, with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some of these groups, however, survived beyond the founding elections.

Just as the authoritarian political opportunity structure interacts with the processes of party formation and political mobilization, legacies of the authoritarian era similarly interact with opposition successor-party collapse, though do not as uniformly shape events after founding elections as before. As the following sections show, the organizational resources and characteristics that some political parties possess as a result of the authoritarian–era political opportunity structure persist beyond founding elections, while reputational resources fade much more quickly. The political opportunity structure also sets in motion processes that lead to elite fracture and movement dissolution. Finally, the persistence of institutions that shaped the political opportunity structure during the authoritarian era can set in motion processes that lead to the resurgence of repression after founding elections, as in Egypt in 2013.

Reputational Resources, Organizational Characteristics and Loss of Voter Base

The argument laid out in the previous section shows how opposition groups win founding elections precisely as a result of being able to more effectively mobilize voters. Excluded opposition groups also earn reputational resources that create one of their advantages in mobilizing voters in the run-up to founding elections. After founding elections, however, this reputational resource does very little to shield these groups from membership loss or a decline in popularity.

Symbolic resources, like the reputational resources discussed here, tend to be ephemeral in general, and, once elected, political parties are more likely to be judged based upon their immediate policy performance rather than on the basis of their historical record.⁸⁸ The longevity of the reputational resources possessed by repressed opposition groups is no exception; suffering years of prison or torture appears to provide a brief bubble of popularity that is soon forgotten after the first free elections. The transitory nature of oppositional credibility is particularly important when considering the fact that many, if not most, new democracies face crippling economic challenges, among other conditions, and economic reforms in this juncture are often extremely painful for multiple segments of the population.⁸⁹ Authoritarian regimes are notorious mis-managers of economic wealth, whether through botched economic policies or simply corruption; the state of employment, natural resource management, state resources, and economic growth is more often than not in shambles when the new government takes office. The new government is most likely unable to make noticeable progress in reversing this damage within the first term of office, despite promises to the contrary. In the face of inflation, breadlines, a decline in (or sudden absence of) social services, and unemployment, it is logical that the average citizen would care less about how badly the current elected party suffered in the past than about how he or she lacks the money to provide for his or her family. Thus, opposition groups that win founding elections generally lose a segment of their voter base or quickly lose popularity in the years after founding elections, and their decline in popularity is made more extreme in the context of economic hardship.

Similarly, the organizational resources and characteristics of groups that faced a repressive or closed political opposition structure during the authoritarian era no longer provide the same advantages after founding elections as they did prior to them. The use of informal networks and organizational practices that enabled these groups to mobilize supporters more effectively than other groups prior to founding elections can prove to be a liability in subsequent years. These formerly repressed groups may have a tendency to continue the same insular, opaque communication practices and decision-making methods that they utilized when they faced state repression and exclusion. In doing so, they may alienate some of their voter base, who may expect different behaviors and more open communication and decision-making practices from a democratically elected government. Additionally, if the authoritarian–era social movement lacked clear hierarchies or organizational discipline as a response to repression, the newly elected government may not operate effectively or efficiently, leading to poor performance and loss of popularity. Thus, the organizational legacies of the authoritarian era can become liabilities after founding elections as these groups contend with the requirements of democratic governance, leading to the loss of popularity and opposition successor group decline or dissolution.

Political Opportunity Structure, Elite Fracture, and Movement Cohesion

In addition to influencing how opposition groups organize, the tactics they use, and their interactions with their communities, the political opportunity structure of the authoritarian regime also can lead to elite fracture and opposition group dissolution in the years following founding elections.

As described, most new governments face challenges after taking office upon the end of an authoritarian regime, especially when dealing with crippling economic difficulties. Opposition successor parties themselves come under increasing strain during this time, as those who are in power must often make decisions that are unpopular with party elites and certain segments of the population, and may even alienate segments of the movement’s original constituency.⁹⁰ Movements, parties, and organizations are better able to form in the first place and then remain cohesive when their members share a common identity or ideological perspective,⁹¹ what Clemens calls “social solidarity independent of party.”⁹² This social solidarity, and the ability to maintain it, generates loyalty, prevents defection, and facilitates mobilization.⁹³ When the members of movements, parties, and organizations begin to diverge in their opinions regarding the most effective course of action or ideological priorities, they are more likely to splinter, lose momentum, and decline in their ability to collectively mobilize.⁹⁴

The political opportunity structure of the authoritarian era can set in motion processes that lead to successor party fracture or cohesion following founding elections. As explained in a prior section, the political opportunity structure of authoritarian regimes shapes the kind of political parties that emerge out of opposition organizations. In more closed opportunity structures, where no opposition political parties are permitted to compete against the ruling party, the opposition is unified through exclusion from the party system. Pro-reform groups often share a membership base with other pro-reform groups, and many of these groups coalesce into a single, negative coalition political party after authoritarian collapse and in the run-up to founding elections. During this period, the different members of this diverse political coalition share the goal of winning founding elections and decisively breaking from the authoritarian regime, and thus initially overlook their very distinct ideological differences.⁹⁵ The pooling of many interests into single anti-regime political parties is thus an advantage during the authoritarian era and in the lead-up to founding elections but makes these same groups vulnerable to elite fracture or membership loss after these elections, precisely due to their umbrella ideological platform. Differences in policy and ideology inevitably emerge after the defeat of the authoritarian regime, making these umbrella political parties and opposition groups more likely to divide into a number of ideologically coherent parties in subsequent years.

In contrast to the pattern of opposition successor party dissolution in formerly closed political opportunity structures, more open opportunity structures divide the opposition by permitting a set of opposition groups to compete against the ruling party in elections while excluding others from doing so, typically due to the ideology or creed expressed by the excluded opposition group. As a result, political parties that form out of opposition groups in more open opportunity structures tend to be ideologically coherent, and they do not suffer from the same vulnerability to elite fracture or membership loss over policy disagreements.

Authoritarian Elites, Institutions and Renewed State Repression

State repression is an external factor that limits opposition groups’ resources and can lead to opposition group or social movement dissolution. In the context of regime transition and founding elections, in which a formerly repressed opposition group wins, the persistence of coercive authoritarian institutions in particular can make the resurgence of repression against opposition successor parties more likely to occur.

The success of democratic consolidation after founding elections is closely tied to the fate of authoritarian elites and institutions in the years following the transition.⁹⁶ State institutions and political parties are both vehicles through which authoritarian elites and members of the old regime can protect their interests in the democratic era. Authoritarian–era successor parties can offer former elites a means through which to represent their interests while still playing within the boundaries of the democratic “game,”⁹⁷ rather than remaining spoilers outside the system.⁹⁸ Authoritarian successor parties can also “promote party system institutionalization,”⁹⁹ thus aiding in the transition to a party-based, stable, participatory democracy.¹⁰⁰ For example, communist successor parties continue to shape the political landscape of the new democratic regimes in the former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Grzymala-Busse demonstrates that when communist elites dispersed into multiple new parties, voters had difficulty identifying and distinguishing party platforms, which led to greater “nationalist outbidding” and a more shallow commitment to democracy and democratic procedures.¹⁰¹ The absence of a coherent communist successor party, which typically occupied an ideological position to the left of center, also meant that “a single political actor could continue to dominate the political scene, and draw … private benefits and questionable policy decisions”¹⁰² without the threat of genuine competition or replacement. In contrast, when communist elites did not disperse into multiple parties and instead solidified into a single, left-of-center political party, voters could more easily identify who was who; the degree of political competition in the new system was much higher; policy debates focused on economic issues rather than nationalist ones; and a single party was prevented from continuing to rule without fear of replacement, thus improving the quality of policymaking.¹⁰³ Other scholars have identified similar insights in Latin America, Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁰⁴

In contrast to authoritarian successor parties, the persistence of authoritarian institutions can continue to actively shape the rules governing post-transition politics and directly undermine the ability of opposition successor parties to effectively govern. Loxton and Mainwaring found that “outgoing authoritarian incumbents may leave behind authoritarian enclaves, or undemocratic institutions such as tutelary powers for the military that limit the ability of elected governments to govern.”¹⁰⁵ Grzymala-Busse argues that the reform of Communist state institutions ensured that former regime members fully exited state institutions; “the communist exit was important not only for the formal institutional space it opened up, promoting the rise of institutions that favored no play ex ante, but also for its informal aspects. Communist parties lost their privileged position, and their ability to continue to benefit privately en masse from public assets and institutions.”¹⁰⁶ The opposite situation, whereby authoritarian institutions are not reformed and in which former regime members continue to occupy positions of authority, would provide opportunity for authoritarian elites to reassert authority, undermine policy choices and the efficacy of the newly elected government, and to employ state institutions to once again repress political opponents.

In this vein, not all state institutions carry equal weight in terms of their ability to coerce the population after founding elections. While the media, judiciary, and various arms of the state bureaucracy are all important to the ability to govern, the military in particular is central to the consolidation of a new democratic order, and subordinating this institution and its leaders to democratic control is key to this endeavor.¹⁰⁷ Eva Bellin famously points to the role of the coercive apparatus in repressing mass mobilization and long preventing a transition to democracy in the Middle East and North Africa in particular.¹⁰⁸ After the 2011 wave of uprisings throughout the region, Bellin again highlighted the varying role of the coercive apparatus in Syria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, focusing on whether or not the military responded to mass mobilization with repression.¹⁰⁹ She showed that these militaries’ choices at critical junctures – specifically regarding whether or not to fire on mass demonstrations – were pivotal in determining the course of each country’s uprising. With respect to post-transition politics, as well, the military – and the individuals who control it – plays an equally powerful role in supporting the consolidation of democracy or undermining it with renewed repression. Thus, we would expect that when authoritarian-era institutions are not reformed or brought under democratic control as part of the transition, or in the years following founding elections, the new polity is more vulnerable to renewed state repression, especially when the institutions in question include the security services.

Observable Implications of the Argument

This study employs theory–building and theory–testing process tracing to augment our understanding of mechanisms and processes of party formation, political mobilization, and successor party survival in the wake of a regime transition.¹¹⁰ As demanded of theory–building process tracing, I first used a theoretical foundation to ground the inquiry (here the theoretical foundation of the political opportunity structure of authoritarian regimes and its interaction with the theoretical microfoundations of party formation, political mobilization, and successor party dissolution) and then examined the empirical record of the central case (Egypt) to theorize the mechanisms linking the authoritarian political opportunity structure and outcomes around founding elections to construct the theory, as presented in previous sections of this chapter. The application of the theoretical foundation to the Egypt case and subsequent process tracing of empirical evidence are presented in Chapters 2 and 4. Moving to theory testing through process tracing, I selected five additional cases from the population of cases (in which the same authoritarian political opportunity structure and outcomes around founding elections are present) and again evaluated the empirical evidence to determine whether the theorized mechanisms function as expected.¹¹¹ I used four sets of observable implications to structure the empirical process tracing.

The first set of implications relates to the effect of the individual POS facing opposition groups on their organizational characteristics and strategies during the authoritarian era. We expect to see that opposition groups that were included in the formal political system will for the most part abide by the regime’s regulations in exchange for formal participation, thus restricting their ability to conduct meaningful outreach, and will as a result lack ties to or a presence at, the grassroots level. Opposition groups that were excluded from the formal political system will rely on informal networks for their activities and will develop an extensive grassroots presence relative to included groups. Groups that struck a corporatist bargain with the regime will for the most part abide by the rules laid out by the regime in exchange for selective benefits. These groups may engage in contentious politics (strikes or protests) when institutional arrangements break down, but will limit their demands or actions to the boundaries that will leave their corporatist bargain intact.

The second set of implications relates to how the authoritarian political opportunity structure shapes the incentives surrounding political party formation in the run-up to founding elections. In general, we expect that opposition groups that attempted to form political parties during the authoritarian era but were excluded from doing so will form parties in the run-up to founding elections. We expect that those groups that had entered corporatist relationships with the state during the authoritarian era will not form political parties in the run-up to founding elections but rather will seek to maintain or adjust those bargains. If the empirical evidence exists, we expect to see indications that the corporatist group did not conceive of itself as “political” or did not want to engage in politics. In more open authoritarian opportunity structures, we expect to see negative coalition opposition groups decide not to form a political party, and we expect that these groups will lose a segment or much of their membership base to new political parties built off preexisting opposition groups with more specific ideological orientations. In more closed opportunity structures, these same negative coalition opposition groups will use their broad coalition as the most expedient structure upon which to form a political party, rather than to create new organizations, and will not face the threat of membership loss to other groups.

The third set of implications relates to the electoral strategies used by different groups while campaigning prior to founding elections. Here, we should find evidence that the different authoritarian–era opportunity structure endowed groups with different resources and mobilizing strategies, based upon their particular relationship with the regime. Parties that form from groups that were excluded from formal participation will use mobilizing strategies that reflect their grassroots presence; their experience using informal networks; and an awareness of their reputational advantage. Parties that form from groups that were included in formal participation will be less able to use mobilizing strategies that connect with voters at the grassroots level, and we expect to see them using their ideological platform and more impersonal campaign tactics rather than one-on-one outreach.

A final set of implications concerns the persistence of authoritarian legacies after founding elections are concluded. First, we expect that a group’s reputational advantage, built from its role during the authoritarian era, will decline quite quickly after founding elections, and will be replaced by perceptions of its performance in elected office. Second, we expect that opposition successor parties will be more likely to remain cohesive after founding elections, despite winning office, when they are rooted in a specific ideological platform or identity; successor parties that lack this shared identity will be more likely to lose their ability to mobilize supporters, or suffer elite fracture and dissolve, when they lack this shared identity or ideology as the basis for the party. Third, we expect that the persistence of authoritarian-era state institutions after founding elections will make the failure of an opposition successor party more likely; the persistence of coercive institutions may even lead to a resurgence of repression against successor parties and groups.

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The following chapters trace in detail how the authoritarian political opportunity structure of each of the cases shaped events in the run-up to founding elections. Chapters 2 and 3 analyze the political opposition structure of the six cases, beginning with an in-depth examination of Egypt, followed by comparative analyses of a similarly more open opportunity structure (Tunisia); more closed structures (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Zambia); and a case in the middle (Brazil). These chapters also analyze the specific opportunity structure facing individual groups in each case, and how this structure altered their activities. Chapters 4 and 5 trace the mechanisms that link the authoritarian–era political opportunity structure to the processes of party formation and political mobilization in each of the six cases, again beginning with an in-depth look at Egypt, followed by the comparative cases. Chapter 6 turns to events after founding elections in each of the six cases, and the differing fate of the winning opposition successor parties in each. Finally, Chapter 7 examines the theoretical and policy implications of the idea that authoritarian legacies shape founding elections and the fate, to a certain extent, of newly elected democratic governments.