Book contents
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Constitutionalism and Democracy
- 2 The Law As Conversation among Equals
- 3 “Democratic Dissonance”
- 4 A Constitution Marked by a “Discomfort with Democracy”
- 5 Motivations and Institutions: “If Men Were Angels”
- 6 The Structural Difficulties of Representation
- 7 The Rise and Fall of Popular Control
- 8 The Periodic Vote, or “Electoral Extortion”
- 9 Checks and Balances
- 10 Presidentialism
- 11 Rights
- 12 Social Rights and the “Engine Room”
- 13 Judicial Review
- 14 Constitutional Interpretation
- 15 Constitution Making
- 16 The Birth of Dialogical Constitutionalism
- 17 Why We Care About Dialogue
- 18 “Democratic Erosion”
- 19 The New Deliberative Assemblies
- 20 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
13 - Judicial Review
“It Seems Something of an Insult”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 April 2022
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Constitutionalism and Democracy
- 2 The Law As Conversation among Equals
- 3 “Democratic Dissonance”
- 4 A Constitution Marked by a “Discomfort with Democracy”
- 5 Motivations and Institutions: “If Men Were Angels”
- 6 The Structural Difficulties of Representation
- 7 The Rise and Fall of Popular Control
- 8 The Periodic Vote, or “Electoral Extortion”
- 9 Checks and Balances
- 10 Presidentialism
- 11 Rights
- 12 Social Rights and the “Engine Room”
- 13 Judicial Review
- 14 Constitutional Interpretation
- 15 Constitution Making
- 16 The Birth of Dialogical Constitutionalism
- 17 Why We Care About Dialogue
- 18 “Democratic Erosion”
- 19 The New Deliberative Assemblies
- 20 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter I show that the judicial branch, as it was designed at the end of the 18th century, jeopardized the democratic nature of the incipient governments. As many contemporary critics of judicial review maintain, I argue that it is “offensive” (“it seems something of an insult”) for a democratic society, and for the equal dignity of its members, that in the face of profound constitutional disagreements, a minority of judges, and not the representatives of the people, pronounce the last word on the matter (Waldron 1999). I explore the “democratic objection” against judicial review through a diversity of cases and debates, including Alexander Hamilton’s early defense of judicial review in Federalist Papers n. 78, and John Marshall’s famous decision in Marbury v. Madison. I conclude this chapter by showing that the “decisive argument” against the dominant, standard position on the justification of judicial review is (what I call) the “interpretive gap” argument.
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- The Law As a Conversation among Equals , pp. 183 - 201Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022