Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-grxwn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-13T16:50:23.709Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

21 - Explanation-Based Approaches to Reasoning about Evidence and Proof in Criminal Trials

from IV - Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2021

By
Anne Ruth Mackor ,
Hylke Jellema  and
Peter J. van Koppen
Edited by
Bartosz Brożek ,
Jaap Hage  and
Nicole Vincent
Bartosz Brożek
Affiliation:
Jagiellonian University, Krakow
Jaap Hage
Affiliation:
Universiteit Maastricht, Netherlands
Nicole Vincent
Affiliation:
Macquarie University, Sydney
Get access

Summary

In this chapter the authors discuss explanation-based theories on reasoning about evidence and on proof in criminal trials that view such reasoning in terms of evaluating competing explanations. These theories are all grounded in the cognitive psychology of decision making. They aim to describe how people actually reason when they have to make sense of a great deal of evidence in, for example, criminal trials. According to these theories, people in such contexts typically construct one or more causal explanations for the evidence.

The explanation-based theories discussed in this chapter extend these empirical findings by developing theories that are, in varying degrees, normative. These theories are about the extent to which people actually reason in a rational manner, but also the extent to which they should change their manners. In particular, we discuss three theories, namely Allen and Pardo’s relative plausibility theory, Amaya’s theory of inference to the most coherent explanation and Van Koppen’s theory of anchored narratives or, as it has also been called, the scenario theory.

These three theories share three characteristics, namely that causal explanation, more specifically inference to the best explanation (IBE), is at their heart; that coherence is a core criterion to assess the quality of explanations; and that, as normative theories, they try to stay close to how people actually reason, both in everyday life and in criminal trials.

In the literature about evidence and proof in criminal law, explanation-based approaches are generally contrasted with probabilistic, more specifically Bayesian, approaches. Therefore, we discuss both Bayesian critiques of explanation-based approaches and explanation-based critiques of Bayesian approaches. We also discuss the question of whether a productive partnership between explanation-based and probabilistic approaches is possible.

Type
Chapter
Information
Law and Mind
A Survey of Law and the Cognitive Sciences
 , pp. 431 - 470
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Allen, R. J. (1997). Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Inquiry. International Journal of Evidence and Proof 1, 254–275.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Allen, R. J. & Leiter, B. (2001). Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence. Virginia Law Review 87, 1491–1550.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Allen, R. J. & Pardo, M. S. (2019a). Clarifying Relative Plausibility: A Rejoinder. International Journal of Evidence and Proof. Advanced online publication. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1365712718816760CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Allen, R. J. & Pardo, M. S. (2019b). Relative Plausibility and Its Critics. International Journal of Evidence and Proof. Advance online publication.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Amaya, A. (2009). Inference to the Best Legal Explanation. In Kaptein, H., Prakken, H. & Verheij, B. (eds.), Legal Evidence and Proof: Statistics, Stories, Logic. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 135–160.Google Scholar
Amaya, A. (2013). Coherence, Evidence and Proof. Legal Theory 19, 1–43.Google Scholar
Amaya, A. (2015). The Tapestry of Reason: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Coherence and Its Role in Legal Argument. Oxford: Hart.Google Scholar
Anderson, T. J., Schum, D. A. & Twining, W. L. (2005). Analysis of Evidence, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Ask, K. & Granhag, P. A. (2005). Motivational Sources of Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations: The Need for Cognitive Closure. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling 2, 43–63.Google Scholar
Bennett, W. L. & Feldman, M. S. (2014). Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: Justice and Judgement in American Culture, 2nd ed. New Orleans: Quid Pro.Google Scholar
Bex, F. J. (2011). Arguments, Stories and Criminal Evidence: A Formal Hybrid Theory. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
Bex, F. J., Van Koppen, P. J., Prakken, H. & Verheij, B. (2010). A Hybrid Formal Theory of Arguments, Stories and Criminal Evidence. Artificial Intelligence and Law 18, 123–152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bex, F. J., Prakken, H., Reed, C. & Walton, D. (2003). Towards a Formal Account of Reasoning about Evidence: Argumentation Schemes and Generalisations. Artificial Intelligence and Law 11, 125–165.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blackstone, W. (1765–1769). Commentaries on the Laws of England. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Bovens, L. & Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Butler, J. M., Kline, M. C. & Coble, M. D. (2018). NIST Interlaboratory Studies Involving DNA Mixtures (MIX05 and MIX13): Variation Observed and Lessons Learned. Forensic Science International: Genetics 37, 81–94.Google Scholar
Cabrera, F. (2017). Can There Be a Bayesian Explanationism? On the Prospects of a Productive Partnership. Synthese 194, 1245–1272.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clermont, K. M. (2015). Trial by Traditional Probability, Relative Plausibility, or Belief Function? Case Western Reserve Law Review 66, 353–391.Google Scholar
Clermont, K. M. (2017). Common Sense on Standards of Proof. Seton Hall Law Review 48, 1057–1080.Google Scholar
Cohen, L. J. (1977). The Probable and the Provable. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Connolly, T. (1987). Decision Theory, Reasonable Doubt, and the Utility of Erroneous Acquittals. Law and Human Behavior 11, 101–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dahlman, C. (2018). Determining the Base Rate for Guilt. Law, Probability and Risk 17, 15–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dahlman, C. & Mackor, A. R. (2019). Coherence and Probability in Legal Evidence. Law, Probability and Risk 18, 275–94. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/lpr/mgz016Google Scholar
Dane, F. C. (1985). In Search of Reasonable Doubt: A Systematic Examination of Selected Quantification Approaches. Law and Human Behavior 9, 141–158.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Keijser, J. W., De Lange, E. G. M. & Van Wilsem, J. A. (2014). Wrongful Convictions and the Blackstone Ratio: An Empirical Analysis of Public Attitudes. Punishment and Society 16, 32–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Keijser, J. W. & Van Koppen, P. J. (2007). Paradoxes of Proof and Punishment: Psychological Pitfalls in Judicial Decision Making. Legal and Criminological Psychology 12, 189–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Poot, C. J., Bokhorst, R. J., Van Koppen, P. J. & Muller, E. R. (2004). Rechercheportret: Over dilemma’s in de opsporing [Detectives’ portrait: On dilemma’s in police investigations]. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer.Google Scholar
De Zoete, J., Fenton, N., Noguchi, T. & Lagnado, D. (2019). Resolving the So-Called ‘Probabilistic Paradoxes in Legal Reasoning’ with Bayesian Networks. Science and Justice 59, 367–379.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Dershowitz, A. M. (1996). Reasonable Doubt: The Criminal Justice System and the O. J. Simpson Case. New York: Simon and Schuster.Google Scholar
Dhami, M. K. (2008). On Measuring Quantitative Interpretations of Reasonable Doubt. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 14, 353–363.Google Scholar
Di Bello, M. (2019). Plausibility and Probability in Juridical Proof. International Journal of Evidence and Proof. Advance online publication. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1365712718815355CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DiMaggio, P. (1997). Culture and Cognition. Annual Review of Sociology 23, 263–287.Google Scholar
Douglas, H. (2009). Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
Douven, I. (2017). Abduction. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/.Google Scholar
Edwards, W., Lindman, H. & Savage, L. J. (1963). Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological Research. Psychological Review 70, 193–242.Google Scholar
Fenton, N. E., Lagnado, D. A., Dahlman, C. & Neil, M. (2017). The Opportunity Prior: A Simple and Practical Solution to the Prior Probability Problem for Legal Cases. Proceedings of the 16th edition of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law. ACM Online Library, pp. 69–76.Google Scholar
Fenton, N. E., Neil, M. & Berger, D. (2016). Bayes and the Law. Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application 3, 51–77.Google Scholar
Fenton, N.E., Neil, M., Yet, B. & Lagnado, D. A. (2020). Analyzing the Simonshaven Case Using Bayesian Networks. Topics in Cognitive Science 12(4), 1092–1114. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12417CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.Google Scholar
Fitelson, B. (2003). A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence. Analysis 63, 194–199.Google Scholar
Friedman, R. D. (1997). Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge. International Journal of Evidence and Proof 1, 276–291.Google Scholar
Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Gut Feelings: Short Cuts to Better Decision Making. London: Penguin.Google Scholar
Gigerenzer, G. & Engel, C. (eds.). (2006). Heuristics and the Law. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gill, P. (2016). Misleading DNA Evidence: Reasons for Miscarriages of Justice. Amsterdam: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009). Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Granhag, P. A. & Strömwall, L. A. (eds.). (2004). The Detection of Deception in Forensic Contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Gross, S. R. (1998). Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases. Law and Contemporary Problems 61, 125–149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gross, S. R. (2008). Convicting the Innocent. Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences 4, 173–192.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gross, S. R., Jacoby, K., Matheson, D. J., Montgomery, N. & Patel, S. (2005). Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 95, 523–560.Google Scholar
Hans, V. P. (2008). Jury Systems Around the World. Annual Review of Law and Social Science 4, 275–297.Google Scholar
Harman, G. H. (1965). The Inference to the Best Explanation. Philosophical Review 74, 88–95.Google Scholar
Hitchcock, C. (2007). The Lovely and the Probable. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, 433–440.Google Scholar
Hofstee, W. K. B. (1980). De empirische discussie: Theorie van het sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek [The empirical discussion: Theory of social science research]. Amsterdam: Boom.Google Scholar
Huff, R. & Killias, M. (eds.) (2008). Wrongful Conviction: International Perspectives on Miscarriages of Justice. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.Google Scholar
Kadane, J. B. & Schum, D. A. (2011). A Probabilistic Analysis of the Sacco and Vanzetti Evidence. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (eds.) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kassin, S. M., Dror, I. E. & Kukučka, J. (2013). The Forensic Confirmation Bias: Problems, Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 2, 42–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaye, D. H. (1979). The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories. Arizona State Law Journal, 101–109.Google Scholar
Kleider, H. M., Pezdek, K., Goldinger, S. D. & Kirk, A. (2008). Schema-Driven Source Misattribution Errors: Remembering the Expected from a Witnessed Event. Applied Cognitive Psychology 22, 1–20.Google Scholar
Lagnado, D. A., Fenton, N. E., & Neil, M. (2013). Legal Idioms: A Framework for Evidential Reasoning. Argument and Computation 4, 46–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, L. (2007). Strange Bedfellows: Inference to the Best Explanation and the Criminal Standard of Proof. International Journal of Evidence and Proof 11, 292–306.Google Scholar
Lewicka, M. (1998). Confirmation Bias: Cognitive Error or Adaptive Strategy of Action Control? In Kofta, M., Weary, G. & Sedek, G. (eds.), Personal Control in Action: Cognitive and Motivational Mechanisms. New York: Plenum, pp. 233–258.Google Scholar
Lipton, P. (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Lipton, P. (2007). Alien Abduction: Inference to the Best Explanation and the Management of Testimony. Episteme 4, 238–251.Google Scholar
Lycan, W. G. (1988). Judgment and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Lycan, W. G. (2002). Explanation and Epistemology. In Moser, P. K. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 408–433.Google Scholar
Mackor, A. R. (2017). Novel Facts: The Relevance of Predictions in Criminal Law. Strafblad 15, 145–156.Google Scholar
Mackor, A. R. (in press). Different Ways of Being Naked: A Scenario Approach to the Naked Statistical Evidence Problem. IFCOLOG.Google Scholar
McMullin, E. (1996). Epistemic Virtue and Theory-Appraisal. In Douven, I. & Horsten, L. (eds.), Realism in the Sciences. Leuven: University of Leuven Press, pp. 1–34.Google Scholar
Meester, R. & Kerkvliet, T. (2016). Assessing Forensic Evidence by Computing Belief Functions. Law, Probability and Risk 15, 127–153.Google Scholar
Meissner, C. A., & Kassin, S. M. (2004). ‘You’re Guilty, So Just Confess!’ Cognitive and Behavioral Confirmation Biases in the Interrogation Room. In Lassiter, G. D. (ed.), Interrogations, Confessions, and Entrapment. New York: Kluwer Academic, pp. 85–106.Google Scholar
Nance, D. A. (2001). Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory. Virginia Law Review 87, 1551–1618.Google Scholar
Nance, D. A. (2019). Belief Functions and Burdens of Proof. Law, Probability and Risk 18, 53–76.Google Scholar
Nesson, C. R. (1979). Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity. Harvard Law Review 92, 1187–1225.Google Scholar
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation Bias: An Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises. Review of General Psychology 2, 175–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nieuwbeerta, P. & Leistra, G. (2007). Dodelijk geweld: Moord en doodslag in Nederland. Amsterdam: Balans.Google Scholar
Nunn, G. A. (2015). The Incompatibility of Due Process and Naked Statistical Evidence. Vanderbilt Law Review 68, 1407–1433.Google Scholar
Okasha, S. (2000). Van Fraassen’s Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 31, 691–710.Google Scholar
Olsson, E. J. (2005). Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Olsson, E. J. (2019). Dahlman and Mackor on Coherence and Probability in Legal Evidence: A Commentary. Law, Probability and Risk 18, 295–303. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/lpr/mgz017Google Scholar
Oswald, M. E., & Grosjean, S. (2004). Confirmation Bias. In Pohl, R. F. (ed.), Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgment and Memory. Hove: Psychology Press, pp. 79–96.Google Scholar
Pardo, M. S. (2013). The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory. Vanderbilt Law Review 66, 547–613.Google Scholar
Pardo, M. S. & Allen, R. J. (2008). Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation. Law and Philosophy 27, 223–268.Google Scholar
Pennington, N. & Hastie, R. (1993). The Story Model for Juror Decision Making. In Hastie, R. (ed.), Inside the Jury: The Psychology of Juror Decision Making, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 192–221.Google Scholar
Popper, K. R. (1935). Logik der Forschung: Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft. Vienna: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Poston, T. L. (2014). Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Prakken, H. (2020). An Argumentation-Based Analysis of the Simonshaven Case. Topics in Cognitive Science 12(4), 1068–1091. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12418Google Scholar
Prakken, H. & Meester, R. (2017). Bayesiaanse analyses van complexe strafzaken door deskundigen. Betrouwbaar en zo ja: nuttig? [Bayesian Analyses of Complex Criminal Cases by Experts. Reliable and If So: Useful?] Expertise en Recht 5, 185–197.Google Scholar
Psillos, S. (2007). The Fine Structure of Inference to the Best Explanation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, 441–448.Google Scholar
Saks, M. J. & Thompson, W. C. (2003). Assessing Evidence: Proving Facts. In Carson, D. & Bull, R. H. C. (eds.), Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts, 2nd ed. Chichester: Wiley, pp. 329–45.Google Scholar
Shafer, G. (1976). A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Schippers, M. (2016). The Problem of Coherence and Truth Redux. Erkenntnis 81, 817–851.Google Scholar
Schum, D. A. (1994). The Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Schwartz, D. S. & Sober, E. (2017). The Conjunction Problem and the Logic of Jury Findings. William and Mary Law Review 59, 619–692.Google Scholar
Schweizer, M. (2014). Comparing Holistic and Atomistic Evaluation of Evidence. Law, Probability and Risk 13, 65–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shogenji, T. (1999). Is Coherence Truth Conducive. Analysis 59, 338–345.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siebel, M. (2011). Why Explanation and Thus Coherence Cannot Be Reduced to Probability. Analysis 71, 264–266.Google Scholar
Simon, D. (2004). A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making. University of Chicago Law Review 71, 511–586.Google Scholar
Simon, D. (2019). Thin Empirics. International Journal of Evidence and Proof. Advanced internet publication. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1365712718815350CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Spottswood, M. (2016). Unraveling the Conjunction Paradox. Law, Probability and Risk 15, 259–296.Google Scholar
Stein, A. (1996). Judicial Fact-Finding and the Bayesian Method: The Case for Deeper Scepticism About Their Combination. International Journal of Evidence and Proof 1, 25–47. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F136571279600100103Google Scholar
Stoffelmayr, E., & Diamond, S. S. (2000). The Conflict Between Precision and Flexibility in Explaining Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 6, 769–787.Google Scholar
Taylor, S. E., & Crocker, J. (1981). Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing. In Higgins, E. T., Herman, C. A. & Zanna, M. P. (eds.), Social Cognition: The Ontario Symposium on Personality and Social Psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 89–134.Google Scholar
Thagard, P. R. (1978). The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice. The Journal of Philosophy 75, 76–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thagard, P. R. (2000). Coherence in Thought and Action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Thompson, W. C. (2009). Painting the Target Around the Matching Profile: The Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy in Forensic DNA Interpretation. Law, Probability and Risk 8, 257–276.Google Scholar
Thompson, W. C. (2011). What Role Should Investigative Facts Play in the Evaluation of Scientific Evidence? Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 43, 123–134.Google Scholar
Tillers, P. & Green, E. D. (eds.). (1988). Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence: The Uses and Limits of Bayesianism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.Google Scholar
Van Fraassen, B. C. (1989). Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Van Koppen, P. J. (2009). Jury Trials: Opposed. E-Journal USA 14 (7), 18, 23–24.Google Scholar
Van Koppen, P. J. (2011). Overtuigend bewijs: Indammen van rechterlijke dwalingen (Convincing evidence: Reducing the number of miscarriages of justice). Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam.Google Scholar
Van Koppen, P. J. (2013). Gerede twijfel: Over bewijs in strafzaken (Reasonable doubt: On evidence in criminal cases). Amsterdam: De Kring.Google Scholar
Van Koppen, P. J., & Mackor, A. R. (2020). A Scenario Approach to the Simonshaven Case. Topics in Cognitive Science 12(4), 1132–1151. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12429Google Scholar
Vidmar, N. J. (2009). Jury Trials: In Favor. E-Journal USA 14(7), 18–22.Google Scholar
Vidmar, N. J. (2011). The Psychology of Trial Judging. Current Directions in Psychological Science 20, 58–62.Google Scholar
Vidmar, N. J., & Hans, V. P. (2007). American Juries: The Verdict. Amherst, NY: Prometheus.Google Scholar
Vineberg, S. (2016). Dutch Book Arguments. In Zalta, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/dutch-book/.Google Scholar
Volokh, A. (1997). n Guilty Men. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 146, 173–211.Google Scholar
Wagenaar, W. A., Van Koppen, P. J. & Crombag, H. F. M. (1993). Anchored Narratives: The Psychology of Criminal Evidence. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.Google Scholar
Walton, D. N., Reed, C. A. & Macagno, F. (2008). Argumentation Schemes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Wittlin, M. (2019). Common Problems of Plausibility and Probabilism. International Journal of Evidence and Proof. Online advanced publication. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1365712718815349Google Scholar
Ylikoski, P. & Kuorikoski, J. (2010). Dissecting Explanatory Power. Philosophical Studies 148, 201–219.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×