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A Kripkean Argument against Physicalism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 February 2024
In this chapter, I present a Kripkean argument against the materialist thesis that intentionality supervenes on the physical. The argument is inspired both by Kripke’s remarks on the essential nature of intentionality in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, and his argument against the identification of mind and body in Naming and Necessity. The argument turns on the metaphysical possibility of quadders and zombies, where quadders are minimal physical duplicates of us who mean quaddition rather than addition by “plus,” and where zombies are minimal physical duplicates of us whose thought and talk are altogether devoid of intentionality.
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