Book contents
- Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Chapter 1 Knowledge from Knowledge
- Chapter 2 Inferential Knowledge from Falsehood
- Chapter 3 Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth
- Chapter 4 Explaining Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 5 Testimony and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 6 Memory and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 7 Knowledge from Non-Knowledge in Inference, Testimony and Memory
- References
- Index
Chapter 5 - Testimony and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 July 2019
- Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Chapter 1 Knowledge from Knowledge
- Chapter 2 Inferential Knowledge from Falsehood
- Chapter 3 Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth
- Chapter 4 Explaining Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 5 Testimony and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 6 Memory and Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
- Chapter 7 Knowledge from Non-Knowledge in Inference, Testimony and Memory
- References
- Index
Summary
I present the debate on testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge. After explaining Jennifer Lackey's challenges to the received view that a hearer can only come to know p testimonially if the speaker knows p, I raise several difficulties for Lizzie Fricker's view, according to which testimonial knowledge is necessarily second-hand knowledge, and reject it on the basis of these problems. I then argue that Sandy Goldberg's case of safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony survives Lackey's criticism. I offer a first comparison between inferential and testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge in terms of defeaters.
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- Knowledge from Non-KnowledgeInference, Testimony and Memory, pp. 121 - 166Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019