Book contents
- The Knowledge Argument
- Classic Philosophical Arguments
- The Knowledge Argument
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: The Enduring Significance of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
- 1 The Knowledge Argument Is an Argument about Knowledge
- 2 There’s Nothing about Mary
- 3 Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism
- 4 Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts
- 5 The Knowledge Argument Meets Representationalism about Colour Experience
- 6 The Mary-Go-Round
- 7 Concept Mastery, Social Externalism, and Mary’s New Knowledge
- 8 Mary’s Powers of Imagination
- 9 The Knowledge Argument Is Either Indefensible or Redundant
- 10 Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism
- 11 Phenomenal Knowledge Why: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
- 12 The Knowledge Argument and the Self
- 13 What Uninformed Mary Can Teach Us
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2019
- The Knowledge Argument
- Classic Philosophical Arguments
- The Knowledge Argument
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: The Enduring Significance of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
- 1 The Knowledge Argument Is an Argument about Knowledge
- 2 There’s Nothing about Mary
- 3 Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism
- 4 Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts
- 5 The Knowledge Argument Meets Representationalism about Colour Experience
- 6 The Mary-Go-Round
- 7 Concept Mastery, Social Externalism, and Mary’s New Knowledge
- 8 Mary’s Powers of Imagination
- 9 The Knowledge Argument Is Either Indefensible or Redundant
- 10 Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism
- 11 Phenomenal Knowledge Why: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
- 12 The Knowledge Argument and the Self
- 13 What Uninformed Mary Can Teach Us
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Mary in her black and white room knows all that physical science can teach us about the physical facts involved in colour experience. But it does not follow that she knows everything there is to know about these facts. The Russellian monist exploits this gap to defend a form of physicalism – in a very broad sense of that word. Unfortunately, recent developments in the grounding literature cast doubt on that strategy, or so I will argue.
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- The Knowledge Argument , pp. 198 - 222Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
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