Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A Theory of Power Sharing and Attributions under Authoritarian Rule
- 3 Cross-National Evidence on Power Sharing and Attributions in Autocracies
- 4 The Jordanian Monarchy’s Strategic Blame Games
- 5 How Jordanians Attribute Responsibility
- 6 Power Sharing and Attributions across Jordan’s Modern History
- 7 How Jordan’s Blame Games Influence Governance
- 8 The Royal Advantage in Power Sharing and Blame Shifting
- 9 Power Sharing, Blame, and the Collapse of Royal Regimes
- 10 Conclusion
- References
- Index
6 - Power Sharing and Attributions across Jordan’s Modern History
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 November 2024
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A Theory of Power Sharing and Attributions under Authoritarian Rule
- 3 Cross-National Evidence on Power Sharing and Attributions in Autocracies
- 4 The Jordanian Monarchy’s Strategic Blame Games
- 5 How Jordanians Attribute Responsibility
- 6 Power Sharing and Attributions across Jordan’s Modern History
- 7 How Jordan’s Blame Games Influence Governance
- 8 The Royal Advantage in Power Sharing and Blame Shifting
- 9 Power Sharing, Blame, and the Collapse of Royal Regimes
- 10 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
Chapter 6 continues the Jordan case study by providing an important assessment of the theory’s expectations over time. Drawing on archival documents, internet search data, elite interviews, and secondary sources, the chapter shows that Jordan’s kings have shared power more credibly when they have more reasons to be concerned about popular discontent. Furthermore, it also demonstrates that Jordanians have responded to these changes as the theory expects, becoming more likely to blame the king for their grievances when the monarchy controls the decision-making process more directly, and less likely to blame the king when he delegates more credibly to other political elites. Not only do these findings demonstrate the theory’s utility for explaining changes in authoritarian decision-making over time, but they also help to account for alternative explanations to the argument, such as the possibility that the Jordanian monarchy benefits from traditional legitimacy that protects its reputation from popular anger.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The King Can Do No WrongBlame Games and Power Sharing in Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 173 - 212Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024