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1 - Becoming subjective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 February 2010

Edited and translated by
Alastair Hannay
Affiliation:
Universitetet i Oslo
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Summary

What would there be for ethics to judge if becoming subjective were not the highest task set for a human being; what must be put aside on a closer understanding of this; examples of thinking directed towards becoming subjective.

Objectively, one always speaks only to the matter at issue; subjectively one speaks of the subject and subjectivity – and then, what do you know, subjectivity is the matter at issue! It has constantly to be stressed that the subjective problem is nothing about the matter at issue, it is the subjectivity itself. For since the problem is the decision and all decision lies, as was shown above, in subjectivity, the important thing is that objectively there be absolutely no remaining trace of a matter at issue, for at that very moment subjectivity wants to sneak its way out of some of the pain and crisis of decision, i.e., make the problem a little objective. If the introductory science is waiting for one more work to appear before taking the matter up for judgment; if the system still lacks a paragraph; if the speaker has still another argument up his sleeve, the decision is postponed. Hence, what is raised here is not the question of the truth of Christianity, in the sense that if this was decided, subjectivity would be ready and willing to accept it. No, it is a question of the subject's acceptance.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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  • Becoming subjective
  • Edited and translated by Alastair Hannay
  • Book: Kierkegaard: Concluding Unscientific Postscript
  • Online publication: 26 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511626760.014
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  • Becoming subjective
  • Edited and translated by Alastair Hannay
  • Book: Kierkegaard: Concluding Unscientific Postscript
  • Online publication: 26 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511626760.014
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Becoming subjective
  • Edited and translated by Alastair Hannay
  • Book: Kierkegaard: Concluding Unscientific Postscript
  • Online publication: 26 February 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511626760.014
Available formats
×