Book contents
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Plates
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Lessons of Keynes’s Economic Consequences in a Turbulent Century
- 2 The Making of a Classic: Keynes and the Origins of The Economic Consequences of the Peace
- 3 Keynes’s Economic Consequences (1919)
- 4 “Too Bad to Be True”: Swedish Economists on Keynes’s The Economic Consequences of the Peace and German Reparations, 1919–29
- 5 Revisionism as Intellectual-Political Vindication, or the French Receptions of Consequences after the Two World Wars (1919–1946)
- 6 Between Cambridge, Paris, and Amsterdam
- 7 Keynes, the Transfer Problem, and Reparations
- 8 The Speculative Consequences of the Peace
- 9 Why Was Keynes Opposed to Reparations and a Carthaginian Peace?
- 10 One Case Where The Economic Consequences of the Peace Mattered
- 11 Keynes and International Trade Politics after the First World War
- 12 Gold, International Monetary Cooperation, and the Tripartite Agreement of 1936
- 13 Exchange Rates, Tariffs and Prices in 1930s Britain
- 14 “Unusual, Unstable, Complicated, Unreliable and Temporary”: Reinterpreting the Ebb and Flow of Globalization
- 15 Keynes’s Arc of Discovery
- 16 Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, and Popular Perceptions of the First World War
- Index
- Plate Section (PDF Only)
- References
4 - “Too Bad to Be True”: Swedish Economists on Keynes’s The Economic Consequences of the Peace and German Reparations, 1919–29
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 December 2023
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Plates
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Lessons of Keynes’s Economic Consequences in a Turbulent Century
- 2 The Making of a Classic: Keynes and the Origins of The Economic Consequences of the Peace
- 3 Keynes’s Economic Consequences (1919)
- 4 “Too Bad to Be True”: Swedish Economists on Keynes’s The Economic Consequences of the Peace and German Reparations, 1919–29
- 5 Revisionism as Intellectual-Political Vindication, or the French Receptions of Consequences after the Two World Wars (1919–1946)
- 6 Between Cambridge, Paris, and Amsterdam
- 7 Keynes, the Transfer Problem, and Reparations
- 8 The Speculative Consequences of the Peace
- 9 Why Was Keynes Opposed to Reparations and a Carthaginian Peace?
- 10 One Case Where The Economic Consequences of the Peace Mattered
- 11 Keynes and International Trade Politics after the First World War
- 12 Gold, International Monetary Cooperation, and the Tripartite Agreement of 1936
- 13 Exchange Rates, Tariffs and Prices in 1930s Britain
- 14 “Unusual, Unstable, Complicated, Unreliable and Temporary”: Reinterpreting the Ebb and Flow of Globalization
- 15 Keynes’s Arc of Discovery
- 16 Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, and Popular Perceptions of the First World War
- Index
- Plate Section (PDF Only)
- References
Summary
This chapter examines the response of five prominent Swedish economists, David Davidson, Gustav Cassel, Eli Heckscher, Knut Wicksell and Bertil Ohlin, to John Maynard Keynes’s The Economic Consequences of the Peace and to the German reparations in the 1920s. When Keynes’s book appeared, Davidson and Cassel strongly endorsed it. Heckscher also agreed with Keynes in a long review entitled “Too Bad to Be True”. Inspired by his Malthusian view, Wicksell found the reparations feasible if only German population growth was arrested. The contacts between the Swedes and Keynes became close after Keynes’s book, in particular between Cassel and Keynes. The exchange of views took a new turn when Bertil Ohlin responded to an article by Keynes in The Economic Journal in 1929 on the transfer problem. The famous Keynes–Ohlin discussion laid the foundation for the analysis of the transfer problem, bringing Ohlin international recognition. We also trace how Davidson, Cassel and Heckscher changed their appreciation of Keynes in the 1930s with the publication of the General Theory while Ohlin viewed the message of Keynes in the 1930s as consistent with the policy views of the Stockholm school of economics.
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- Keynes's Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 YearsPolemics and Policy, pp. 99 - 129Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024