12 - IOM’s Engagement with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Summary

Despite having no such explicit mandate, IOM is one of the largest global actors in IDP response and protection. Yet, its activities on behalf of IDPs have been remarkably under-studied. This chapter appraises IOM’s obligations under the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPs), and assesses the extent to which IOM applies these in its work. The chapter does so in two main ways. First, by mapping references to IDPs and the GPs in IOM’s policies, and, second, by examining how these policies are implemented in practice in two country contexts – Haiti (disaster displacement) and Iraq (conflict-induced displacement). While important to recognise the positive impacts of IOMs IDP protection efforts, this chapter identifies and interrogates, with some concern, substantial inconsistencies between IOMs activities and the ethos of the GPs. In particular, the chapter is critical of IOMs almost exclusive camp-based focus and its predominant preference for return as a durable solution. Also troubling is an observed decline in IOM references to the GPs as the leading international standards for IDP protection. The chapter finds that IOM adherence with the GPs cannot thus be taken as a given - indeed, adherence to date is likely more by chance than by design.

12.1 Introduction

The vast majority of migrants with whom IOM works directly are Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in conflict and disaster situations. For example, in 2019 IOM provided protection and assistance to more than 21 million IDPs.¹ This makes IOM one of the largest global actors in responding to IDPs and their protection needs. It is one of the few agencies whose operations on internal displacement span the crisis continuum – from preparedness and risk reduction, to humanitarian protection and assistance, through the transition to longer-term solutions and recovery.² Responses to internal displacement constitute most of IOM’s crisis-related programming, whether implemented at the individual or community levels.³ Put simply, all these factors mean IOM is a major player – if not the major player – in the international community’s response to internal displacement.

Yet, IOM has been remarkably under-studied – especially compared to other agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).⁴ IOM’s operations with IDPs have received even less attention.⁵ Thus, although IOM has made an explicit commitment to human rights and humanitarian principles,⁶ scholars are not holding IOM accountable to these norms.

As such, this chapter is the first to take the important initial step in holding IOM to account from the perspective of the key international instrument for the protection of IDPs – the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPs). Specifically, it assesses to what extent IOM has integrated the GPs into its policies and frameworks and, through two case studies of IOM’s work with IDPs in Haiti and Iraq, examines the extent to which IOM has implemented the GPs in its practice and approach in these country-specific contexts. At present, these aspects of IOM’s work are very unclear for three reasons. First, as aforementioned, there is little scholarly analysis on this topic. Second, IOM contended, as recently as 2004, that it was not bound by international human rights law.⁷ This contention is of particular concern as many of the GPs are in substance grounded in international human rights law and hence form part of IOM’s obligations.⁸ Third, although several of IOM’s more recent core institutional policies and frameworks have explicitly recognized an obligation to protect and promote human rights,⁹ these frameworks and policies are not yet well known outside the agency, and they rarely mention the GPs.¹⁰ This omission is striking because IOM’s operations are overwhelmingly focused on the ‘global south’, particularly with IDPs in conflict and disaster situations.¹¹ Moreover, IDPs are amongst the most vulnerable groups in the world,¹² and naturally, it is highly desirable that one of the largest actors responding to their needs pays close heed to their key rights as encapsulated by the GPs.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Part 2 sets out what an IDP is and introduces the GPs, the obligations reflected in the GPs, and the centrality of the GPs in the overall international framework of IDP protection. Part 3 then explains the basis for IOM’s operations with IDPs. In particular, we explain that although IOM does not have a clear formal mandate for assisting and protecting IDPs, it has justified its IDP activities in various ways, including through its Constitution, its role in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and the cluster system. Part 4 holds IOM to account by critically examining the extent to which it has delivered on its explicit undertaking ‘to promote and respect the Guiding Principles in its work, and to disseminate them as widely as possible’.¹³ We do this by mapping explicit references to the GPs in pertinent IOM policy instruments and by interrogating IOM’s adherence to the durable solutions approach that is espoused by the GPs. Part 5 then critically examines how the GPs have been implemented by IOM in practice in the context of disaster (Haiti) and conflict-induced displacement (Iraq).

While it is important to recognize the positive impacts of IOM’s work with IDPs,¹⁴ this chapter identifies and interrogates, with some concern, substantial inconsistencies that exist between IOM’s activities and both the letter and ethos of the GPs. Concerns arise from a seeming decline in explicit IOM references to the GPs as the leading international standards for IDP protection, evidenced in part by their absence in key IOM documents such as the 2015 Humanitarian Policy and its 2012 Migration Crisis Operational Framework. In addition, some of IOM’s policies and frameworks not only neglect to refer to the GPs but also suffer inconsistencies with the GPs in terms of content. Inconsistencies also exist between IOM’s operations and the ethos of the GPs. For example, this chapter is critical of IOM’s almost exclusive camp-based focus in Haiti and its predominant preference for return as a durable solution to internal displacement, which is evident in IOM’s operations in Iraq. Adherence to the GPs cannot thus be taken as a given and should be more concertedly systematized in IOM’s ongoing work with IDPs.

12.2 The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons

IDPs are persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their places of habitual residence as a result of factors such as armed conflict, violence, human rights violations or natural or human-made disasters, but who have not crossed an international border.¹⁵ IDPs often have similar wants, fears, and needs as refugees such as access to shelter, medicines, food, water, and safety from harm.¹⁶ However, unlike refugees, IDPs do not have a specific legal status under international law and there is no dedicated global (as opposed to regional) treaty that grants them protection.¹⁷ In addition, while the UNHCR has a specific mandate for the protection of refugees,¹⁸ there is no international organization that has a dedicated mandate for protecting IDPs. IDPs are therefore amongst the most vulnerable groups in the world in terms of the harm to which they are exposed, the relative lack of binding international legal frameworks dedicated to their protection, and the absence of institutions with a specific responsibility for their protection.

In 1998, Francis Deng, the then Representative of the UN Secretary General on Internal Displacement, concluded the drafting of a protection framework for IDPs. The form of the framework was unspecified in the UN resolutions asking him to draft the framework. Consequently, the Representative decided to elaborate a set of non-binding principles based on existing provisions of human rights and humanitarian law and drawing from refugee law by analogy. The 30 principles were divided into five parts – (i) General Principles; (ii) Principles Relating to Protection from Displacement; (iii) Principles Relating to Protection during Displacement; (iv) Principles Relating to Humanitarian Assistance; and (v) Principles Relating to Return, Resettlement and Reintegration. Under the GPs, states have primary responsibility for protecting IDPs within their borders. Yet, the GPs also address the roles and responsibilities of international actors. For example, Principle 27 indicates that international humanitarian organizations and other appropriate actors should ‘give due regard to the protection needs and human rights’ of IDPs, and that they should ‘respect relevant international standards and codes of conduct’.

The publication of the GPs has been described as a ‘benchmark’¹⁹ and a ‘watershed event’²⁰ in IDP protection. Although technically a soft law instrument and not in themselves legally binding, most of the principles are based on existing international law. Moreover, the GPs have received widespread endorsement, with IOM itself noting that the GPs ‘reflect and are consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law’.²¹ At least 78 displacement affected states from all over the world have adopted national laws or policies on IDPs,²² many of which explicitly recognize or are based on the GPs. The GPs have also inspired the development of two regional treaties on internal displacement in Africa,²³ and they have been heralded as ‘the key international framework’ for the protection of the internally displaced by the UN General Assembly.²⁴ That is not to say the GPs are without limitations. For example, parts of the GPs, such as the prohibition on internal refoulement in Principle 15, appear to go further than existing hard law provisions.²⁵ This confuses and conflicts with the common assertion that the GPs simply reflect and reassert existing international law provisions.²⁶ The GPs are also limited in respect to durable solutions, most notably in their lack of an explicit IDP right to return.²⁷ Nevertheless, the GPs are the globally acknowledged blueprint for all actors addressing internal displacement, which thus justifies their use in this chapter as an analytical lens through which to critique IOM’s work on internal displacement.

Despite the introduction of the GPs in 1998, internal displacement remains a major global challenge. We are indeed now witnessing the highest number of IDPs on record. Numbering 55 million by the end of 2020,²⁸ IDPs can be found on almost every continent. Moreover, internal displacement is expected to rise even further in the future, particularly because of new and ongoing protracted conflicts that will likely displace millions of people, and the increased displacement anticipated as a result of disasters associated with the effects of climate change.²⁹ Internal displacement is therefore a multi-causal issue that is set to become even more significant in the coming years. It is precisely for this reason that it is important to appraise to what extent IOM’s policies and frameworks integrate the GPs, and to what extent IOM abides by the GPs in practice.

12.3 IOM’s Justification for Its Activities with Internally Displaced Persons

Even though IOM is one of the largest global actors on IDP issues, it does not actually have an explicit legal mandate to protect the rights of migrants, let alone the rights of IDPs. Rather, IOM’s Constitution tasks it with facilitating orderly migration flows generally. The IOM Constitution has been described as ‘permissive’ because it allows IOM to provide assistance without limiting the categories of persons with whom it engages, or the forms of assistance it provides.³⁰

IOM has defined the term ‘migrant’ broadly, encompassing ‘any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of stay is’.³¹ As such, this definition includes IDPs as persons of concern to IOM. Specifically, it is broad enough to include all IDPs described as such by the GPs, that is

persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.³²

IOM’s permissive Constitution has allowed the organization to strategically position itself as a ‘jack of all trades’,³³ filling key gaps in the international humanitarian system. IOM is involved in a wide variety of activities with IDPs ranging from providing shelter and aid packages in crisis situations, to facilitating IDP evacuations and return processes, transport and logistics, and addressing displaced persons’ housing and property concerns. More recently, it jointly designed and prepared the UN High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement (with UNHCR and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)).

While IOM’s activities span a very broad range, it has also carved out distinctive niches in particular areas. For example, IOM has played a significant role in responding to disaster-induced displacement. As Hall’s chapter in this volume indicates, IOM has conducted extensive research and facilitated discussions on displacement associated with the effects of climate change,³⁴ and has taken on major operational roles in post-disaster displacement crises.³⁵ IOM has also developed disaster risk reduction and management initiatives intended to prevent large-scale and protracted displacement linked to natural hazards,³⁶ convened policy discussions on displacement linked to the effects of climate change,³⁷ and also provides training on how to use the GPs.³⁸ It was involved in many high-profile disaster situations including the 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iraq; and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.³⁹

IOM’s role as a global leader in disaster situations is solidified by its participation in the ‘cluster approach’ to international coordination in humanitarian crises, including in relation to internal displacement. The cluster approach focuses on nine different areas of humanitarian response, with each assigned a ‘cluster lead’. The cluster lead sets out the needs for the relevant situation as well as organizes planning, coordination and reporting. It is the first port of call and the provider of last resort in respect of each individual operation in which the system is applied. Within the cluster approach, UNHCR and IOM are co-leads of the Camp Coordination and Camp Management cluster (CCCM), with UNHCR leading in conflicts and IOM leading in disasters. In taking on this role, IOM saw itself as a ‘key and consistent actor within this collective [i.e. cluster] response’.⁴⁰ It crystallized IOM’s influential position in the humanitarian system, which it has leveraged to facilitate further growth and influence, making IOM among the largest humanitarian agencies in disaster settings. Within the cluster approach, IOM has responded to many high-profile disaster situations including the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, the 2017 Iraqi earthquake,⁴¹ and the 2019 Cyclone Idai in Mozambique.⁴² IOM’s role within the cluster approach will be further analysed in the case studies explored in Section 12.5.

IOM has also carved out a niche for itself as a major player in data collection in IDP situations, as set out in Koch’s chapter in this volume.⁴³ Specifically, it has developed the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM).⁴⁴ The DTM is:

[A] system to track and monitor displacement and population mobility. It is designed to regularly and systematically capture, process, and disseminate information to provide a better understanding of the movements and evolving needs of displaced populations whether on site or en route.⁴⁵

The DTM was initially developed in Iraq in 2004 where it was used to inform needs assessment and monitoring activities pertaining to the enormous IDP population created by the US invasion of Iraq and the subsequent widespread conflict.⁴⁶ Through the DTM, IOM identifies and counts people as IDPs. IOM also determines, in cooperation with states, when individuals are no longer counted in the DTM, consequently implying that they are no longer IDPs, at least in the eyes of IOM.

Although IOM’s ‘permissive’ Constitution has some strengths, allowing it to engage in the wide varieties of activities as outlined above, it has drawbacks. Taken in the context of its historical status outside the UN, its tendency to engage in a diverse range of activities and its project-based funding model, IOM’s permissive Constitution has led to considerable confusion about the organization’s mandate and, by extension, its obligations, accountability, and ethos. The following sections will provide some clarity on these matters in respect to IOM’s work on internal displacement, through the analytical lens of the GPs.

12.4 IOM Policies and the GPs

This section identifies the manner and extent to which IOM engages with the GPs in its policies and frameworks. It does so, first, by mapping explicit references to the GPs in pertinent IOM documents. Five IOM policies and frameworks form the basis of this analysis, spanning the early 2000s to the present day. We examine the: (i) 2002 document, ‘Internally Displaced Persons: IOM Policy and Activities’; (ii) 2012 Migration Crisis Operational Framework; (iii) 2015 IOM Humanitarian Policy – Principles for Humanitarian Action; (iv) 2016 Framework on the Progressive Resolution of Displacement Situations; and (v) 2017 Framework for Addressing Internal Displacement. These have been chosen because they are the principal documents guiding IOM’s global approach to mobility and humanitarian action as applies to internal displacement. Second, it presents a critique of the extent to which these IOM policies and frameworks promote, in letter and ethos, the durable solutions approach that is central to the GPs.⁴⁷ A focus on durable solutions is apt given the centrality of this issue in the GPs’ approach to resolving internal displacement and, as will be shown, ‘resolving’ internal displacement is core to much of IOM’s work in respect to internal displacement.

12.4.1 Explicit Engagement

The IOM Executive Committee first considered IOM policy and practice in respect to IDPs in May 1997.⁴⁸ At this time, the GPs were in a developmental phase. Nonetheless, IOM used themes drawn from the then draft GPs to shape its ‘general principles and operational guidelines’ on internal displacement.⁴⁹ In its 2002 document, ‘Internally Displaced Persons: IOM Policy and Activities’ (‘the 2002 IOM Policy and Activities’), IOM made a series of affirmatory statements and commitments in respect to the GPs. IOM here recognised that the GPs ‘consolidate into one document the relevant rights and norms and state them in a way as to be specifically relevant to the situation in internal displacement’,⁵⁰ and that the GPs ‘thus provide a practical tool for implementation and should be closely followed in all programmes benefiting IDPs, and in all attempts to address the issue of displacement’.⁵¹ Crucially, it then states that ‘IOM has undertaken to promote and respect the GPs in its work, and to disseminate them as widely as possible’,⁵² with the then IOM Emergency and Post-Conflict Unit⁵³ tasked with ‘ensuring that IOM project proposals are consistent with the Guiding Principles’.⁵⁴

Since 2002, and especially in the past decade, IOM has published a plethora of policies and frameworks, many of general application and one in particular that is specific to internal displacement. Much of this policy development came in part as a consequence of a far-reaching review by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) of IOM’s work in the field of humanitarian assistance.⁵⁵ In 2012, the IOM Council published its Member State-approved Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF).⁵⁶ The MCOF ‘provides a reference frame for IOM’s response to the mobility dimensions of crisis situations’.⁵⁷ It was ‘developed at the request of IOM Member States, pursuant to their growing interest in the migration consequences of crisis situations’.⁵⁸ The overarching intention of the MCOF is to ‘allow IOM to improve and systematize the way in which the Organization supports its Member States and partners to better respond to the assistance and protection needs of crisis-affected populations’.⁵⁹

The MCOF is underpinned by ‘the migration crisis approach’.⁶⁰ IOM explains this approach as being more holistic than that offered by existing migration frameworks, which, in its view, do not comprehensively cover ‘all patterns of mobility during crises’ or ‘all those on the move during crises’.⁶¹ IOM thus seeks through the MCOF ‘to complement systems that privilege certain categories of affected populations through a focus on the vulnerability of a variety of people on the move and the affected communities’.⁶² Within the MCOF, IOM identifies what it calls the ‘[m]ost relevant frameworks and modalities for cooperation’.⁶³ The list is extensive, with reference made to, inter alia, the IASC cluster approach and the UNHCR,⁶⁴ the 1951 Refugee Convention and its associated 1967 Protocol,⁶⁵ and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 on disaster risk reduction.⁶⁶ Yet, there is one glaring omission when the MCOF is viewed through the lens of internal displacement – there is no reference whatsoever to the GPs. This is despite, as discussed in Section 12.2, the GPs having been widely cited in international fora as the leading normative statement on minimum IDP protection and assistance standards.⁶⁷ Moreover, it is indeed highly curious to see the GPs neglected in the MCOF when the concept of a ‘migration crisis’ is intended to apply not only in cross-border contexts but also in relation to internal displacement⁶⁸ and, as discussed, IOM has advocated for the GPs to be ‘closely followed in all programmes benefiting IDPs, and in all attempts to address the issue of displacement’,⁶⁹ and has committed itself ‘to promote and respect the Guiding Principles in its work’.⁷⁰

This situation is then repeated in the 2015 IOM Humanitarian Policy – Principles for Humanitarian Action (‘the Principles for Humanitarian Action’).⁷¹ These Principles constitute ‘a key element of IOM’s efforts to prioritize policy development as part of its engagement to strengthen its humanitarian role’.⁷² They aim to ‘define IOM’s responsibilities vis-à-vis internationally agreed core humanitarian principles and to clarify its role at all levels’.⁷³ While the Principles for Humanitarian Action recognise IDPs (alongside refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons) as being ‘covered by dedicated international protection frameworks and norms’,⁷⁴ and while ‘internal movements’ explicitly feature in the series of ‘operating contexts’ presented,⁷⁵ at no point are the GPs mentioned. This is in contrast to international humanitarian law and refugee law, which feature throughout.

Although neither the MCOF nor the Principles for Humanitarian Action contain any explicit reference to the GPs, the 2016 Framework on the Progressive Resolution of Displacement Situations (‘the PRDS Framework’)⁷⁶ does, albeit only in endnotes. It ‘aims to guide IOM and inform its partners to frame and navigate the complexity of forced migration dynamics and support efforts to progressively resolve displacement situations’.⁷⁷ The PRDS Framework explicitly cites the GPs on two occasions. It does so first by simply identifying them as an existing IDP durable solutions framework.⁷⁸ Second, and more importantly, it states that IOM’s ‘key programmatic principles’ are inspired by, inter alia, the GPs, in recognition of these as a ‘key international framework’.⁷⁹

Lastly, in 2017, IOM published its Framework for Addressing Internal Displacement (‘the 2017 Framework’).⁸⁰ This goes one step further than the PRDS Framework by recognising the GPs as ‘the most important international framework for the protection of IDPs’.⁸¹ The 2017 Framework lays out three key ‘Principles of Engagement’ – (1) primary responsibility of States; (2) grounded in prevailing principles, policies, and practices; and (3) people-centred.⁸² In respect to the second principle, IOM commits to its programmes and activities on internal displacement being ‘in line with prevailing normative and legal frameworks, including international human rights law, international humanitarian law, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and relevant IASC-endorsed standards and practices’.⁸³ Additionally, the 2017 Framework asserts that it ‘consolidates its comprehensive and diverse programming on internal displacement’ under a series of operational objectives⁸⁴ that are ‘[i]n line with’ what it accurately identifies as the GPs’ goals. These are namely ‘to prevent conditions that might lead to internal displacement and to minimize its adverse effects when it does occur; to provide protection and assistance to IDPs during displacement; and to promote durable solutions’.⁸⁵ The 2017 Framework therefore not only contains several substantive and explicit references to the GPs but gives the GPs their due weight alongside other applicable frameworks. The 2017 Framework is indeed highly complimentary of the GPs, and respects that while the document itself is not legally binding, it nonetheless ‘consolidate[s] international legal norms found in existing treaties and conventions’.⁸⁶

Overall, despite the welcome publication of the 2017 Framework, it remains apparent that explicit reference and endorsement of the GPs is, despite promises made elsewhere, notably absent in key general (i.e. not IDP-exclusive) IOM policies and frameworks. Indeed, on the basis of this analysis alone, there is little evidence that IOM has, in the context of its internal policy-making processes, met its own commitment ‘to promote and respect the Guiding Principles in its work, and to disseminate them as widely as possible’.⁸⁷ However, this evidenced lack of explicit mention of the GPs does not necessarily mean that inconsistencies exist between IOM policies and frameworks and the content of the GPs. Equally, simply because there are references in support of the GPs in, for example, the 2017 Framework, does not guarantee that the content of such policies and frameworks is in accordance with the ethos and spirit of the GPs. Assessing whether IOM respects and ensures consistency with the GPs in its work requires a more substantive examination of the content of these documents, which is the focus of Section 12.4.2, and its field-based operations and approach, which is examined in Section 12.5.

12.4.2 Advancing the Pursuit of Durable Solutions?

This section will analyse the extent to which IOM’s policies and frameworks reveal an approach to resolving displacement that is compatible with the durable solutions approach laid out in the GPs, which has become the dominant approach internationally.

As outlined in Section 12.2 of this chapter, the GPs cover all phases of displacement. In respect to the post-displacement phase, Principle 28 is most relevant. Principle 28(1) states that ‘the primary duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily … or to resettle voluntarily’ lies with the competent authorities, with such authorities also expected to ‘endeavour to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled internally displaced persons’. Principle 28(2) then goes on to promote IDPs’ ‘full participation … in the planning and management of their return or resettlement and reintegration’.⁸⁸

Although the term ‘durable solutions’ does not feature in the GPs, the three durable solutions of ‘return, local integration in the locations where persons have been displaced, and resettlement in another part of the country’⁸⁹ are evident in Principle 28. In respect to return and resettlement, both of course explicitly feature. In respect to local integration, although there is no explicit mention of this in Principle 28, that return or resettlement be chosen voluntarily means IDPs cannot be forced, or in any way coerced, into further movement, whether onward or return, for the purpose of seeking a durable solution to their displacement. This therefore implicity includes local integration within the scope of Principle 28. Kälin confirms in the Annotations to the GPs that all three types of durable solution, including local integration, are indeed envisioned by the GPs.⁹⁰ It is also widely acknowledged, including by IOM,⁹¹ that the GPs endorse the three types of durable solutions, even if not explicitly or by that precise name.

The language of ‘durable solutions’ does feature in IOM policies and frameworks. For instance, in the MCOF and the Principles for Humanitarian Action, there is explicit mention of ‘advocating for’,⁹² ‘laying the foundations for’,⁹³ ‘allowing’⁹⁴ and ‘promoting’⁹⁵ durable solutions. While IOM itself does not unequivocally define ‘durable solutions’, it does refer, namely in the PRDS Framework⁹⁶ and the 2017 Framework,⁹⁷ to the three solutions of return, resettlement and local integration as featured in the GPs and elsewhere. Yet, despite this, it is nonetheless apparent that IOM policies tend towards supporting the mobility-related solutions of return and resettlement. For example, in the MCOF, although there are several references to ‘(re)integration support’,⁹⁸ these typically appear in the context of securing sustainable return.⁹⁹ ‘Local integration’ is in fact explicitly mentioned only once, and this is in respect to refugees.¹⁰⁰ This focus on return and resettlement is also implicit at other points throughout the MCOF, for example, in respect to health, when it is stated that IOM ‘provide[s] comprehensive migrant health-care and prevention services … at the pre-departure stage, during travel and transit and upon return’.¹⁰¹ It is additionally revealed by IOM’s promise to ‘improve living conditions of displaced persons and migrants in transit, by … advocating for durable solutions and ensuring organized closure and phase-out of camps’.¹⁰² This thus seemingly closes off any possibility of a ‘local integration’ durable solution to displacement in a camp-based setting, for instance, through the transformation of camps into permanent residential districts.

This mobility-centred approach is even more explicit in the 2016 PRDS Framework, which provides an intriguing insight into IOM’s approach and underlying ethos in respect to resolving displacement. The PRDS Framework expresses concern that ‘the growing complexity and unpredictability’ of migration crises ‘challenge[s] the versatility of the three traditional durable solutions – voluntary return and sustainable reintegration, sustainable settlement elsewhere and sustainable local integration’.¹⁰³ Indeed, the very existence of the PRDS Framework reveals unease on the part of IOM with the definition of a durable solution as presented by the IASC and/or the idea that the achievement of a durable solution is determinative of when displacement ends. The 2010 IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (‘IASC Framework’)¹⁰⁴ defines a durable solution, and thus the end of displacement, as ‘when IDPs no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement’.¹⁰⁵ The PRDS Framework instead proposes a ‘resilience-based approach’ aimed towards progressively resolving displacement situations.¹⁰⁶ As explained by IOM, ‘[m]obility can be a crucial component of resilience’,¹⁰⁷ thus, mobility lies at the core of the PRDS’ mission statement to ‘maximize opportunities that employ mobility strategies to foster the resilience of displaced populations’.¹⁰⁸ It is argued that the PRDS Framework therefore ‘embraces broader, more inclusive approaches which integrate mobility dimensions’,¹⁰⁹ and that as a framework it complements the three durable solutions of local integration, return and resettlement.¹¹⁰ Although a detailed critique of the PRDS Framework lies beyond the scope of this chapter, when viewed through the lens of the GPs, it is telling to see the weight given to mobility. Even though IOM asserts its approach as being complementary to the three durable solutions approach, the PRDS Framework says nothing that encourages or respects local integration as a possible solution to internal displacement. Moreover, it is concerning that, aside from IOM stating that it ‘recognizes those affected by crisis and displacement as central actors and agents in finding their own solutions’,¹¹¹ and calling in its PRDS key programmatic principles to ‘[s]upport the freedom of choice of affected persons to identify appropriate solutions…’,¹¹² the language of ‘voluntariness’ is noticeably sparse throughout.¹¹³

In sum, while the GPs and other associated frameworks embrace a durable solutions approach that views such solutions as not being exclusively mobility-related, IOM’s approach appears to favour mobility-related solutions to internal displacement. The PRDS Framework in particular articulates a view that is clearly critical of the durable solutions framework espoused by the GPs. This focus on mobility is perhaps understandable in the light of IOM’s own expertise.¹¹⁴ Indeed, the MCOF proclaims IOM’s ‘unique expertise in the transportation of beneficiaries in emergency (evacuation) and post-crisis (resettlement or return) situations’,¹¹⁵ and it is mentioned in the Principles for Humanitarian Action that ‘IOM Member States recognize IOM’s comparative advantage in addressing the mobility dimensions of crises’.¹¹⁶ It nonetheless calls into question the adherence of IOM policies and frameworks with the GPs, as well as IOM’s stated commitment to respect and ensure consistency with the GPs in its work.¹¹⁷

Even more importantly, however, it raises concerns in respect to voluntariness. Any imbalance in the emphasis placed on mobile and non-mobile means by which to resolve displacement risks undermining ‘free choice’ on the part of IDPs.¹¹⁸ A ‘free choice’ in this context draws legally binding force from the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose one’s residence, as articulated throughout international human rights law.¹¹⁹ To realise a ‘free choice’ requires the availability of feasible options¹²⁰ – a choice to return or resettle cannot be deemed freely-made when decided in the context of unbearable local conditions or when IDPs perceive local integration to not be an option. Moreover, the IASC Framework tells us that further movement, whether onward or return, by an already displaced individual is not required to resolve displacement.¹²¹ Indeed, to in any way coerce onward movement would be to subject IDPs to secondary displacement. It is therefore to some extent reassuring to see IOM caveat its embrace of mobility strategies to those that ‘suppose progression towards resolving displacement, while ensuring safety nets are in place to avoid potentially harmful mobility strategies’,¹²² which could for instance include coercion into smuggling. Extreme caution must nevertheless be taken to ensure that any institutional preference for mobility, even if based on a well-founded belief in the beneficial role that further movement can play in ultimately resolving displacement, does not undermine the paramount principle of voluntariness that lies at the heart of the durable solutions model.¹²³

Having established the extent to which IOM policies and frameworks explicitly refer to the GPs and reflect their durable solutions approach, this chapter now shifts the focus to IOM’s field-based practice. Specifically, Section 12.5 examines IOM’s in-country operations and approach to internal displacement in Haiti and Iraq, doing so once again through the analytical lens of the GPs.

12.5 Putting the GPs into Practice?

12.5.1 Experiences in Haiti

IOM has a long history of activities in Haiti. From 1994 onwards it was involved in a wide variety of activities including community stabilization, border management, responding to disasters such as Tropical Storm Jeanne and the massive flooding in Fonds-Verettes, and facilitating returns.¹²⁴ The focus of this section is on IOM’s 2010 response to the 7.0 magnitude earthquake that hit Haiti on 12 January 2010. This focus is justified for four main reasons. First, the disaster was enormous in scope – it killed more than 100,000 people, destroyed some 300,000 homes, and displaced over 1.5 million people into 1,555 camps at the peak of the crisis.¹²⁵ In fact, it was the worst disaster to hit the Western hemisphere in recorded history.¹²⁶ As such it has been widely studied and there are ample reports of IOM’s operations at that time.¹²⁷ Second, it represented one of IOM’s biggest ever missions – not only in Haiti but globally. At its peak, IOM had almost 100 international staff in Haiti and more than 600 Haitian employees, making it one of the largest teams in the earthquake zone.¹²⁸ Third, the Haitian operation was in response to a disaster, which, as set out in Section 12.3 is one of the major niches that has been carved out by IOM. Fourth, as aforementioned, many from the displaced population crowded into camps. Camp coordination and camp management in disaster contexts is IOM’s responsibility under the cluster system; hence IOM was the major player in Haiti at that time.

After the earthquake hit Haiti, IOM mobilised and began deploying resources within 24 hours.¹²⁹ IOM engaged in a wide variety of crisis response efforts including distributing shelters and ‘non-food items’, constructing emergency water and sanitation facilities, and responding to the autumn 2010 cholera outbreak.¹³⁰ Moreover, IOM was one of the largest recipients of funding in the entire international community’s response to the earthquake.¹³¹ However, its main activities focused on camp coordination/camp management and facilitating camp closures, activities in which its data collection and management work, thought the DTM, figured centrally. These two facets of IOM’s work in Haiti will be analysed in turn, with a view to determining to what extent IOM’s work abided by the GPs.

12.5.1.1 Camp Coordination and Camp Management

As cluster lead, IOM coordinated the actors working in the camps and attempted to manage the provision of basic services in the camps. The scale of IOM’s tasks in Haiti was colossal. As aforementioned, there were over 1.5 million IDPs living in 1,555 camps at the peak of the crisis. These camps varied enormously in size and logistics – ranging from massive sites at the airport to smaller clusters of tents on hillsides and crammed alongside flattened buildings. Conditions were dire, with residents struggling to find access to adequate water, food, sanitation, shelter, and security. In addition, IOM was responsible for coordinating the hundreds of NGOs and UN agencies working in the camps. However, the camp population did not represent Haiti’s total IDP population. Many displaced Haitians did not shelter in camps but pursued other options such as moving in with friends or family, and many of these people also needed assistance.¹³² Yet international actors and the Haitian government focused almost exclusively on camps, and this is where the most data collection happened.

IOM’s work in the camps was commendable in many respects. IOM teams carried out daily camp management operations making sure that basic services were provided, including distribution of non-food items; camp infrastructure improvement; referral of vulnerable cases to health and protection partners; support to statistical data collection; support to cholera response operations in camps; and emergency response (e.g. during Hurricane Tomas and several other storms).¹³³ In addition, IOM identified the protection of women, children, elderly people with special needs, and people with disabilities and health conditions as a priority within its relief strategy.¹³⁴ This approach aligns with Principle 4 of the GPs, which identifies such categories of individuals as meriting protection and assistance that takes account of their special needs.

Yet IOM’s focus on camp-based IDPs was problematic in three main respects. First, the camp-based focus gave the impression that to be an IDP, one must live in a camp.¹³⁵ Viewed from the perspective of the GPs, this is simply not true. The GPs’ description of IDPs sets out just one geographic limitation on who can be an IDP – they must not have crossed an international border. Hence an individual can, in principle, be an IDP regardless of where they find themselves in their state, be it within an IDP camp or elsewhere. In fact, not only did IOM focus on camps, but it also seemed to exclude smaller camps from its remit. As aforementioned, IOM’s DTM is its main tool for assessing IDP figures, which in turn plays a huge role in designing its IDP-related programmes. During IOM’s Haiti operations, very small or far-flung camps could slip under the DTM radar, leaving their residents with little aid (and those living outside the camps often with even less). Thus, IOM’s camp focus was criticised by the then UN Special Rapporteur on IDPs, Chaloka Beyani:

The Special Rapporteur makes the case for the need for a comprehensive profiling exercise for the overall displaced population, the location of those IDPs, both in and outside camps, and their specific needs. He considers the absence of such profiling and needs assessment (with disaggregated data) to be a handicap to formulating evidence-based, durable solutions, having regard to the causes and magnitude of internal displacement (i.e. the earthquake and other causes of displacement) and, most importantly, their consequences on the human rights of IDPs.¹³⁶

Second, although IOM’s lead role in the CCCM cluster might explain its focus on IDPs in camps, the cluster mandate does not limit the organization from assisting IDPs who live outside the camp environment. In addition, as set out in Sections 12.3 and 12.4, there is nothing in IOM’s mandate or in its policy documents that limits its role to camp-based IDPs. IOM could have assisted those in camps while at the same time offering assistance to the many IDPs who lived outside camps. Moreover, IOM’s focus on camp-based IDPs may have violated Principle 4 of the GPs, which states that the GPs shall be applied ‘without discrimination of any kind’, providing a non-exhaustive list of grounds for discrimination. Thus, IOM’s policy of conditioning much of its assistance based on residency in a camp not only misrepresented who is an IDP in Haiti but was also potentially discriminatory vis-à-vis non-camp-based IDPs.

12.5.1.2 Camp Closures

As outlined in Section 12.4, IDPs have achieved a durable solution when they ‘no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement’.¹³⁷ The GPs foresee three means by which a durable solution can be achieved: (1) return voluntarily, in safety and dignity, to their homes or places of habitual residence; (2) local integration; or (3) voluntary resettlement in another part of the country. Special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of IDPs in the planning and management of their return or resettlement.¹³⁸

It is important to acknowledge here that the concept of ‘durable solutions’ was particularly difficult to deploy in the context of the Haitian earthquake. This was because of the conditions in Haiti, and Port-au-Prince in particular, that preceded the earthquake. Many Haitians were extremely poor, and they often changed their places of residence because of massive tenure insecurity, high rents, and lack of accessible shelter. Against this background, understanding the meaning and application of the IDP concept and the idea of ‘durable solutions’ was a challenge for all humanitarian actors, including but not limited to IOM.¹³⁹

IOM’s approach to durable solutions focused predominantly on camp closures. As the emergency response wound down, IOM’s work shifted to shutting camps and supporting the progressive resolution of the IDP situation. Camp closures were pursued because of the dire conditions and/or lack of services in many camps and the fact that they were often erected on important public spaces, flood-prone areas and/or on private property.¹⁴⁰ In addition, the Haitian government was determined to see the camps closed and thus painted the camp-based IDPs as opportunists who wanted to take advantage of the aid system.¹⁴¹

IOM employed various approaches to facilitate camp closures, some of which arguably assisted former camp residents to find a durable solution. It helped displaced landowners who lost their homes by building temporary shelters on their properties.¹⁴² It also provided more modest support for the reconstruction of permanent homes, and its legal team attempted to mediate land disputes and support the negotiation of land tenure agreements.¹⁴³ Yet these initiatives left out the majority of IDPs without property on which to rebuild. The main mechanism by which IOM facilitated camp closures was the provision of a cash grant to former camp residents to support the cost of one year’s rental accommodation.¹⁴⁴ In many cases, the grant was supplemented by training and skills development programmes and other forms of (admittedly modest) reintegration assistance.¹⁴⁵

However, these approaches did not always assist IDPs to achieve durable solutions in practice. They helped some IDPs but for many these approaches did not enable durable solutions or even sustainable progress towards them. Given the high costs of rent in Haiti some did not want to leave the camp environment at all but were forced to do so.¹⁴⁶ Many of these IDPs could not secure rental accommodation and had to relocate to temporary settlements and/or buildings that were not structurally safe, with many living in worse conditions than they were in before the earthquake struck.¹⁴⁷

IOM’s approach towards durable solutions thus suffered from major shortfalls. By heralding camp closures as the yardstick by which to measure progress,¹⁴⁸ IOM seemed to lose focus on the actual outcomes for the IDPs themselves. In the words of Chaloka Beyani:

Durable solutions are reached only when the needs related to displacement no longer exist, which is a medium-to-long-term complex development-led process for all IDPs and not just those living in camps or sites. Therefore, the closure of camps by itself does not mean that durable solutions for IDPs have been found.¹⁴⁹

A more accurate indicator of progress would have been based on the durable solutions evident in the GPs: the numbers of individuals who had returned voluntarily to their homes, resettled voluntarily in another part of the country and/or integrated locally. In addition, the focus on the closure of camps as an indicator of whether displacement had ended entirely neglected the experiences of those who did not live in camps. Finally, the forced closure of the camps seems to have violated Principle 28 of the GPs, which emphasises that IDP return or resettlement must be voluntary. It might also have violated Principle 6 of the GPs which states that ‘every human being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence’. Rather than contribute to a durable solution, camp closures in many cases fuelled continued displacement.¹⁵⁰

To conclude, IOM should be credited for its swift response to the Haitian earthquake and its focus on particularly vulnerable IDPs. However, its focus on IDPs in camps was ‘practically and morally unsustainable’¹⁵¹ and its adherence to the GPs – particularly regarding who it considered to be an IDP and its approach to durable solutions – is unsatisfactory. As neatly summed up by Bradley:

[A]lthough IOM supports the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, in its data collection work in post-earthquake Haiti, IOM’s implementation of the Displacement Tracking Matrix focused predominantly on IDPs resident in camps. This perpetuated the perception that, despite the broader conceptualization of internal displacement in the Guiding Principles, IDPs in Haiti were simply those resident in camps, and that closing camps was tantamount to resolving the IDPs’ predicament.¹⁵²

Having examined IOM’s in-country operations and approach in the Haitian disaster setting, the next section will focus on internal displacement in conflict contexts by way of a case study of Iraq.

12.5.2 Experiences in Iraq

Forced displacement has been an enduring feature of Iraqi life for many decades.¹⁵³ Iraq has experienced several significant waves of displacement, both internal and cross-border.¹⁵⁴ These waves can perhaps be best categorised into three ‘epochs’.¹⁵⁵ Throughout the second half of the twentieth century and up to 2003, displacement was ‘an instrument of rule in the hands of Iraq’s Ba’athist regime’,¹⁵⁶ utilised to effect ethnic cleansing and ultimately strengthen State control over a disempowered population.¹⁵⁷ Post-2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein, displacements not only continued but expanded to cover the entire Iraqi State,¹⁵⁸ driven by intense sectarian fighting and generalised violence.¹⁵⁹ Most recently, unprecedented mass displacement was triggered by the advance of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the ensuing conflict against ISIL.¹⁶⁰ Internal displacement in Iraq thus contrasts with that in Haiti in several ways. Most important of these differences is that displacement in Iraq is predominantly a consequence of armed conflict, generalised violence, and political and religious persecution,¹⁶¹ rather than disaster induced. It is also important to note that the majority of IDPs in Iraq reside in non-camp, urban and peri-urban settings,¹⁶² within or alongside host communities.¹⁶³

The search for durable solutions in Iraq is complicated by several factors. First, Iraq faces ongoing insecurity and political instability. History shows that any cessation of hostilities and consequent reductions in internal displacement rates are often short-lived.¹⁶⁴ No sooner does one wave of displacement slow and people begin to rebuild their lives, then further waves commence, with individuals often displaced multiple times.¹⁶⁵ Second, displacement is not a single issue event in Iraq – its multiple displacement epochs are in many ways distinct in respect to their causes, yet they overlap temporally as displacement becomes protracted.¹⁶⁶ Third, displacement in Iraq is underpinned and exacerbated by ethnic and sectarian tensions, with the State having become increasingly fragmented along such lines.¹⁶⁷ Fourth, internal displacement is interwoven with the wider regional context. Displacement in Iraq cannot be viewed as distinct from, for example, the situation in Syria.¹⁶⁸ This is especially so given that many previous Iraqi refugees in Syria have been forced to return, yet, being unable to return to their former places of residence, are now internally displaced within Iraq.¹⁶⁹ Fifth, and finally, the Iraqi authorities have demonstrated an ambivalent attitude towards durable solutions other than return, particularly in respect to local integration. Despite an apparent shift in 2011 towards accepting settlement options other than return,¹⁷⁰ in 2016, the UN Special Rapporteur on IDPs reported ‘a lack of dialogue with or willingness on the part of the Government to pursue local integration, which it currently does not consider as a viable alternative to returns’.¹⁷¹ In 2020, IOM itself asserted that ‘the national [government] priority for durable solutions remains the return of IDPs’, and that coerced returns have occurred against this backdrop.¹⁷² Khedir has similarly argued that the ‘social integration of IDPs is by no means a government policy/priority’,¹⁷³ citing the absence of social integration from the mandates of relevant government institutions.¹⁷⁴ Khedir identifies this as being in part a consequence of an ‘ominously pervasive’ preference for return among authorities and host communities,¹⁷⁵ but also ‘an obvious lack of a policy concept and tradition of social integration in Iraq’.¹⁷⁶ Khedir notes fear of demographic change (and the associated impact this might have on election constituencies), security concerns, and the perceived economic burden of displacement on host locations all as reasons for such a strong focus on return.¹⁷⁷

IDPs’ durable solutions intentions have shifted markedly over time. According to IOM data, the number of IOM-assessed IDPs expressing a desire to integrate locally increased from 25% in 2006, to 37% in 2010, and then 44% in 2011.¹⁷⁸ In 2016, a survey of IDPs living with host families revealed that the vast majority of those surveyed, 97.6%, indicated that they intended to return.¹⁷⁹ The trend has seemingly since again reversed as, in 2019, the percentage of IDPs not intending to return in the short- and long-term was 90% and 70%, respectively.¹⁸⁰ IOM has found that intentions often depend upon, and shift with, the prevailing security situation, the availability of basic services, and the degree to which IDPs feel settled in their place of displacement.¹⁸¹

It is within this complex context that international organizations in Iraq operate. Alongside UNHCR, IOM performs a leading role in addressing internal displacement.¹⁸² Since commencing operations in 2003, IOM Iraq has established a presence in all 18 Iraqi governorates.¹⁸³ Its work extends across multiple diverse areas, broadly categorised under the headings of humanitarian emergencies and operations, recovery and community stabilisation, migration management, and migration and displacement data.¹⁸⁴ In respect to the latter, IOM’s DTM is recognised as the primary means by which to track displacement movements in Iraq.¹⁸⁵ Aside from the DTM, IOM Iraq has invested substantial energy into internal displacement research. This includes empirical work to measure IDP needs and intentions in respect to durable solutions,¹⁸⁶ and to ‘better understand the progress IDPs are making toward durable solutions and the end of displacement among IDPs’.¹⁸⁷

Viewing this activity through the lens of the GPs and the framing of durable solutions, it is evident that operationally – as in Haiti – IOM is predominantly concerned with returns. This manifests itself in two main ways. First, assisted voluntary return and reintegration activities are at the core of IOM’s migration management work stream.¹⁸⁸ Since 2016, IOM has chaired the Returns Working Group (RWG), which has ‘invested considerably’ in sustaining IDP return levels in Iraq.¹⁸⁹ The RWG develops guidance, policies and operational recommendations for governorates affected by returns; provides technical advice to support the implementation of IDP returns; and determines to what extent returnees have, in its view, achieved durable solutions. Second, since 2007, the DTM has recorded not only instances of displacement as they occur, but also IDP and refugee returns.¹⁹⁰ The DTM includes a sophisticated returns dashboard that records numbers of returnees, disaggregated and ranked by, inter alia, location, time period and shelter category.¹⁹¹ In contrast to this dedicated work on returns, local integration is not core to IOM Iraq’s functions or expertise. Moreover, while the DTM tracks return, the same cannot be said for other means by which to achieve a durable solution, including local integration.

This is not, however, to say that IOM Iraq is exclusively concerned with returns. In 2013, for example, IOM Iraq partnered with the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement to conduct research into the experience of IDP integration.¹⁹² This research sought to provide ‘a fresh look into the issues pertinent to the integration of IDPs in Iraq’, by ‘explor[ing] the causes and effects of displacement and integration, so that the perceived benefits can be exploited and the barriers to integration identified and mitigated’.¹⁹³ The research drew upon pertinent international standards on durable solutions, including the IASC Framework, in its analysis. This is important because conceptualising local integration through the lens of the IASC Framework demonstrates support for local integration as a valid means by which to achieve a durable solution.¹⁹⁴ The research concluded with a clear statement in support of local integration, that it is ‘of critical importance that the Government of Iraq and the international community redouble their efforts to help facilitate local integration’.¹⁹⁵ More recently, IOM Iraq has conducted further research into local integration as a durable solution in Iraq. This includes a 2019 study in the Sulaymaniyah and Baghdad Governorates, titled ‘Reasons to Remain’;¹⁹⁶ and the 2020 study, ‘Cities as Home’, which examined conditions and prospects for local integration across several localities in Iraq.¹⁹⁷ In 2021, IOM Iraq unequivocally recognised that a durable solution can be achieved through ‘integration in locations of displacement’.¹⁹⁸

This embrace of the IASC Framework and local integration as a means by which to achieve a durable solution is also evident in ongoing IOM Iraq research. Since 2016, IOM Iraq has partnered with Georgetown University to conduct a longitudinal mixed-method study, titled ‘Access to Durable Solutions among IDPs in Iraq’ (‘the IOM-GU study’).¹⁹⁹ This research involves tracking 4,000 Iraqi IDP households, all of whom were displaced by ISIL to non-camp settings between January 2014 and December 2015, over several years.²⁰⁰ The purpose of the research is to understand how these households progress towards achieving a durable solution to their displacement.²⁰¹ It does this by ‘examining the ways in which Iraqis themselves seek durable solutions’,²⁰² using data collected through quantitative surveys and interviews with IDPs, host communities, relevant authorities, and others.²⁰³ The IOM-GU study ‘relies on [the IASC Framework] as an analytical frame for assessing IDPs’ access to durable solutions in Iraq’.²⁰⁴ This is an explicit recognition of the IASC Framework as ‘the principal point of reference for understanding the process of achieving durable solutions’,²⁰⁵ and ‘the primary international standard for supporting and assessing durable solutions’.²⁰⁶ The study’s findings are presented against each of the eight durable solutions assessment criteria outlined in the IASC Framework.²⁰⁷

Yet, it would be erroneous to conclude that IOM Iraq’s approach towards durable solutions fully aligns with that found in the IASC Framework. Even in respect to IOM Iraq’s research into local integration, a preference for return still filters through. For instance, within the 2013 research on barriers to integration, a tendency remains towards conceptualising and thus implicity promoting return as the primary means by which to achieve a durable solution in Iraq. The report does this through its framing of local integration as an option that is secondary to return. This is especially evident when it states:

IDPs are not able to consider return as a safe option and a means of achieving a durable solution to their displacement because the security conditions do not allow this. Those that remain displaced are left with two remaining options. The intentions of the displaced are now, predominantly, to integrate.²⁰⁸

This perspective on local integration contrasts with the IASC Framework approach, which unequivocally espouses the equality of all three means by which to achieve a durable solution. It also fails to recognise that any decision to pursue a durable solution by a particular means can only be considered voluntary if IDPs have a real choice between all three options. It is nonetheless positive to see the views of those affected by displacement at the core of IOM Iraq’s research, particularly the ongoing IOM-GU study. This reveals respect within IOM Iraq’s research activities for the principle of voluntary choice and for the active participation of IDPs themselves in the pursuit of durable solutions to their displacement, as well as learning being guided by IDPs as experts in their own experience. It remains to be seen whether this approach as manifest in IOM Iraq’s recent research outputs will feed into practice on the ground.

In sum, IOM Iraq evidently embraces durable solutions, including local integration, in its research activities, yet its operations remain predominantly concerned with return. This reflects IOM’s traditional expertise in managed mobility. When viewed through the lens of the durable solutions approach, the conceptual shift initiated by the GPs and made explicit in the IASC Framework has thus far not been fully realised in IOM’s in-country operations on internal displacement, in either Iraq or Haiti. In other words, its actual implementation of durable solutions in practice is limited. It is of course true and right to acknowledge that IOM, as an international organization, cannot alone achieve durable solutions for IDPs – indeed, the primary responsibility for doing so remains with States. IOM nonetheless has the ability and the means by which to influence States. Yet, IOM has to date often been highly deferential and reluctant to actively push States on human rights principles. It is time for IOM to use its, perhaps uniquely close, working relationship with States to positively pursue durable solutions in the States in which it operates. This is especially important given that IOM is no longer, if ever it was, a small, niche operator – as argued at the beginning of this chapter, IOM might very well be the major player in the international community’s response to internal displacement. Relatedly, IOM’s responsibility extends to all IDPs regardless of their relative mobility.

12.6 Conclusion

IOM has obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law, many of which are reflected in the GPs. There are limited channels available to ensure that IOM is compliant with these obligations, including in relation to its responses to IDPs and particularly vis-à-vis the struggle to achieve durable solutions to internal displacement. It is therefore particularly important that the academic community scrutinises the extent to which IOM engages with the GPs both in principle and in practice.

This chapter has taken the first important steps in addressing this gap in the research. Its central argument is that IOM’s activities are inconsistent in many ways with both the letter and ethos of the GPs. For example, some of IOM’s policies and frameworks not only neglect to refer to the GPs but are also inconsistent with the GPs in terms of content. Inconsistencies also exist between the GPs and IOM’s operations in practice, as evidenced by IOM’s almost exclusive camp-based focus in Haiti and its predominant preference for return as a durable solution to internal displacement in both Haiti and Iraq. IOM’s future policies and frameworks need to make explicit reference to the GPs, which should in turn feed into how these policies and frameworks are implemented on the ground.

It is difficult to understand why IOM pays such little attention to the GPs. This may stem from a lack of external pressure on IOM; IOM’s lack of a formal protection mandate for IDPs; the fact that the GPs are technically a non-binding, soft law document; and/or practical difficulties faced by IOM, for example in contexts where the State vocally prefers returns. The reasons behind why IOM has not substantially engaged with the GPs are outside the scope of this chapter and remain important questions for further research. It is indeed hoped that this chapter is just the beginning of a new conversation of IOM’s engagement with the GPs and of its substantial role in internal displacement contexts worldwide.