Book contents
- Interpreting Duns Scotus
- Interpreting Duns Scotus
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Notes on contributors
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 John Duns Scotus’s life in context
- Chapter 2 The modal framework of Duns Scotus’s argument for the existence of a first cause
- Chapter 3 Duns Scotus on essential order in De Primo Principio and elsewhere
- Chapter 4 Duns Scotus on how God causes the created will’s volitions
- Chapter 5 Duns Scotus on free will and human agency
- Chapter 6 Duns Scotus on the dignities of human nature
- Chapter 7 Duns Scotus on matter and form
- Chapter 8 Duns Scotus, intuitionism, and the third sense of ‘natural law’
- Chapter 9 The bounds of sense: adequacy and abstraction in the later works of Duns Scotus
- Chapter 10 Before univocity: Duns Scotus’s rejection of analogy
- Chapter 11 Analogy after Duns Scotus: the role of the analogia entis in the Scotist metaphysics at Barcelona, 1320–1330
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 10 - Before univocity: Duns Scotus’s rejection of analogy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 December 2021
- Interpreting Duns Scotus
- Interpreting Duns Scotus
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Notes on contributors
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 John Duns Scotus’s life in context
- Chapter 2 The modal framework of Duns Scotus’s argument for the existence of a first cause
- Chapter 3 Duns Scotus on essential order in De Primo Principio and elsewhere
- Chapter 4 Duns Scotus on how God causes the created will’s volitions
- Chapter 5 Duns Scotus on free will and human agency
- Chapter 6 Duns Scotus on the dignities of human nature
- Chapter 7 Duns Scotus on matter and form
- Chapter 8 Duns Scotus, intuitionism, and the third sense of ‘natural law’
- Chapter 9 The bounds of sense: adequacy and abstraction in the later works of Duns Scotus
- Chapter 10 Before univocity: Duns Scotus’s rejection of analogy
- Chapter 11 Analogy after Duns Scotus: the role of the analogia entis in the Scotist metaphysics at Barcelona, 1320–1330
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This essay considers Duns Scotus’s arguments against the so-called semantic analogy—the view according to which a term can signify two or more things according to relations of priority and posteriority. It argues that this view was commonly adopted in Paris but was rejected by a group of late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century English thinkers, which included Duns Scotus. Since supporters of semantic analogy held that ‘being’ was the foremost example of a term signifying according to priority and posteriority, the implications of this debate on metaphysics are profound. This essay's conclusion is that Duns Scotus’s rejection of semantic analogy should be considered as preliminary to his famous claim that being is a univocal concept.
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- Interpreting Duns ScotusCritical Essays, pp. 204 - 222Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022