Book contents
- The International Criminal Responsibility of War’s Funders and Profiteers
- The International Criminal Responsibility of War’s Funders and Profiteers
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Financiers and Profiteers after World War II
- 1 Economic Aggression
- 2 Forced Labour and Norwegian War Profiteers in the Legal Purges after World War II
- 3 Economic Protectionism
- Part II Arms Fairs and ‘Flying Money’
- Part III Developing the Available Law
- Part IV Where Should the Buck Stop?
- Part V Criminal Accountability and Beyond
- Part VI Discovering and Recovering the Profits of War
- Index
3 - Economic Protectionism
Economic Policy and the Choice of Targets in International Criminal Tribunals
from Part I - Financiers and Profiteers after World War II
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2020
- The International Criminal Responsibility of War’s Funders and Profiteers
- The International Criminal Responsibility of War’s Funders and Profiteers
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Financiers and Profiteers after World War II
- 1 Economic Aggression
- 2 Forced Labour and Norwegian War Profiteers in the Legal Purges after World War II
- 3 Economic Protectionism
- Part II Arms Fairs and ‘Flying Money’
- Part III Developing the Available Law
- Part IV Where Should the Buck Stop?
- Part V Criminal Accountability and Beyond
- Part VI Discovering and Recovering the Profits of War
- Index
Summary
International law resides at the confluence of law and politics and though it is guided by judicial judgement, it is particularly sensitive to political whim. Perceived economic interests are key to understanding the political motivations in international decision-making. In the UN model underof the Charter, international criminal law, and more specifically target selection for international criminal prosecutions, has been prejudicially skewed by economic/trade considerations. This chapter argues that target selection by the UN Security Council has historically been latently vetted according to economic considerations, inter alia, in a way that is unjust, and counter-productive to deterrence-based rationales. It further argues that the International Criminal Court, as a treaty-based body, is comparatively immune to most economic influences, at least by degree, and represents a positive evolution in the unbiased dispensation of international criminal justice. In support of this hypothesis this chapter reviews the target selection of UN based prosecutions (ad hoc and hybrid) and compares them to other grave situations not chosen for prosecution to conclude the determinative economic basis of target selection. It further iterates a comparison to ICC prosecutions where the independent court has initiated prosecutions in situations where the UN dared not to tread.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020