Rights-Protecting iCourts: The Curious Case of the <span class='italic'>OP-ICESCR</span>

doi:10.1017/9781108590396.007

5 - Rights-Protecting iCourts: The Curious Case of the OP-ICESCR

from Part I

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 June 2018

Benjamin Perryman

Edited by

Marlene Wind

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Marlene Wind: Affiliation:
University of Copenhagen

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Summary

Principal-Agent theory predicts that States will only create international courts where the benefits exceed the costs. Recently, a small number of States empowered a quasi-judicial body to receive and adjudicate economic, social and cultural rights complaints under a new Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This is a surprising occurrence given the highly contested nature of these rights and the unclear benefits that enure to States from this regime. This chapter reviews and applies Principal-Agent theory to the Optional Protocol, finding that the theory explains some of its features but not its creation. The chapter argues that the creation of the Optional Protocol is the result of three interrelated global phenomena: (1) the proliferation of international courts, (2) the widespread adoption of constitutional review and (3) the increased acceptance of economic, social and cultural rights. These phenomena are mutually reinforcing and function to socialise key legal specialists within States who are responsible for assessing the benefits and costs of international court creation, resulting in an increased willingness to accept rights-protecting international courts. This socialisation process is thus crucial for understanding how and why international courts have an impact on domestic political and legal systems.

Type: Chapter
Information: International Courts and Domestic Politics , pp. 117 - 138

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108590396.007 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2018

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