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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Gretchen Helmke
Affiliation:
University of Rochester, New York
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Institutions on the Edge
The Origins and Consequences of Inter-Branch Crises in Latin America
, pp. 165 - 176
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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References

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  • Bibliography
  • Gretchen Helmke, University of Rochester, New York
  • Book: Institutions on the Edge
  • Online publication: 20 January 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139031738.009
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  • Bibliography
  • Gretchen Helmke, University of Rochester, New York
  • Book: Institutions on the Edge
  • Online publication: 20 January 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139031738.009
Available formats
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  • Bibliography
  • Gretchen Helmke, University of Rochester, New York
  • Book: Institutions on the Edge
  • Online publication: 20 January 2017
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139031738.009
Available formats
×