Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Machines as Persons?
- The Importance of Being Human
- Response to McNaughton
- Response to Diamond
- Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind
- Personal Identity and Brain Transplants
- Personal Identity and the Idea of a Human Being
- Imagination and the Sense of Identity
- Radical Critique, Scepticism and Commonsense
- Getting the Subject back into the World: Heidegger's Version
- Incarnational Anthropology
- How Many Selves Make Me?
- Sartre and Our Identity as Individuals
- Bibliography
- Notes on Contributors
- Index
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Machines as Persons?
- The Importance of Being Human
- Response to McNaughton
- Response to Diamond
- Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind
- Personal Identity and Brain Transplants
- Personal Identity and the Idea of a Human Being
- Imagination and the Sense of Identity
- Radical Critique, Scepticism and Commonsense
- Getting the Subject back into the World: Heidegger's Version
- Incarnational Anthropology
- How Many Selves Make Me?
- Sartre and Our Identity as Individuals
- Bibliography
- Notes on Contributors
- Index
Summary
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- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Human Beings , pp. i - iiPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991