5 - The Content of the Action

Summary

In this concluding chapter, I will pursue two questions. First (in Section 5.1), I look at the statements in which Hegel addresses the content of actions. My underlying thesis is that Hegel's connection of “intention” and “welfare” is plausible even if one is not ready to go along with the speculative transition from form to content. As I discussed in the last chapter, Hegel provides, with his analysis of “intention,” the action-theoretic basis that enables him to unfold the freedom of action that is normally called instrumental or means-end rationality. I take as my starting point the claim that this freedom belongs to the concept of attributable action. Since the issue at hand is Hegel's theory of action, in this first section I only interpret those concepts that Hegel deems necessary to the concept of action. I will therefore not discuss the fact that with these concepts Hegel also depicts and grounds a certain conception of ethics – namely, the doctrine of happiness.

The second question I will discuss in this chapter is the connection of rational action and the moral attitude. I have already argued (in Chapter 3) that in the Morality chapter, Hegel not only unfolds his concept of action, but also develops his interpretation of moral philosophy. The question remains open as to whether Hegel asserts an analytic connection between the concept of morality and his concept of action.