4 - The epistemology of meaning and the analysis of meaning

Summary

For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be explained [erklaeren] thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained [erklaeren] by pointing to its bearer.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, no. 43

INTRODUCTION

There are a variety of issues associated with the metaphysics of meaning. At least, many of the following questions will strike readers as familiar: Are there facts about meaning? Are there such entities as meanings? If so, what sort of entities are they? What sorts of facts, if any, do facts about meaning supervene upon? How are claims about meaning to be analyzed? By virtue of what do words and sentences have the particular meanings that they do? What is the relationship between semantic facts and non-semantic facts?

In the remainder of this book we fulfill our promise to explore metaphysical issues about meaning. As we move from the project of describing the function of meaning discourse to that of engaging directly with metaphysical issues, we are hopeful that our discussion thus far will shed some light on those issues, yet we should not expect too tight a connection between the metaphysics and socio-linguistic practice. In that regard we question in this chapter a pervasive assumption relating to our list of metaphysical questions.