Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Theorems
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Frustrated Majorities, Issue Intensity, and Political Action
- Part II Argument: an Intensity Theory of Electoral Competition
- 3 Sketching a Theory of Intensity and Electoral Competition
- 4 Theory and Model Results: Issue Intensity, Costly Action, and Minority Representation
- 5 Model Extensions: Varying Size of the Minority, the Free-Rider Problem, and Social Welfare
- Part III Evidence: Empirical Patterns and Intensity Theory
- Part IV Conclusions
- Part V Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
- Other books in the series
5 - Model Extensions: Varying Size of the Minority, the Free-Rider Problem, and Social Welfare
from Part II - Argument: an Intensity Theory of Electoral Competition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 September 2022
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Theorems
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Frustrated Majorities, Issue Intensity, and Political Action
- Part II Argument: an Intensity Theory of Electoral Competition
- 3 Sketching a Theory of Intensity and Electoral Competition
- 4 Theory and Model Results: Issue Intensity, Costly Action, and Minority Representation
- 5 Model Extensions: Varying Size of the Minority, the Free-Rider Problem, and Social Welfare
- Part III Evidence: Empirical Patterns and Intensity Theory
- Part IV Conclusions
- Part V Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
- Other books in the series
Summary
In this chapter I explore three extensions to the mathematical model presented in Chapter 4. First, I show that the results do not depend upon the balance of minority to majority assumed in Chapter 4. Instead, at any ratio of majority to minority size, candidates might side with an intense minority over a less-intense majority. Candidates do not, however, side with any intense minority, siding only with those of a sufficient combination of size and intensity. Second, I consider the free-rider problem in large electorates. I discuss a modification to the mathematical model where increasing the size of the electorate does not prevent some voters from choosing to incur costly political action. Finally, I consider the social welfare implications of intensity theory showing that utilitarian welfare can sometimes be higher with frustrated majorities and costly political action than under simple majority rule.
Keywords
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- Chapter
- Information
- Frustrated MajoritiesHow Issue Intensity Enables Smaller Groups of Voters to Get What They Want, pp. 85 - 96Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022