Chapter 3 - From diplomacy to trade: 1955–1958

Summary

We are not of the opinion that we must conduct a political policy for the sake of business. [Eastern] markets are political markets. How we shape our relations is a political and not an economic question.

Heinrich von Brentano, 1956

We would rather go down in the dust than make political concessions to capitalists. I can say to all who combine trade with political concessions that they will be eaten by worms before we will crawl to them.

Nikita Khrushchev, 1964

The international situation immediately following Adenauer's visit to the USSR was not auspicious for the development of Soviet–West German relations. The Geneva meeting of the foreign ministers of the Big Four in October proved to be yet another “exercise in public relations” at which contacts seemed good on a superficial level. Adenauer and his government realized, however, that beneath the declarations of good intent, the Russians were as uncompromising as ever on the issue of German reunification. The deadlock over the future of Germany was complete. The Suez crisis and the Soviet intervention in Hungary in the autumn of 1956 marked the conclusive end to the period of the Geneva thaw.

The FRG, now firmly ensconced as a member of NATO, continued to assert its commitment to German reunification while reintroducing conscription and taking measures to strengthen its integration into the Western bloc.

Although the main priority of Khrushchev's German policy was the continued stability of the Ulbricht regime, he began to pursue a more active policy toward the FRG.