Book contents
- Free Will and the Brain
- Free Will and the Brain
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Contributors
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Conceptual issues
- Part III Mental capacities and disorders of the will
- Part IV Neural circuitry and modification of the will
- Part V Legal implications of neuroscience
- 12 Neurobiology collides with moral and criminal responsibility: the result is double vision
- 13 Neuroscience, free will, and criminal responsibility
- Index
- References
13 - Neuroscience, free will, and criminal responsibility
from Part V - Legal implications of neuroscience
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2015
Edited by
Book contents
- Free Will and the Brain
- Free Will and the Brain
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Contributors
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Conceptual issues
- Part III Mental capacities and disorders of the will
- Part IV Neural circuitry and modification of the will
- Part V Legal implications of neuroscience
- 12 Neurobiology collides with moral and criminal responsibility: the result is double vision
- 13 Neuroscience, free will, and criminal responsibility
- Index
- References
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Free Will and the BrainNeuroscientific, Philosophical, and Legal Perspectives, pp. 251 - 286Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015
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